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A Note on Terms 
  
VIỆT NAM:  Throughout this thesis, I have chosen to use the Vietnamese spelling of “Việt 
Nam” as the default to which to refer to the country, unless I am explicitly referencing an 
American conceptualization, such as the “Vietnam War,” “South Vietnam,” or the “Republic of 
Vietnam.”   Furthermore, I acknowledge that “Việt Nam” is a temporally contingent 
construction; the space has gone through many name changes and identities through history; thus 
at times I may use the term “Việt Nam” when it is not quite historically accurate.  However, 
unless I am expounding on a particular historically grounded space—such as the Nam Việt 
Kingdom—I will use the name “Việt Nam” as a default in order to retain narrative coherency. 
 
SECOND INDOCHINA WAR:  “Second Indochina War” is the term that historians prefer to 
use to identify the conflict in Southeast Asia that began in the late 1950s and ended with the Fall 
of Sài Gòn in 1975.  Because it is considered the most “politically neutral” term—a neutrality 
that in and of itself should be problematized and questioned—I will use it as the default term for 
this chapter, unless I am referring specifically to the American perspective—in which I will use 
the “Vietnam War”—or the North Vietnamese perspective—the in which I will use “Chiến 
Tranh Chống Mỹ Cứu Nước,” “War to Save the Nation Against the Americans.” 
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Chapter 1 
In the Beginning: Absence and Excess 
 
 
 
“The struggle of man against power  
is the struggle of memory against forgetting.”1 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 War displaces people.  Refugees flee from their homelands to escape death and violence.  
But war displaces memory as well.  War is a gaping wound in the psyche’s conceptualization of 
the past.  Different agents seek to heal this wound—to fill this hole—in different ways.  Others 
leave the wound alone; they bury it in silence and hope it fades away. 
 This is a story that starts in silence.  With a hole in memory—suddenly found, then 
painstakingly filled.  This is a story about Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.   But it is also a story of how I 
found Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn; of how he started as a displaced family memory, wrapped in 
silence; of how I then pieced together the fragmented narratives to reconstruct a multifaceted 
portrait—a portrait that reflects a struggle for control over the past. 
 
                                                
1 Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting (New York: Knopf, 1981), 3. 
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 Who was Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn?  He was born in Rạch Giá, Việt Nam in 1938; served in 
the South Vietnamese army—the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)—during the 
Second Indochina War; and was publicly executed by the Communist forces on August 14, 1975, 
after refusing to surrender.  Beyond that, it depends on whom you ask.  To the current 
Communist government of Việt Nam, whose historical narrative of national unity against foreign 
invasion denies the legitimacy of South Vietnam, he is a political traitor.  To the American state, 
who conceptualizes the Vietnam War as a struggle between the U.S. and the Communists, he is a 
forgotten subject.  To patriotic South Vietnamese veterans in the diaspora, who push back 
against these state imposed narratives of “organized forgetting,” he is hero. 2  To Colonel Hồ 
Ngọc Cẩn’s family members, most of whom live in Việt Nam, he is a loved a one.  To me, he is 
a grand-uncle.  But I did not know of his fame—of his story—until I was twenty-one. 
 I came to this project obliquely, through another project in which I was interviewing my 
grandmother, Hồ Ngọc Hoa Taylor, about her life both in Việt Nam and the United States.  It 
was summer 2011.  We were sitting in my grandmother’s living room in Oceanside, California.  
I was perched behind a video camera, asking my grandmother questions about her past.  She 
answered in a surprisingly open manner.  She told me stories she never had the space or occasion 
to tell me before.  One of these stories concerned her brother, Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  She was 
sad that she had left Việt Nam before he was executed, and thus never had a chance to say 
goodbye.  She cried in front of the camera.  At the end she mentioned that Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn 
was famous; he had a following on YouTube. 
 Her parting comment did not stand out to me in the moment.  It wasn’t until several 
months later, when I was going through the video footage in the post-production phase, that I   
                                                
2 Marita Sturken, Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1997), 7. 
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re-stumbled upon my grandmother’s insistence on her brother’s fame and decided to look him up 
online.  I was surprised at the abundance of information that popped up. 
 It was a jarring moment of simultaneous absence and excess, of silence and cacophony. 
As I watched the YouTube videos praising Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, I felt like I was staring into 
the face of a ghost that I hadn’t known haunted my family—haunted me—until now.  I was 
struck by my ignorance of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  If he was so famous, why hadn’t I known 
about him until now?  Why the silence surrounding his memory—his absence from my psyche—
given the wealth of information online?  And why was he so famous in the first place?  What did 
it all mean?      
 These were the questions that sparked this project, whose purpose is not necessarily to 
reconstruct a factual account of Colonel Cẩn’s life, but rather to examine the conflicting 
narrative constructions and memory productions surrounding this controversial figure.  This is a 
personal project.  But it is a political and academic project as well—a project that has larger 
implications for the field of history and cultural memory studies.  Researching Colonel Hồ Ngọc 
Cẩn, I grappled with the following questions: Who has the power to write history?  How do 
stateless peoples archive their own history?  What is the relationship between history and cultural 
memory?  How is cultural memory embodied and enacted?  How do cultural memory practices 
both challenge and constitute “official” history and nationalist discourse?  What is the nature and 
use of a politics haunted by ghosts and oriented towards the past? 
 Thus I place my project in conversation with the existing literature theorizing “history” 
and “cultural memory,” drawing most heavily from the work of Pierre Nora, Hue-Tam Ho Tai, 
Lisa Yoneyama, Marita Sturken, and Avery Gordon.  In “Between Memory and History: Les 
Lieux de Mémoire,” Pierre Nora draws a sharp distinction between memory and history:  
 7 
Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name.  It remains in 
permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, 
unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and 
appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived.  
History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and 
incomplete, of what is no longer.3   
 
Nora theorizes an antagonistic relationship between history and memory, claiming that “History 
is perpetually suspicious of memory, and its true mission is to suppress and destroy it.”4  In the 
introduction to The Country of Memory: Remaking the Past in Late Socialist Vietnam, Hue-Tam 
Ho Tai also outlines the differences and similarities between history and memory: “Unlike 
history, memory is not weighed by the need to unify the past, and its production is proceeding at 
a faster pace than the rewriting of history.  Yet memory does not exist without reference to 
history.  The unmooring of the historical past from its predicted end has undone the carefully 
erected structures of history.”5  Furthermore, “[Memory] is considered more authentic and more 
democratic because it is more dispersed and, supposedly, less likely to be controlled from 
above.”6  
 In Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory, Lisa Yoneyama 
contextualizes the recent explosion in memory projects and memory studies, identifying that “the 
postwar and postcolonial reality within which we remember is one of late modernity, of late 
capitalist culture, in which a sense of history has tended to dissipate, even as yearnings for the 
real and the original intensify.”7  Yoneyama distinguishes the importance of memory in 
constructions of history: “By formulating the question of historical knowledge in terms of 
memory, and by illuminating its constructed and mediated nature, we can determine more 
                                                
3 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Le Lieux de Mémoire,” Representations 26 (1989): 8. 
4 Ibid., pp. 
5 Hue-Tam Ho Tai, Introduction to The Country of Memory: Remaking the Past in Late Socialist Vietnam, ed. Hue-Tam Ho Tai (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001), 4. 
6 Ibid., 7. 
7 Lisa Yoneyama, Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 4. 
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precisely the conditions of power that shape the ways in which the past is conveyed and ask how 
such representations interpellate and produce subjects.”8  However, like Tai, Yoneyama troubles 
the dichotomy between history and memory, drawing from Foucault to point out that  
the production of knowledge about the past, whether in the form of History or 
Memory, is always enmeshed in the exercise of power and is always accompanied 
by elements of repression. . . . [Memory is] as deeply embedded in and hopelessly 
complicitous with history in fashioning an official and authoritative account of the 
past.9   
 
Thus, in writing a counternarrative out of oral histories or memories, one must be cautious to not 
reestablish “yet another regime of totality, stability, confidence, and universal truthfulness”, but 
rather to continually ask, “How can memories, once recuperated, remain self-critically 
unsettling?”10  Thus I do not romantically valorize the memories of South Vietnamese 
immigrants or Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s relatives as necessarily being “more true” than the state-
imposed histories about the past, but rather look at how the multiple narratives interact 
dialectically.  In Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of 
Remembering, Marita Sturken examines the Vietnam War and the AIDS epidemic to theorize an 
understanding of “cultural memory.”  According to Sturken, “Memory is crucial to the 
understanding of culture precisely because it indicates collective desires, needs, and self-
definitions.  We need to ask not whether a memory is true but rather what its telling reveals 
about how the past affects the present.”11  What are the stakes and implications of shared 
memories, and how do they reflect the current geopolitical moment?  Sturken also coins the 
concept “technologies of memory” to identify the “objects, images, and representations . . . 
                                                
8 Ibid., 33. 
9 Ibid., 27. 
10 Ibid., 5. 
11 Marita Sturken, Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997), 2. 
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through which memories are shared, produced, and given meaning.”12  In Ghostly Matters: 
Haunting and the Sociological Imagination, Avery Gordon theorizes the figure of the ghost—
that embodiment of the past that reaches out and touches us affectively.  Gordon’s ghost is 
ultimately a political one: “It is something about writing ghost stories, stories that not only repair 
representational mistakes, but also strive to understand the conditions under which a memory 
was produced in the first place, toward a countermemory, for the future.”13  In this thesis I probe 
the stories surrounding the “ghost” of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn and explore what it means to create 
a countermemory for the future.  
 Building off these theories of history and cultural memory, I go a step further to theorize 
the role of the state in these narrative processes.  Hue-Tam Ho Tai initiates this discussion with 
her assertion that “Memory is an important aspect of cultural production, a production that the 
state is eager to control.”14  If history is the purview of the state, and memory is the tool of 
subaltern groups to construct counternarratives about the past, then how do we understand the 
history of stateless peoples—of communities, like the South Vietnamese diaspora, who trace 
their origin to a now-defunct state?  What is the purpose of resurrecting this ghostly state?  How 
does the ghosts of the past affect the present? 
 For history and memory are not relegated to the past; rather they intimately shape—and 
are shaped by—the present.  To further understand this sense of non-linear temporarily, I draw 
from queer theorists such as José Esteban Muñoz, who asserts the need to “call on the past, to 
animate it, understanding that the past has a performative nature, which is to say that rather than 
                                                
12 Ibid., 9. 
13 Avery F. Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 22. 
14 Hue-Tam Ho Tai, “Faces of Remembrance and Forgetting,” in The Country of Memory: Remaking the Past in Late Socialist Vietnam, ed. Hue-
Tam Ho Tai, 167-195 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 177. 
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being static and fixed, the past does things.”15  He theorizes the importance of engaging ghosts 
for subaltern struggles over the present and future:   
The double ontology of ghosts and ghostliness, the manner in which ghosts exist 
inside and out and traverse categorical distinctions, seems especially useful for a 
queer criticism that attempts to understand communal mourning, group 
psychologies, and the need for a politics that ‘carries’ our dead with us into battles 
for the present and future.16 
 
What are these “battles for the present and future”?  What is the purpose of remembering 
Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn and thus resurrecting the ghost of the Republic of Vietnam?  On one hand, 
the political investment is personal: South Vietnamese veterans and Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s 
family members fight for their right to mourn their dead, to resist the state’s misrepresentation 
and erasure of their loved one.  Thus they resist the state’s desire to control not only the living—
what Michel Foucault calls “biopower”—but also the dead.17   
 This project also has larger implications in this post-9/11 moment.  The American 
struggle against Communism has striking parallels with the current struggle against Terrorism, as 
embodied by this quote by President George W. Bush, who spoke at the official dedication 
ceremony for the Victims of Communism Memorial in Washington, D.C. on June 12, 2007: 
“Like the Communists, the terrorists and radicals who have attacked our nation are followers of a 
murderous ideology that despises freedom, crushes all dissent, has expansionist ambitions and 
pursues totalitarian aims.”18  To remember Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn is to challenge these state-
imposed histories—to remember an alternative history of the Vietnam War, which in turn 
encourages an alternative reading of the current war against terrorism.  A reading that challenges 
                                                
15 José Esteban Muñoz, Cruising Utopia: The Then and There or Queer Futurity, (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 27-28. 
16 Ibid., 46. 
17 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976 (New York City: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 242-
244. 
18 Omar Fekeiki, “The Toll of Communism,” The Washington Post, June 13, 2007.   
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the state’s rhetoric of decisive dichotomies, remaining ever vigilant of which narratives get 
erased or forgotten. 
 
 Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s story is an example of such an erased narrative.  If  “official 
history” is what the state considers “worth remembering,” then the Vietnamese and American 
states have chosen not to remember Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  But this story is not a forgotten 
narrative—at least, not yet.  In light of this threat of forgetting, I have researched, gathered, 
organized, and analyzed the multiple existing narratives surrounding Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, 
preserving them in a written document—an archive—lest they die with the memory holders.   
 In Chapter Two, I draw from websites created by South Vietnamese veterans—what I 
call a “subaltern digital archive”—to recreate a biographical sketch of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  
This sketch is interwoven with a narration of the sociopolitical context—the different events that 
were happening in the Asian Pacific during Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s lifetime.  To reconstruct this 
context, I draw heavily from online timelines of the Second Indochina War—I am interested in 
what information is disseminated to the general Internet-using public about Việt Nam, and how 
this information shapes popular conceptions of the Second Indochina War—as well as academic 
texts, such as Marilyn B. Young’s The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990, A. J. Langguth’s Our 
Vietnam: The War 1954-1975, and James H. Willbanks’ Vietnam War Almanac.  I acknowledge 
that all of history is a construction—a process of editing and making sense of the past—and thus 
I construct a history that centers, rather than effaces, Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  Chapters Three and 
Four examine the cultural memory production surrounding Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  Chapter 
Three highlights the ways in which South Vietnamese Americans engage in cultural memory 
practices, carving out a space in the present for the ghost of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  In these 
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memory acts, Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn becomes a symbol for the Republic of Vietnam—a way for 
veterans to resurrect the ghost of this now-defunct state.  In this chapter, I quote interviews with 
two veterans (one South Vietnamese and one American), discuss a Vietnam War memorial, and 
analyze YouTube videos of commemoration ceremonies.  Although South Vietnamese 
Americans’ resistance to state-imposed narratives is admirable, I acknowledge that not everyone 
has the privilege to be so vocal.  Thus in Chapter Four, I highlight the oral histories of Colonel 
Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s family members, most of whom live in Việt Nam, and thus are not allowed to 
publicly commemorate their loved one.  These are stories that exist only in the space of 
memory—that are absent from both official state histories as well as the online timelines created 
by South Vietnamese American veterans.  Those timelines focus of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s 
military valor.  In contrast, Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s relatives offer an alternate version of 
heroism—a more feminine conceptualization of heroism that appreciates Colonel Cẩn’s virtues 
and domestic contributions as well as his masculine victories. 
 What is the significance of conducting and analyzing oral histories?  In the edited volume 
Soldier Talk, Paul Budra and Michael Zeitlin explicitly link oral history as a methodology to the 
Vietnam War:  
Never before in the history of American military conflicts has such a vast archive 
of recorded voices—transcribed and published—become available, giving us an 
unprecedented opportunity to confront the brutal secrets of a devastating war 
through the testimonies of its historical protagonists. . . . In the broadest sense, the 
Vietnam War oral history project proceeds from the deeply felt recognition that 
there is something unfinished and incomplete, perhaps even something false, 
about the official accounts of the war.19  
  
However, like most books about the Vietnam War, Budra and Zeitlin’s volume focuses 
exclusively on the oral histories of American Vietnam War veterans, ignoring the perspectives of 
                                                
19 Paul Budra and Michael Zeitlin, “Introduction: Talk the Talk,” in Soldier Talk: The Vietnam War in Oral Narrative, ed. Paul Budra and 
Michael Zeitlin, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 2. 
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other participants.  It is these perspectives of “other participants”—South Vietnamese veterans as 
well as Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s relatives—that I thus highlight in this thesis.   
 In my use of oral histories, I reference this methodology’s historical commitment to 
social change.  In “The Voices of the Past: Oral History,” Paul Thompson argues that oral history 
“can be used to change the focus of history itself,” opening up “new areas of inquiry” and giving 
“back to the people who made and experienced history, through their own words, a central 
place.”20  The use of oral history, however, begs the question of the potential problematics of 
transcription.  The spoken narrative is thus mediated by the historian, who not only edits and cuts 
the interviewee’s words, but who may also add punctuation, correct grammar, delete “umms” 
and pauses, and manipulate speech patterns.21  Furthermore, given that eight out of the eleven 
interviews were conducted in Vietnamese, I acknowledge the imperfections of translation: 
“Translation seeks faithfulness and accuracy and ends up always betraying either letter of the 
text, its spirit, or its aesthetics.”22  Therefore, whenever I quote the interviews, I have included 
both the Vietnamese transcription and the English translation, to highlight rather than elide these 
gaps and tensions in meaning and articulation.  Since the primary audience of this thesis is 
American, however, I have chosen to place the English translation before the Vietnamese 
transcription, for the sake of greater readability. 
Oral history also begs the question of “truth” and accuracy.  The interviewee’s memory is 
colored by time and subsequent influences, and s/he may make conscious decisions about what 
to tell and what to hide.  According to Avery Gordon, “Complex personhood means that the 
stories people tell about themselves, about their troubles, about their social worlds, and about 
                                                
20 Paul Thompson, “The Voices of the Past: Oral History,” 1988, reprinted in The Oral History Reader, 2nd Edition, ed. Robert Perks and Alistair 
Thomson (London: Routledge, 2006), 26. 
21 These problematics are outlined in Francis Goode, “Voice, Ear and Text: Words, Meaning, and Transcription,” in The Oral History Reader, 2nd 
Edition, ed. Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, (London: Routledge, 2006), 362-373. 
22 Trinh T. Minh Ha, Surname Viet Given Name Nam, Film, 1989.  I should also note that I did not translate the oral histories myself.  Thus I 
thank Yen Lê Espiritu for her indispensible assistance. 
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their society’s problems are entangled and weave between what is immediately available as a 
story and what their imaginations are reaching toward.”23  Thus, when analyzing these oral 
histories, I try to pay equal attention to the silences, to probe what is not said or cannot yet be 
articulated.   Francis Goode also points out that “disentangling the respondent’s perceptions from 
behind-the-scenes pressure of relatives who feel they have a stake in presenting their family in a 
‘respectable’ light can be a minefield too.”24  This is especially potent in the case of Colonel Hồ 
Ngọc Cẩn, who is already such a politically charged and controversial figure.  I choose to 
reconcile this problem by ultimately echoing Goode’s rhetorical question: “[W]hose history is it 
anyway, and does the respondent not have a right to decide how they wish to be represented in 
the record?”25  I am concerned less with reconstructing a factually accurate account of Colonel 
Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s life, and more with analyzing how he is memorialized.   
Lastly, I do not purport to speak on behalf of the interviewees, and I acknowledge that 
“[a]ttempts to mediate for others inevitably objectify and sometimes even patronize the 
mediated.”26  Thus I sincerely thank the Vietnam War veterans and Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s 
relatives for sharing their stories and memories—especially given the state suppression of these 
narratives—and for allowing my creative interpretations, projections, and conclusions.  I ask 
them to generously forgive any misrepresentations of their words.       
I am especially indebted to my grandmother, Hồ Ngọc Hoa Taylor, who helped me to 
conduct these oral histories in Vietnamese, and thus who very much shaped this project, as much 
if not more than it shaped her.27  When asked about her reflections on interviewing her siblings 
and cousins about Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, she said, it “really opened my eyes a lot, and I really 
                                                
23 Ibid., 4. 
24 Francis Goode, “Voice, Ear and Text: Words, Meaning, and Transcription,” in The Oral History Reader, 2nd Edition, ed. Robert Perks and 
Alistair Thomson, (London: Routledge, 2006), 363. 
25 Ibid., 364. 
26 Lisa Yoneyama, Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 39. 
27 I was especially interested in the way my grandmother would reframe and rearticulate my interview questions in Vietnamese when she 
translated my English inquiries. 
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have emotions!”28  Public suppression of Colonel Cẩn’s memory meant that Taylor was denied 
access to not only her own brother’s story, but also to her very ability to mourn.  Unlike her other 
siblings, Taylor left Việt Nam in April 1975, before her brother was executed in August, and did 
not find out about his death until five months after the fact.29  Even when she did find out, it was 
perhaps difficult to bring up past ghosts with her family.  What is the nature of this silence—a 
silence that seems to parallel the effects of state-sponsored organized forgetting?  According to 
Hue Tam Ho-Tai,   
southern forgetting is not merely a case of individual memory collapsing under 
the weight of state suppression.  Practically every southern family has members 
who fought on different sides of the Vietnam War and whose sufferings are 
therefore blamed on different agents.  Every memory calls forth countermemory: 
stories of imprisonment under the South Vietnamese regime are countered by 
narratives of experience in reeducation camps under the new Communist one. . . . 
Only the suppression of memories such as these makes possible the continuation 
of family life, family sentiment, and even personal sanity.30 
 
Thus forgetting may “also be an attempt to keep the past from damaging the present.”31   
 Perhaps this then is the answer to my original question:  If Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn—my 
grand-uncle—is so famous, then why didn’t I find out about him until now?  Perhaps there 
needed to be a space for healing.  A time for distance and reflection, a period for escaping the 
ghosts of the past.  After almost forty years of silence and forgetting, however, my grandmother 
was eager to engage with this painful memory:     
Because I don’t know much about my brother when I left the country, because we 
don’t really talk—my family, we not in touch for at least about twenty years.  And 
that’s why I don’t know much about that. . . . [When] Evyn want to interview the 
family, want to know more about my brother, I very excited!  Because, you know, 
I want to know about him.32  
 
                                                
28 Hồ Ngọc Hoa Taylor, Interview with Evyn Lê Espiritu, July 17, 2012. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Hue-Tam Ho Tai, “Faces of Remembrance and Forgetting,” in The Country of Memory: Remaking the Past in Late Socialist Vietnam, ed. Hue-
Tam Ho Tai (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 190-191. 
31 Ibid., 190. 
32 Hồ Ngọc Hoa Taylor, Interview with Evyn Lê Espiritu, July 17, 2012. 
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I wanted to know about him as well.  Thus I embarked on this process, this journey.   
 This project is for the partial fulfillment of my History degree.  It is for the field of 
history and cultural memory studies.  But it is also for my family—for the stories they were 
finally able to hear and tell. 
 17 
Chapter 2 
Constructing a Narrative: Situating Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn 
 
 
 
“Personal memory, cultural memory, and history  
do no exist within neatly defined boundaries.  
Rather, memories and memory objects can move 
from one realm to another, shifting meaning and  
context.  Thus, personal memories can sometimes 
be subsumed into history, and elements of  
cultural memory can exist in concert with  
historical narratives.”33 
 
  
 
 
 Who was Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn?  There is no official history for this military figure, 
although he was the Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s most decorated battalion commander 
and the only South Vietnamese official that was publicly executed after the Fall of Saigon.  What 
we know is sparse and fragmented, drawn from the memories of those who knew him.  In the 
absence of an official archive, individuals of the South Vietnamese diaspora have uploaded, 
circulated and repeated what they know of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s life in blogs, on websites, 
and in YouTube videos.34  Thus his biography—memories of his military promotions and 
                                                
33 Marita Sturken, Tangled Memories (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 6. 
34 For this chapter, I reference: Phạm Phong Dinh, “Đại Tá Hồ Ngọc Cẩn,” Anh Hùng Quân Lực Việt Nam Cộng Hòa / Đại Tá Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, 
accessed March 31, 2010, http://daitahongoccan.blogspot.com/; Phạm Phong Dinh, “Đại Tá Hồ Ngọc Cẩn Anh Hùng Vị Quốc Vong Thân,” 
VCOMTech, April 27, 2010, accessed March 31, 2013, http://www.vcomtech.net/vn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id =644:i-ta-
h-ngc-cn-anh-hung-v-quc-vong- than&catid=38:lichsuvietnam&Itemid=527; Nguyen Huy Hung, “Dai Ta Ho Ngoc Can,” QUÂN TRƯỜNG 
ĐỒNG ĐẾ NHA TRANG THSQ-QLVNC, May 22, 2008, accessed March 31, 2013, http://dongdenhatrang.blogspot.com/2008/05/dai-ta-ho-
ngoc-can.html; Hieu D. Vu, “A Hard Time (Rangers after April 30th 1975),” Oct. 19, 1996, accessed March 31, 2013, 
http://www.bietdongquan.com/article1/rgrhard.htm; “The ARVN Generals,” Armchair General and HistoryNet: The Best Forums in History, 
accessed March 22, 2013, http://www.armchairgeneral.com /forums/showthread.php?t=121048/; “Vài nét về một anh hùng: Đại-tá Hồ Ngọc-
Cẩn,” accessed March 23, 2013, http://chinhnghia.com/ hongoccan.htm; Phạm Phong Dinh, “Đại Tá Hồ Ngọc Cẩn,” Biển Đông , Với Hoàng Sa 
& Trường Sa , Là Của Tổ Quốc Việt Nam, April 2, 2009, accessed March 30, 2013, 
http://nguoivietqgtp.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=184:cvvvhongoccan01&catid=84:vvdvc &Itemid=76; “Tấm hình 
Việt cộng xử bắn Đại Tá Hồ Ngọc Cẩn,” February 16, 2013, accessed March 30, 2013, http://hoiaihuutaysonbinhdinh. 
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recollections of his in-combat victories—is preserved online.  It is from this subaltern digital 
archive that I draw in order to reconstruct a sketch of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn. 
 The story of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, however, cannot be separated from the story of Việt 
Nam. Việt Nam, in turn, is defined by and against a host of other political actors such as China, 
France, Japan, Korea, Laos, Cambodia, and the United States.  Thus this chapter situates Colonel 
Hồ Ngọc Cẩn in his sociopolitical context, laying out the historical events that shaped Việt Nam 
and influenced Colonel Cẩn’s life: the history of Vietnamese resistance to foreign invasion, 
World War II, the First Indochina War, and the Second Indochina War (alternatively called the 
“Vietnam War,” the “American War,” the “Vietnam Conflict,” and the “War to Save the Nation 
Against the Americans”).  In order to reconstruct this history, I draw from Marilyn B. Young’s 
The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990, A. J. Langguth’s Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975, and James 
H. Willbanks’ Vietnam War Almanac, as well as reference eight timelines that have been posted 
online.35  One timeline encompasses a wide overview of Vietnamese history, some are more 
American-centric in their description of key events, others highlight the influence of other 
countries like France and Korea, and a couple extend beyond the Fall of Saigon in 1975 to shed 
light on more recent occurrences.  I deliberately chose online timelines for their easy 
accessibility, because I am interested in examining what information is disseminated to the 
general Internet-using public about Việt Nam, and how this shapes popular conceptions of the 
Second Indochina War. 
                                                
wordpress.com/2013/02/16/541/.  I also draw from one book, published by a South Vietnamese military official: Quang Thi Lâm, An Loc: The 
1972 Easter Invasion and the Battle that Saved South Viet Nam (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2009). 
35 These timelines are: “Fall of Saigon,” United States History, accessed March 22, 2013, http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1880.html; Quang-
Tuan Luong, “Timeline of Vietnam History,” 2011, accessed March 22, 2013, http://www.terragalleria.com/vietnam/info/timeline.html; BBC 
News, “Vietnam Profile,” BBC News Asia-Pacific, Feb. 5, 2013, accessed March 22, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-
16568035; “Vietnam War Timeline: 1945 – 1975,” accessed March 22, 2013, http://www.vietnamgear.com/timeline.aspx; Public Broadcasting 
System, “A Vietnam War Timeline,” The American Experience: Vietnam Online, accessed March 22, 2013, 
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/timeline.htm; Jennifer Rosenberg, “Vietnam War Timeline,” 20th Century History, accessed March 
22, 2013, http://history1900s.about.com/od/vietnamwar/a/vietnamtimeline.htm; Schmoop University, “The Vietnam War,” accessed March 22, 
2013, http://www.shmoop.com/vietnam-war/timeline.html; The History Place, “The Vietnam War,” 1999, accessed March 23, 2013, 
http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-1945.html.  
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 In this chapter I attempt to synthesize all these narrations of history to construct a 
comprehensive representation of the sociopolitical context surrounding the life of Colonel Hồ 
Ngọc Cẩn, all the while acknowledging that this is in no way a “complete” history, as such a 
thing can never exist.  History is always a narration, a construction—an act of picking and 
choosing, however self-reflexive or aware the constructor.  Thus this is my own attempt at an 
“accurate” narration—a synthesis of the different facts preserved online about Colonel Hồ Ngọc 
Cẩn, interwoven into an account of the sociopolitical context surrounding his life and death.  
 
 Việt Nam remembers the Second Indochina War as “Chiến Tranh Chống Mỹ Cứu Nước,” 
the “War to Save the Nation Against the Americans.”  This memorialization of the war fits into a 
larger historical narrative of Việt Nam as a country both conceived in—and constantly shaped 
by—resistance to foreign invasion.  Initially the main threat came from China.  Thus, one 
possible point of entry into our story is 111BC, when the Nam Việt kingdom—located between 
what is now called the Red River delta and region north of China’s Canton Province—was 
forcibly annexed by the Han, who renamed it the Chinese district of Giao-chi.  Despite 
occupation, over the next thousand years Việt Nam continued to develop its own sense of 
national unity and independence. It memorializes as folk heroes those who rebelled against the 
Chinese presence in Việt Nam, such as the Trưng sisters (40-43) and Ly Bon (542-545).  In 939, 
General Ngô Quyền vanquished the Chinese armies at the Bạch Đằng River, finally freeing the 
country, which was then called Đại Cồ Việt.  The Mongols continued to invade Đại Cồ Việt, but 
after thirty years of periodic attacks, Grand Commander Trần Hưng Đạo defeated them.   In 1407 
the Ming Dynasty once against annexed Đại Cồ Việt as its 14th province, but in 1428, General Lê 
Lợi won back independence and initiated the Later Lê dynasty, proclaiming himself emperor.  
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Thus Việt Nam has a long and contentious history with China; it is simultaneously shaped by and 
against its more powerful neighbor. 
 Then the first the French Catholic missionaries came, and Vietnam’s sovereignty was 
threatened by not only China but also France.  In 1651, Jesuit Alexandres de Rhodes created 
Ngôn Ngữ, the roman-based script currently used for the Vietnamese written language, thus 
replacing the Chinese-character based system.  In 1771, the Tây Sơn brothers initiated a bloody 
rebellion against the again encroaching Chinese army and establish the Tây Sơn Dynasty, only to 
be overthrown by Nguyễn Ánh in 1802, who, with the help of French mercenaries recruited by 
Jesuit Pigneau de Behaine, unified what is now modern-day Việt Nam and established the 
Nguyễn Dynasty.  This, however, was the last of the Vietnamese dynasties, for in 1858 the 
French navy attacked Đà Nẵng and initiated French colonial rule.  France thus began to impose 
its imaginary of French Indochina upon the landscape and the people.  In 1867, Cochinchina (the 
South) became a French Colony, and in 1883, Tonkin (the North) and Annam (the Center) 
become French protectorates.  In 1887, France formed a federation of the three Vietnamese 
regions as well as Cambodia, adding Laos in 1893 and Kouang-Tchéou-Wan (Guangzhouwan) 
in 1900.  
 In opposition to French colonialism, revolutionary leader Hồ Chí Minh founded the 
Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 1930.  Hồ Chí Minh (meaning “He Who Enlightens”) is 
an interesting character in and of himself: born Nguyễn Sinh on March 19, 1890, Hồ Chí Minh 
traveled through the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and China 
from 1911 to 1940.  It was in the United States that he developed the language of civil rights 
from the U.S. Declaration of Independence, and it was in France that he first came across ideas 
of Communism.  However, neither President Woodrow Wilson nor the leaders of the Versailles 
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peace talks would heed Hồ Chí Minh’s arguments in favor of Vietnamese independence.  
Meanwhile in Việt Nam in 1932, Bảo Đại (meaning “Keeper of Greatness”) ascended the throne, 
becoming the thirteenth and final emperor of the Nguyễn dynasty.   He only had nominal power 
over the French protectorate of Amman.  Bảo Đại would rule until 1955, serving largely as a 
symbolic leader. 
 It was into this political turmoil that Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn enters the story.  On March 
24, 1938, Cẩn was born in the Vĩnh Thanh Vân Ward of the small countryside town of Rạch Giá, 
in the Southern Kiên Giang province.  His birth coincided with another major shift in global 
politics: World War II.  Although not a main actor, Việt Nam—then French Indochina—was 
indeed affected by the shifting geopolitical landscape, as greater powers such as France, Japan, 
and China fought for dominance in the Asian Pacific.  In 1938, the Empire of Japan was already 
at war with the Republic of China for control over East Asia.  Japan managed to invade 
Indochina in 1940, but the French administrations collaborated and continued to run the 
government.  The next year, Hồ Chí Minh secretly returned to Việt Nam after thirty years in 
exile and organized the Việt Minh, a guerilla Communist national independence coalition 
initially formed in opposition to French colonialism.  The Việt Minh’s alliances were temporary 
and strategic; its main goal was Vietnamese sovereignty, and it aligned itself with or against the 
other global actors accordingly.  On March 9, 1945, amid rumors of a possible American 
invasion, the Japanese troops ousted the French colonial government to seize control of 
Indochina, installing Bảo Đại as their puppet ruler.  The Việt Minh then allied with the United 
States and the Republic of China to fight the occupying Japanese troops.  Thus, contrary to the 
conception that the United States had always been in opposition to the Communist Việt Minh, 
during this time period the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) actually united with Hồ Chí 
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Minh and his Việt Minh guerrillas.  After World War II, however, the Việt Minh opposed not 
Japan but France—who sought to reoccupy Vietnam—and broke its ties with the United States—
who sided with France for the First Indochina War and then South Vietnam for the Second 
Indochina War.  
 What was Hồ Ngọc Cẩn like growing up?  Unfortunately, little is known of Hồ Ngọc 
Cẩn’s early childhood.  What we do know—the official history that has been written and 
preserved—is what was happening on the global stage, and how these events affected Việt Nam.  
In July 1945, following the defeat of Nazi Germany, World War II’s Allied Powers convened at 
the Potsdam Conference in Germany in order to plan the post-war world. Việt Nam, of course, 
was not invited, but it was there that its fate was at least nominally decided.  In order to defeat 
the Japanese in Việt Nam, the Allies divide the country in half at the 16th parallel, agreeing that 
the Chinese Nationalists would fight the Japanese in the north while the British would do the 
same in the south.  Representatives from France requested the return of all French pre-war 
colonies in Indochina, following the defeat of Japan.  The Allied Powers’ concern was Japan’s 
defeat, not Việt Nam’s independence.  Thus, France’s request was granted.  On August 6th the 
U.S. dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and three days later it dropped another on 
Nagasaki.  The end of the war appeared near.  
 The Việt Minh, however, had other plans for Việt Nam.  One week after the bombing of 
Nakasaki, the Việt Minh National Congress decided the time was ripe to incite a general 
uprising, in the hopes of independence.  It elected the National Liberation Committee of Vietnam 
to serve as a provisional government and chose Hồ Chí Minh to lead as its president.  On August 
20th, the Việt Minh rebels successfully seized power in Hà Nội, and two days later they 
organized a celebration of national independence in Sài Gòn.  Emperor Bảo Đại, who had served 
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as a puppet leader under first France and then Japan, now abdicated under pressure from the Việt 
Minh, serving as Supreme Advisor to the provisional Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
government.  A Committee of the South was established to govern Sài Gòn; six of the 
committee’s nine members were Việt Minh.   
 We will never know to what degree Hồ Ngọc Cẩn was aware of these events that were 
happening in the world around him as he grew up in the rural town of Rạch Giá.  We can only 
speculate about his thoughts concerning the shifting nodes of power in Việt Nam.  But we know 
from his later actions that he identified strongly with Sài Gòn and probably conceptualized the 
Việt Minh as an external threat. 
 On September 2, 1945, Japan surrendered, formally ending World War II in the Pacific. 
On the same day, Hồ Chí Minh proclaimed the independence of Việt Nam, quoting from the U.S. 
Declaration of Independence:  
All men are created equal.  The Creator has given us certain inviolable Rights: the 
right to Life, the right to be Free, and the right to achieve Happiness. . . . We are 
convinced that the Allied nations which at Tehran and San Francisco have 
acknowledged the principle of self-determination and equality of nations, will not 
refuse to acknowledge the independence of Vietnam. . . . Vietnam has the right to 
be a free and independent country—and in fact is so already.36 
 
 Hồ Chí Minh declared himself president of the newly established Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam.  President Harry Truman, however, refused to recognize the country. 
 The Allied Powers had not expected Hồ Chí Minh’s declaration of independence.  They 
retaliated.  As planned at the Potsdam Conference, British soldiers arrived to occupy Sài Gòn 
and Chinese Nationalist soldiers began to loot Hà Nội.  On September 22, 1945, 1400 French 
soldiers, released by the British from former Japanese internment camps, entered Sài Gòn and 
initiated a bloody rampage, attacking the Việt Minh and killing many innocent civilians in the 
                                                
36 Hồ Chí Minh, “Declaration of Independence,” reprinted in Marvin E. Gettleman, Vietnam and America: A Documented History (Broadway: 
Grove Press, 1995), 40-42.  The original Vietnamese transcript was not provided and thus is not reproduced here. 
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process.  An estimated 20,000 French civilians were living in Sài Gòn at the time; many joined 
the rampage.  It was during this time that the first American died in Việt Nam: Lieutenant 
Colonel A. Peter Dewey, head of an American OSS mission, was killed by Việt Minh troops 
while driving a jeep to the airport.  Reports later indicated that his death was due to the fact that 
he was mistaken for a Frenchman.  In October 1945, 35,000 French soldiers arrived in South 
Vietnam to restore French rule, led by World War II General Jacques Philippe Leclerc.  The Việt 
Minh resisted.  But the French succeeded in expelling them from Sài Gòn. 
 It is here that we have the first record of the surrounding sociopolitical context intimately 
affecting Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s life.  In 1945 his studies were interrupted, and would not resume until 
1947.  In the meantime, Hồ Chí Minh attempted to negotiate Vietnamese independence with the 
French.  On March 6, 1946, he signed a preliminary agreement with the French in Hà Nội, in 
which the French government consented to recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a 
free state that belongs to the Indo-Chinese Federation and to the French Union.  In addition, 
France agreed to carry out a referendum concerning of the reunification of the three 
protectorates: Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina.  However, French troops continued to arrive in 
Việt Nam, and in June 1946, the French high commissioner for Indochina established a separatist 
French-controlled government for the Republic of Chochinchina, thus partitioning the formerly 
unified nation.  This division foreshadowed the later divide between North and South Vietnam.   
 Hồ Chí Minh was angered by France’s attack, and the two parties met at the 
Fontainebleau Conference that summer.  However, they failed to come to an agreement, and the 
fighting was renewed.  In November 1946, after a series of violent clashes with the Việt Minh 
guerillas, the French forces bombarded Hải Phòng harbor and occupied Hà Nội, killing 6000 
civilians and forcing the rebels into the surrounding jungles.  In response, on December 19, 
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1946, 30,000 Việt Minh launched their first large-scale attack, destroying the Hà Nội power 
plant and attacking French civilians.  Thus the First Indochina War—alternatively known as the 
“Dirty War” in France or the “War of Resistance against the French” in Việt Nam —began, 
prompting Việt Minh General Võ Nguyên Giáp to proclaim: “The resistance will be long and 
arduous, but our cause is just and we will surely triumph.”37 
 In 1947, Hồ Ngọc Cẩn was able to return to school.  The Việt Minh troops retreated to 
the war zone and the French troops reoccupied the city.  Cẩn was only an average student, but he 
was described as gentle, simple, thoughtful, and quiet.  In 1948 the ten-year-old had mumps, but 
otherwise he was a healthy individual.  
 Meanwhile, France was trying to secure its power in Việt Nam.  It considered the French-
educated Bảo Đại a more obedient and thus more favorable ally than in the Communist rebel Hồ 
Chí Minh.  Thus on March 8, 1949, French President Auriol and Vietnamese Emperor Bảo Đại 
signed the Elysee Agreement, in which France reconfirmed southern Việt Nam’s status as an 
independent Associated State within the French Union.  Thus the state of south Việt Nam—
officially known as the State of Vietnam (1949-1955) and later the Republic of Vietnam (1955-
1975)—was established, with Bảo Đại as its puppet head of state.  It is to this short-lived state 
that Hồ Ngọc Cẩn would devote his unwavering loyalty.   
 France also agreed to eventually unify Việt Nam and place it under Vietnamese 
administration.  However, the terms of this were to be negotiated subsequently.  In the meantime, 
France would retain control of the Vietnamese Armed Forces and foreign relations.  In July 
1949, the French established the South Vietnamese National Army, thus upholding their pledge 
to help build a national anti-Communist army.  
                                                
37 The History Place, “The Vietnam War: Seeds of Conflict 1945-1960,” 1999, accessed March 23, 2013, 
http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-1945.html.  
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 Why did France think it important to help establish an anti-Community army in Việt 
Nam?  For this, one must look to the global political landscape: increasingly the world was 
becoming divided between Communism and Democracy.  In October 1949, Mao Zedong's 
Communist forces defeated Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Army in the Chinese civil war.  This 
in turn sparked American anti-Communist sentiment and the perceived need to contain 
Communist expansion in Southeast Asia.  In 1950, China and the USSR recognized the 
Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam and began sending modern weapons and military 
advisors to the Việt Minh.38  The same year, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin gave a 
speech claiming that the U.S. State Department harbored Communists; thus the era of 
“McCarthyism” erupted, instigating widespread fear and suspicion and making it hard for any 
U.S. politician to then appear “soft” on Communism.  On June 30, 1950, President Harry S. 
Truman sent troops to Korea, following North Korea’s invasion of the South.  The invasion, 
according to Truman, was a Moscow-backed attack by the “monolithic world Communism” that 
thus needed to be countered by American forces.39  It is within this political climate that the 
United States and Britain’s decision to recognize the French-controlled Republic of Vietnam—
and to oppose the Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam—becomes legible.  On July 26, 
1950, President Truman initiated military involvement in Việt Nam, authorizing $15 million in 
military aid to the French.  Over the next four years, the U.S. would spend an additional $3 
billion on the Indochina War; by 1954, it would provide eighty percent of all war supplies. 
 In 1951, Hồ Ngọc Cẩn initiated his military career.  Because his father was a sergeant, 
Cẩn was accepted to cadet school.  He graduated in late 1952, and was admitted to the Republic 
                                                
38 China sent automatic weapons, mortars, howitzers, and trucks.  Perhaps ironically, much of the equipment was American-made because it had 
belonged to the Chinese Nationalists before their defeat by Mao.  The influx of new equipment and Chinese advisors allowed General Võ Nguyên 
Giáp to transform his guerrilla fighters into conventional army units. 
39 The History Place, “The Vietnam War: Seeds of Conflict 1945-1960,” 1999, accessed March 23, 2013, 
http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-1945.html 
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of Vietnam Junior Military Academy when he was fourteen.  It was there that he studied as the 
global geopolitical landscape continued to shift around him.  In 1953, France granted Laos full 
independence.  The Việt Minh forces pushed into Laos.  Dwight D. Eisenhower, former five-star 
Army general and Allied commander in Europe during World War II, was inaugurated as the 
34th U.S. President.  The Korean War ended.  An armistice divided Korea at the 38th parallel into 
the Communist North and Democratic South.  Many international leaders saw the armistice 
model as a potential solution to the ongoing conflict in Việt Nam.  The Republic of Vietnam—
and by extension, Hồ Ngọc Cẩn—would have embraced such an agreement, but for Hồ Chí 
Minh and the Việt Minh, independence and unification of Việt Nam were the ultimate goals. 
 1954 marked another major turning point.  It was the year of France’s defeat.  In May 
1954, a force of 40,000 heavily armed Việt Minh attacked the French garrison at Điện Biên Phủ. 
On May 7, 10,000 French soldiers ultimately surrendered.  The French troops then proceeded to 
withdraw completely from Việt Nam.  Thus the First Indochina War, which had claimed the 
lives of 400,000 soldiers and civilians during its eight long years, came to an end.   
 International response to the Battle of Điện Biên Phủ varied.  For anti-colonial 
movements around the world, the battle was celebrated as a sign of hope: it was the first time in 
history that a colonized group defeated a colonial power.  For anti-Communist leaders across the 
globe, the turn of events was perceived as a threat; when asked by the Copley Press to comment 
on the “strategic importance of Indochina to the free world,” President Eisenhower outlined his 
Domino Theory: 
First of all, you have the specific value of a locality in its production of materials 
that the world needs.  Then you have the possibility that many human beings pass 
under a dictatorship that is inimical to the free world.  Finally, you have broader 
considerations that might follow what you would call the ‘falling domino’ 
principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and 
what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. 
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So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most 
profound influences.40 
 
Eisenhower associated “disintegration” with the fall of the Asian Pacific to Communism—a fall 
that would upset the U.S.’s imperialistic plans for a democratic stronghold in Southeast Asia. 
 On May 8, 1954, the United States, Britain, China, the Soviet Union, France, Cambodia, 
Laos, and Việt Nam—both the Việt Minh and representatives of Bảo Đại—convened for the 
Geneva Conference.  At the conference’s conclusion on July 21, 1954, it was agreed that a 
provisional demarcation line would be drawn at the 17th parallel, dividing Việt Nam until 
nationwide elections were to be held in 1956.  However, neither the United States nor the 
Republic of Vietnam accepted the agreement; they opposed the unifying elections, fearing a 
likely victory by Hồ Chí Minh. 
 In October 1954, after spending eight years undercover in the jungle, Hồ Chí Minh 
returned to Hà Nội to formally take control of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.  Meanwhile 
in the South, Bảo Đại installed Ngô Đình Diệm as his prime minister.  The United States 
identified anti-Communist Diệm as their best hope for a democratic South Vietnam, and thus 
facilitated his victory in a rigged presidential election on October 23, 1955.  Diệm, however, 
predicted that “another more deadly war” would erupt—a war in which Hồ Ngọc Cẩn would 
establish his bravery and make his name.41 
 Although the recently established—and arguably arbitrary—17th parallel dividing North 
and South Vietnam was strictly policed, Vietnamese individuals—many of whom had family 
members and connections on both sides of the demarcation—still attempted to cross it.  This was 
especially true at the beginning, when many Vietnamese were forced to choose their political 
                                                
40 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, “News Conference on April 7, 1954,” in The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Vol. 1 (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1971), 597-598.   
41 The History Place, “The Vietnam War: Seeds of Conflict 1945-1960,” 1999, accessed March 23, 2013, 
http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-1945.html.  
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allegiance.  For example, some 90,000 Communists in South Vietnam went North.  (Under the 
instruction of Hồ Chí Minh, however, an alleged 10,000 Việt Minh fighters remained quietly 
behind.)  At the same time, nearly one million Vietnamese Catholics from the North fled South 
at the bidding of Diệm, a Roman Catholic in an overwhelmingly Buddhist country.  Hồ Ngọc 
Cẩn was Catholic himself; perhaps this religious affiliation deepened his identification with 
Diệm and consolidated his devotion to the southern Republic of Vietnam. 
 On October 26, 1955, Ngô Đình Diệm became the first president of the newly established 
Republic of Vietnam (formally called the State of Vietnam and informally referred to as South 
Vietnam).  Diệm assigned most high-level government positions to his close friends and family 
members; most notably, he installed his younger brother Ngô Đình Nhu as his chief advisor.  
Throughout his term, Diệm failed to garner much popular support.  He was described as aloof 
and autocratic, despite American advisors’ efforts to popularize him via American-style political 
rallies and tours of the countryside. 
 1955 was a turning point not only for Việt Nam, but also for Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  According to 
cadet rules, a student who had not completed the First Five by the age of seventeen would be 
sent to professional school.  Cẩn’s early education had been interrupted by the chaos surrounding 
the First Indochina War, and thus he did not finish in time.  He was sent to the Thủ Đức Military 
School for Reserved Officers, where he took a course in specialized weapons.42  Although 
previously only an average student, after three months Cẩn graduated with distinction.  He then 
decided to join the Vietnamese National Army, where he started out as a Private.  He quickly 
                                                
42 There were three types of officer military schools: Military Schools established by the French before 1950; the Đà Lạt Inter-armed Military 
School (later renamed The National Military Academy) established by Emperor Bao Dai in 1950; and the Thủ Đức Military School for Reserved 
Officers.  There was no minimum level of education required for a candidate entering an officer military school prior to 1955. From this date on, 
the Đà Lạt National Military Academy required a full baccalauréat diploma (13 years of schooling; equivalent to 1st year of American college) 
and the Thủ Đức Military School for Reserved Officers a partial baccalauréat diploma (12 years of schooling; equivalent to American High 
School diploma). Many non-commissioned officers, due to the shortage of officers, were recruited to attend the Thủ Đức Military School for 
Reserved Officers.  Such was the case with Hồ Ngọc Cẩn. 
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rose through the ranks to become a sergeant, and after nine months, was chosen as the Head 
Sergeant of the Military Arms.  Upon graduating from the Thủ Đức Military School, Cẩn stayed 
to teach the weapons course for the next four years. 
 What happened during those four years?  On April 28, 1956, the last French soldier left 
Việt Nam and the French High Command for Indochina was dissolved.  The U.S. Military 
Assistance Advisor Group (MAAG) assumed responsibility for training the South Vietnamese 
forces.  This change was reflected in Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s classes, which went from being taught in 
French to in English.  In July 1956, the deadline established by the 1954 Geneva Convention 
passed without a unifying election.  Diệm, backed by the U.S., had refused to participate, out of 
certainty that he would lose against Hồ Chí Minh.  Diệm lacked popular support in the South, let 
alone the North.  His administration attacked political dissidents, targeted Buddhists, and did not 
spend enough money on schools, medical care or other social services greatly needed in the 
countryside.  In contrast, Communist guerrillas and propagandists in the South promised land 
reform and a higher standard of living, and were thus able to win the hearts of many South 
Vietnamese peasants. 
 In January 1957, the Soviet Union proposed a permanent division of Việt Nam into the 
North and South, with the admittance of the two separate states into the United Nations.  The 
United States, however, rejected the proposal.  It was unwilling to recognize the Communist 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam.  The same year, Communist insurgent activity in South 
Vietnam began.  Communist guerrillas assassinated more than 400 South Vietnamese officials.  
On May 8, 1957, Diệm visited the White House, where he was embraced by President 
Eisenhower as the “miracle man” of Asia and reassured of the United States’ continued 
commitment to South Vietnam: “The cost of defending freedom, of defending America, must be 
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paid in many forms and in many places . . . [and] military as well as economic help is currently 
needed in Vietnam.”43   
 The conflict escalated in 1959.  In March, Hồ Chí Minh officially declared a People’s 
War to unite all of Việt Nam under his leadership.   In May, he established the Central Office of 
South Vietnam (COSVN) and initiated construction of the Hồ Chí Minh trail.44  In June, 4000 
Việt Minh guerillas, originally born in the South and now part of Hồ Chí Minh’s People’s Army 
of Vietnam (PAVN), traveled across the 17th parallel to infiltrate the Republic of Vietnam.  They 
blended into the countryside, indistinguishable from the South Vietnamese peasants.  They 
recruited many South Vietnamese people to their side.  Diệm labeled these infiltrators Việt Cộng, 
meaning “Communist Vietnamese.”  To Hồ Chí Minh they were part of the National Liberation 
Front—those working in the South to establish Communism in the hopes of Việt Nam’s 
unification.  Their efforts were unintentionally aided by President Diệm’s growing unpopularity.  
In response to the November 1960 failed coup against President Diệm, initiated by South 
Vietnamese Army officers frustrated with Diệm’s ineffective leadership, Diệm once again 
cracked down on all perceived “enemies of state,” arresting over 50,000 South Vietnamese 
individuals with the help of police forces controlled by his brother Nhu.  Many innocent civilians 
were tortured and executed.  Thousands fled to North Vietnam.  Others joined the Việt Cộng.  
 Despite growing evidence of President Diệm’s human rights abuses and domestic 
unpopularity, the United States continued to support the Republic of Vietnam, believing firmly 
in the need for an anti-Communist stronghold in Southeast Asia.  In 1961, newly elected 
President John F. Kennedy increased U.S. military aid to South Vietnam.  Vice President Lyndon 
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B. Johnson visited Sài Gòn and praised Diệm as the “Churchill of Asia.”  The next year, Defense 
Secretary McNamara visited South Vietnam and assessed, “We are winning the war.”45  
President Kennedy signed the Foreign Assistance Act, promising “military assistance to 
countries which are on the rim of the Communist world and under direct attack.”46  The U.S. Air 
Force began to use Agent Orange—a chemical defoliant named after the orange-striped fifty-
five-gallon barrels in which it came—to burn away the jungle cover and expose trails used by the 
Việt Cộng.  Over the next eight years, the United States would spray 20,000,000 gallons of 
Agent Orange over Việt Nam, killing or maiming over 400,000 Vietnamese people and causing 
500,000 children to be born with birth defects.47  
 As the war brewed around him, Hồ Ngọc Cẩn rose steadily through the ranks.  
To address the new shortage of South Vietnamese military officers, the Department of Defense 
opened up a call for special officers.  Hồ Ngọc Cẩn answered the call, enrolling in the Army of 
the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Dong De Academy, which specialized in the training of Non-
Commissioned Officers.48  In 1962 he graduated with distinction as a midshipman.  After, he 
trained with the American Special Forces to become part of the Biệt Ðộng Quân, the ARVN 
Rangers.  As a Ranger, he served as Platoon Commander of the 42nd Battalion Rangers in 
District 42, which included the cities of Cần Thơ (Phong Dinh province), Chương Thiện, Sóc 
Trăng (Ba Xuyên province), Bạc Liêu, and Cà Mau (An Xuyên province).  
 Meanwhile Sài Gòn was fraught with political instability.  The U.S. began to express 
doubts about Diệm’s leadership.  In 1962 Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield visited Sài 
Gòn and reported back to President Kennedy that Diệm had irresponsibly wasted the $2 billion 
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that the U.S. had sent in support.  In 1963, Diệm’s regime attracted international outrage when 
news cameras and photographers captured footage of several Buddhist monks publicly setting 
themselves on fire in protest of Diệm’s abuses.  In response, Diệm imposed martial law and his 
brother Nhu instructed the Special Forces to crack down on Buddhist sanctuaries in South 
Vietnam.  Anti-Diệm demonstrations spread throughout the country, leaving the White House in 
an uncomfortable bind: Diệm clearly did not adhere to American democratic and human rights 
principles, and thus it was unwise to continue supporting him; however, the U.S. could not back 
out of South Vietnam and simultaneously retain its hope for an anti-Communist stronghold in 
Southeast Asia.  Furthermore, in face of the surrounding threat of Communism, it could not just 
publicly dispose of a democratic head of state—a leader that it had corruptly placed in power and 
so publicly supported in the past.  Fortunately for the United States, a solution presented itself: 
on July 4, 1963, South Vietnamese General Trần Văn Đôn contacted the CIA in Sài Gòn about 
the possibility of staging a coup against Diệm.  The next month U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot 
Lodge arrived in Sài Gòn to assess the situation, and after meeting with Diệm, who refused to 
cooperate, he offered the U.S.’s implicit support to the coup.  On November 2, 1963, Diệm and 
Nhu were captured inside a Catholic church.  They surrendered and were placed in the back of an 
armored personnel carrier to be taken into custody.  However, on the way to Sài Gòn the vehicle 
stopped and Diệm and Nhu were assassinated.  Their assassination was perhaps a chilly 
premonition of what was yet to come: be it fate, karma, or coincidence, just twenty days later, 
President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas.  The political instabilities in Việt Nam 
found parallels in the United States.    
 But the change in political leadership did not correlate with a change in the war’s 
direction.  1964 marked a significant escalation in the United States’ involvement in Vietnam, 
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sparked by the controversial Gulf of Tonkin incident.  To this day, it is unclear what exactly 
happened: On August 2, three North Vietnamese Navy torpedo boats allegedly fired at the USS 
Maddox destroyer in the international waters of the Tonkin Gulf, thirty miles off the coast of 
North Vietnam.  The U.S. claimed that the attacks were unsolicited and unwarranted.  Even if the 
details of this particular attack were unclear, the United States and South Vietnam had been 
conducting covert naval operations for at least the past six months.  Two days later, the U.S. 
National Security Agency reported a second, even more highly disputed attack.  Were the attacks 
legitimate, or merely an excuse—or worse, a provocation—that allowed President Lyndon B. 
Johnson to escalate the war, order retaliator strikes, and begin bombing North Vietnam?  On 
August 7, all Congress members except two Senators passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 
authorizing President Johnson to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against 
forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.”49   This effectively allowed 
President Johnson to wage an all-out war against North Vietnam without ever securing a formal 
Declaration of War from Congress.  In 1964, President Johnson—who advocated a de-escalation 
of U.S. involvement in Vietnam—won in a landslide against the more militant Republic 
candidate Barry Goldwater.  However, Johnson did not keep his promise: throughout his term, 
U.S. military involvement in Việt Nam actually increased dramatically.  
 Meanwhile political unrest continued to brew in Sài Gòn.  In January, General Nguyễn 
Khánh and the younger officers ousted Major General Dương Văn Minh and the older generation 
of generals in bloodless coup.   In response, U.S. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, who had 
succeeded Lodge, summoned the young officers to the U.S. embassy and scolded them like 
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schoolboys, warning them that the Americans were “tired of coups.”50  General Khánh took great 
offense to Taylor’s paternalistic language, and publicly denounced Taylor in the U.S. press, 
critiquing the way the U.S. was reverting to “colonialism” in its treatment of South Vietnam.51   
 Despite the succession of coups, Hồ Ngọc Cẩn remained fiercely loyal to South Vietnam, 
and was promoted in captain in 1965.  The same year, President Johnson initiated “Operation 
Rolling Thunder.”  Although initially scheduled to last eight weeks, the nearly continuous air 
raids would go on for three years.  Throughout the war, the U.S. would fly 300,000 sorties and 
drop nearly 864,000 tons of bombs—nearly twice the amount of bombs dropped in the Pacific 
during all of World War II.52  The majority of these were dropped on South Vietnam in an 
attempt to eradicate the Việt Cộng; in the process, numerous villages were destroyed and about 
million civilians were killed.53  In 1965 President Johnson also deployed the first American 
combat troops, the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade.  Not long after, the U.S. Army and North 
Vietnam’s People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) clashed in their first major battle in Ia Drang 
Valley.  Heavy casualties resulted on both sides.  
 Amidst the warfare Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s fame continued to grow.  In 1966, he served as 
Battalion Chief of the 1st Regiment 33, 21st Infantry Division, and for his strong leadership and 
valor in battle he was praised as one of the “Five Tigers” in Tran Yen Tu’s famous song “Ngũ 
Hổ U Minh Thượng” (Five Tigers of U Minh Thượng).  The other four “tigers” were: Major Lư 
Trọng Kiệt, Battalion Chief TD 42; Major Nguyễn văn Huy, TD 44 Rangers; Major Lê văn 
Hưng, Battalion Commander TD 2/31; and Captain Dương văn Trổ, Battalion Chief TD 3/33.  
The same year, South Vietnamese troops captured Huế and Đà Nẵng.  President Johnson 
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promised the new South Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyễn Cao Kỳ continued support for 
South Vietnam.  Johnson warned, however, that the U.S. would be monitoring South Vietnam’s 
efforts to expand democracy and improve economic conditions for its citizens, given the 
previous leaderships’ human rights abuses and inability to win over countryside peasants.  In 
some ways the United States’ commitment to Sài Gòn’s host of militant and unpopular leaders is 
ironic, given Hồ Chí Minh’s initial quoting of the Declaration of Independence in 1945.  Perhaps 
the United States and Hồ Chí Minh shared similar commitments to civil liberties; the U.S., 
however, was strictly democratic, and because Hồ Chí Minh advocated Communism, the two 
could be nothing but enemies in the given geopolitical climate. 
 As U.S. involvement in Việt Nam escalated, so did domestic criticism of the war.  In 
1966 veterans of World War I, World War II, and the Korean War staged a protest rally in New 
York City, burning their discharge and separation papers in protest.  The Congress of Racial 
Equality (CORE) issued a report claiming that the U.S. military draft placed “a heavy 
discriminatory burden on minority groups and the poor” and called for a withdrawal of troops 
from Vietnam.54  In 1967 Martin Luther King Jr. denounced the war and encouraged draft 
evasion, naming the United States the “the greatest purveyor of violence in the world.”55  The 
same year even Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara expressed doubts about the war.  In a 
private letter to President Johnson, he wrote: “The picture of the world’s greatest superpower 
killing or seriously injuring 1000 noncombatants a week while trying to pound a tiny backward 
nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one.”56  In a 
report before a Senate subcommittee, McNamara publicly admitted the futility of bombing North 
Vietnam: the movement of supplies to the South had not been reduced, and the morale of the 
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North Vietnamese had not been broken.  In response, President Johnson “released” Robert 
McNamara from his duties, offering him a position as head of the World Bank instead. 
 But McNamara’s doubts would become reality, as the events of 1968 would demonstrate.  
On January 30, 1968, both the People’s Army of Vietnam and the Việt Cộng attacked South 
Vietnam, catching the U.S. military off guard and temporarily capturing several key cities and 
provinces, including Sài Gòn.  The assault would later be known as the Tết Offensive, for its 
concurrence with the Vietnamese Lunar New Year.  Despite their initial surprise, American and 
South Vietnamese forces recaptured most of the occupied areas within several days.  For his 
feats in battle, Hồ Ngọc Cẩn was promoted to Major and became one of the most well-known 
ARVN combat commanders.  In 1968 he was the most decorated battalion commander.   
 Although the Tết Offensive was technically a military victory for the U.S. and South 
Vietnam, it proved a significant political victory for the Communists.  The Communists’ 
demonstrated force during the Tết Offensive dispelled American expectations of a quick and 
easy victory and dampened troop morale.  To make matters worse, on March 16 the Charlie 
Company 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 11th Brigade of the Americal Division entered 
the village of Mỹ Lai in search of Việt Cộng, and under the approval of their superior officers, 
the angry and frustrated soldiers raped, tortured and brutally killed all the villagers.  More than 
500 civilians died in the Mỹ Lai Massacre.  When the American public heard about the atrocities, 
support for the war fell even more.  The White House realized the need to reevaluate its foreign 
policy.  Peace talks between North Vietnam and the U.S. were slated for May in Paris. 
 In 1969, in response to growing domestic unrest, President Nixon and Secretary of 
Defense Melvin Laird proposed a policy of “Vietnamization,” in which the United States would 
gradually shift the burden of defeating the Communists away from the U.S. military to the Army 
 38 
of the Republic of Vietnam.  Its ultimate goal was South Vietnamese self-reliance and American 
military withdrawal.  However, a decrease in military troops did not necessarily mean a decrease 
in intervention: without the knowledge of either Congress or the American public, President 
Nixon approved “Operation Breakfast”—the secret bombing of Cambodia in an attempt to 
eradicate Communist supply routes and base camps along the Hồ Chí Minh trail.  The bombings 
would continue for fourteen months.  On September 2, 1969, Hồ Chí Minh died from heart 
failure at the age of seventy-nine.  Although the Việt Minh and the Việt Cộng greatly mourned 
the passing of their beloved leader, they remained strong and determined to unite Việt Nam. 
 Despite the pronouncement of America’s imminent withdrawal, many ARVN military 
officials like Hồ Ngọc Cẩn continued to resist valiantly against the Communist forces.  In 1970, 
Cẩn was promoted to lieutenant colonel and Commander of the 15th Regiment, 9th Infantry 
Division.  By that time, he was the most decorated ARVN soldier, with seventy-eight honors 
including the Officer of the National Order, twenty-five Gallantry Crosses with Palm, forty-five 
Gallantry Crosses with Stars, three Medals for the Wounded, and four U.S. medals bestowed by 
President Johnson and Lt. General William C. Westmoreland.57  Meanwhile in the United States, 
Americans continued to protest the war.  On May 4th, the National Guardsmen opened fire on a 
crowd of militant student antiwar protesters at Ohio’s Kent State University, resulting in the 
death of four students and the wounding of eight others.  Although President Nixon publicly 
denounced the Guardsmen’s actions, he did caution that “when dissent turns to violence it invites 
tragedy.”58  The Kent State shootings rattled the country, provoking some Americans to question 
the legitimacy of the U.S.’s intervention in Southeast Asia, given the country’s apparent failure 
to protect civil liberties at home.  Nixon assessed the nation’s discontent.  In 1970 Henry 
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Kissinger, Nixon's national security advisor, and Lê Đức Thọ, the diplomat from North Vietnam, 
started peace talks in Paris.  The next year, however, another even greater scandal rocked the 
United States.  In June 1971, the New York Times began publishing portions of the Pentagon 
Papers—officially titled United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: A Study Prepared by the 
Department of Defense—that had been leaked by Daniel Ellsberg, a U.S. military analyst who 
then opposed the war.  The documents revealed the U.S. military and executive branch’s 
deception regarding U.S. intervention in Vietnam.  In what is perhaps the most well known 
instance of the American government attempting to inhibit the freedom of the press, the Nixon 
administration appealed to the Supreme Court to halt the Pentagon Papers’ publication.  
However, the Court ruled in favor of the New York Times, and the American public was 
shocked and disillusioned by the contents of the files.  This again hurt the legitimacy of the U.S. 
government’s intervention in Vietnam.  
 In 1972, Hồ Ngọc Cẩn proved himself once again in the Battle of An Lộc, a major battle 
that lasted for sixty-six days and that culminated in a decisive victory for South Vietnam.  
Although he belonged to the IV Corps, Hồ Ngọc Cẩn was ordered to lead his troops—the 15th 
Regiment of the 9th Infantry Division—to come to the aid in An Lộc, which was in the III Corps. 
Hồ Ngọc Cẩn walked straight into the line of fire, refusing to duck and cover as he led his troops 
down Highway 13, towards the North Vietnamese 7th Division.  Many of the soldiers were 
exhausted and wounded, but they were inspired by Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s brave example.  Against all 
odds, they reached the besieged city of An Lộc.  Despite his insistence to walk upright, Cẩn was 
not killed.  Thus he gained fame as a mythic figure who was immortal, who could not be killed.  
Quang Thi Lâm recounts the incident in his book An Loc: The 1972 Easter Invasion and the 
Battle that Saved South Viet Nam:  
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TF-15 finally linked up with elements of the 1st Airborne Brigade near Thanh 
Binh hamlet.  Colonel Nhut, province chief, went out to personally greet Lt. Col. 
Ho Ngoc Can, task force commander, and his advisor, Maj. Mandela Craig.  Nhut 
presented them with a bottle of cognac, the last bottle in the entire city.  It was a 
fitting reward for an embattled unit that had paid a heavy price for having 
successfully carried out its difficult mission after uninterrupted murderous combat 
with the enemy 7th Division.  During the Route 13 reopening operation, TF-15 
had 153 KIA, 592 WIA, 27 MIA; one M-60 machinegun and three M-16s were 
lost.  The enemy had paid a heavier price trying to stop TF-15 from linking up 
with the garrison: They suffered 304 KIA; ARVN captured 41 crew-served and 
85 individual weapons, and destroyed two PT-76 tanks.59 
 
For his military feats, Hồ Ngọc Cẩn was invited to attend the U.S. Army Command and General 
Staff in order to be promoted to a Division Commander.  He turned down the offer however, 
saying that with his mere primary school education, he was not intellectually equipped to handle 
that level of responsibility.  He would rather remain on the ground, in the heat of the battle.  He 
would rather lead his soldiers, in the name of the Republic of Vietnam.  Hồ Ngọc Cẩn thus 
accepted the position of Chương Thiện Province Chief in 1973, making him the youngest head 
of the Republic of Vietnam, at the age of thirty-five.  When asked if he would ever consider a 
promotion to Division Commander, Hồ Ngọc Cẩn replied:  
I have done a lot these past fourteen years, and while I am still not tired, my 
knowledge is limited.  Being a Regiment Commander is already high enough.  
We all have to know our place. Why should I expect to be Division Commander?  
I will continue to serve as Province Chief one or two years then I will leave, so 
that those below me can have a chance to advance.  Now I have asked to return to 
the Junior Cadet School, or to the training courses for Staff Sergeant or Battalion 
Chief, so that I can use my experiences in order to train them.  I will share with 
them what I have learned from the more than 300 battles that I had fought. 
 
Tôi lặn lội suốt mười bốn năm qua gối chưa mỏi, nhưng kiến thức có hạn. Được 
chỉ huy trung đoàn là cao rồi, mình phải biết liêm sỉ chớ, coi sư đoàn sao được. 
Làm Tỉnh Trưởng bất quá một hai năm nữa rồi tôi phải ra đi, cho đàn em họ có 
chỗ tiến thân. Bấy giờ tôi xin về coi Trường Thiếu Sinh Quân, hoặc coi các lớp 
huấn luyện Đại Đội Trưởng, Tiểu Đoàn Trưởng, đem những kinh nghiệm thu nhặt 
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được dạy đàn em. Tôi sẽ thuật trước sau hơn ba trăm trận đánh mà tôi đã trải 
qua.60 
 
Hồ Ngọc Cẩn thus was known for his selfless commitment to the next generation of South 
Vietnamese soldiers. He was also said to have been a kind and thoughtful ruler in Chương Thiện. 
 In 1973, Henry Kissinger and Lê Đức Thọ finally reached a cease-fire agreement.  On 
January 27 they signed the Paris Peace Accords, which stipulated a sixty day cease-fire while 
U.S. military troops withdrew from Việt Nam; negotiations between Sài Gòn and the Việt Cộng 
towards a political settlement that would allow the South Vietnamese people to “decide 
themselves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic general 
elections under international supervision;” and a reunification of Việt Nam that would be 
“carried out step by step through peaceful means.”61  President Nixon praised the Paris Peace 
Accords as bringing “peace with honor in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.”62  For North Vietnam, 
the agreement signified a victory—evidence of the United States’ defeat and retreat.  For South 
Vietnam, the agreement was a loss, a premonition of eventual defeat.  The agreement went into 
affect on January 28.  By March 29 the U.S. combat troops had pulled out completely.  Only 
American military advisors and some Marines remained.  For many Americans, the end of 
American involvement had been long overdue.  Over three million Americans had served in the 
war.  Nearly 60,000 had died, some 150,000 had been wounded, and at least 1,000 were missing 
in action.  For their efforts, Henry Kissinger and Lê Đức Thọ won the Nobel Peace Prize.  
Kissinger accepted the award, but Thọ declined.  Thọ declared that true peace did not yet exist in 
Vietnam. 
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 In 1974 President Nixon resigned and Hồ Ngọc Cẩn was promoted to full Colonel.  But 
the end of the Vietnam War was immanent.  First the Communist forces captured Phước Long 
province in January 1975.  The victory was key: given the lack of U.S. response, it proved that 
U.S. involvement in Vietnam was truly over, and that Sài Gòn was thus open for the taking.  On 
March 26 the Communists captured Huế, the largest city in northern South Vietnam.   They then 
initiated the Hồ Chí Minh campaign, a concerted effort led by North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 
General Van Tien Dung to “liberate” Sài Gòn.  The campaign was a clear violation of the Paris 
Peace Accords, but the U.S. did not intervene.  The NVA reached the outskirts of Sài Gòn by late 
April, before the onslaught of the rainy season.  On April 21, 1975, South Vietnamese President 
Nguyễn Văn Thiệu resigned, broadcasting his sentiments in a ninety minute TV speech to the 
people of South Vietnam.  Feeling betrayed, Thiệu tearfully read from a letter sent by Nixon in 
1972 pledging “severe retaliatory action” if South Vietnam was threatened.  He condemned 
Henry Kissinger and the Paris Peace Accords: “I never thought that such a good Secretary of 
State would produce a treaty that would bring us to our death.”63  He lambasted his former 
American allies: “The United States did not keep its promise to help us fight for freedom, a fight 
in which the United States lost 50,000 of its own young men,”64 and thus the United States “is 
inhumane. It is untrustworthy. It is irresponsible.”65  Thiệu was then ushered into exile in 
Taiwan, aided by the CIA.  On April 29 the remaining Americans in Sài Gòn evacuated by 
helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft.  On April 30 the North Vietnamese Army took over Sài Gòn 
and renamed it Hồ Chí Minh City.  General Dương Văn Minh, who had presided for the past two 
days of political upheaval, surrendered unconditionally: “We are here to hand over to you the 
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power in order to avoid bloodshed.”66  North Vietnamese Colonel Bùi Tín accepted the surrender 
and assured Minh that “Only the Americans have been beaten. If you are patriots, consider this a 
moment of joy.”67 
 Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, however, refused to surrender.  He lived by his motto: “Fight to 
the death, never retreat.  Sống chết nằm trong tay Chúa.”68  He and his men—a combination of 
Regional Forces and Popular Forces—held the 33rd Provincial Headquarters until 11:00pm on 
May 1, 1975.69  When his forces ran out of ammunition, he ordered his men to run to safety 
while he and another militiaman covered for them with a machine gun.  Colonel Cẩn could have 
committed suicide like the five ARVN generals who also refused to surrender and are thus 
remembered alongside him: Brigadier General Lê Văn Hưng, Brigadier General Lê Nguyên Vỹ, 
Major General Nguyễn Khoa Nam, Brigadier General Trần Văn Hai, and Major General Phạm 
Văn Phú.70   But Colonel Cẩn was Catholic; he believed that “Birth and death are in God's 
hands.”71  Thus Colonel Cẩn did not escape.  When Việt Cộng Commander Năm Thanh captured 
Colonel Cẩn, he pointed a K-54 at Colonel Cẩn’s head and said bitterly: “Mr. Cẩn, you deserve 
to die for all the things that you have done to us.”  Colonel Cẩn laughed but did not answer.72   
 After his capture, Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn was paraded through the streets and then put on 
trial in front of the municipal building.  According to Nguyễn Văn Tín,   
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Alleged victims were encouraged to come up to humiliate him with cursing and 
beating. No one made a move. Then the trial ended when the death sentence 
pronounced by the judges could not get any approval by a raise of hands from the 
crowd. 
Three weeks later, the Kangaroo court reopened at the public stadium in Can Tho. 
This time, the organizers were cleverer in planting plenty of moles amidst the 
crowd to make sure there would be enough shows of hands when asked, and in 
not attempting to draw out accusers that just did not exist from the non-committal 
crowd.73  
 
Thus Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn was found guilty of the charge “Murder of thousands of innocents.”   
Before he was shot, Colonel Cẩn requested three things: that he see the flag of South Vietnam, 
that he be buried in his uniform, and that his blindfold be removed.  He also declared defiantly: 
If I had won the fight, I wouldn’t have accused you as you have accused me.  I 
wouldn’t humiliate you as you humiliated me.  I wouldn’t have questioned you as 
you have questioned me.  I fight for the freedom of my countrymen.  I should be 
awarded rather than punished.  Nobody has the right to accuse me of anything.  
Let History be the judge of who fought for the just cause.  If you want to kill me, 
go ahead, but don’t blindfold me.  Down with the Communists!  Long live the 
Republic of Viet Nam! 
 
Nếu tôi thắng trong cuộc chiến, tôi sẽ không kết án các anh như các anh kết án tôi. 
Tôi cũng không làm nhục các anh như các anh làm nhục tôi. Tôi cũng không hỏi 
các anh câu mà các anh hỏi tôi. Tôi chiến đấu cho tự do của người dân. Tôi có 
công mà không có tội. Không ai có quyền kết tội tôi. Lịch sử sẽ phê phán các anh 
là giặc đỏ hay tôi là ngụy. Các anh muốn giết tôi, cứ giết đi. Xin đừng bịt mắt. Đả 
đảo Cộng Sản. Việt Nam Cộng Hòa Muôn Năm.74 
  
Thus Colonel Cẩn was publicly executed in the Cần Thơ Stadium on August 14, 1975.  He was 
the only high-ranking officer to be executed after his capture; the others, if they were killed, were 
incarcerated in re-education camps.  Perhaps Colonel Cẩn’s execution was intentionally public, 
meant to dispel the myth that he was immortal—untouchable in battle.  Thus for the 
Communists, the execution was a public display of power.  But for South Vietnamese 
nationalists, the execution has become a rallying point, an event of remembrance—Colonel Hồ 
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Ngọc Cẩn is memorialized not only as a decorated soldier but also as a brave martyr, a loyal 
subject who refused to surrender and who fought for the Republic of Vietnam until the bitter end.   
 Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s story ends here.  But this is far from the end of the story of Việt 
Nam (and its relationship to the United States).  On July 2, 1976, Việt Nam was officially unified 
as a Communist country—the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.  1979 marked the beginning of 
what historians identify as the Third Indochina War: in January, Vietnamese troops entered 
Phnom Penh to end the murderous Pol Pot regime in Cambodia.  In response to what it perceived 
as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s attempt to expand its territory, China retaliated and 
invaded northern Việt Nam.   The conflict would last only a month.  In contrast, Việt Nam would 
occupy Cambodia until 1989.  In 1991, the USSR collapsed, and Việt Nam normalized relations 
with China.  Similarly, it eventually obtained political reconciliation with the United States.  In 
1994, the U.S. lifted its 30-year trade embargo, and in 1995, diplomatic relationships were fully 
normalized with the United States. Việt Nam became a full member of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  In 2000, U.S. President Bill Clinton visited Việt Nam and 
the U.S. pledged to help to clear landmines left over from the war.  In February 2007, the U.S. 
finally agreed to help fund a study that would research the removal of Agent Orange.  It is not 
until June 2011 though that the U.S. and Việt Nam would begin a joint operation to clean up the 
leftover contamination from Agent Orange.  In June 2007, President Nguyễn Minh Triết visited 
the U.S., making him the first Vietnamese head of state to visit since the end of the Second 
Indochina War in 1975. 
 Thus in this new geopolitical context, the United States and Việt Nam are no longer 
political enemies.  Since the implementation of Đổi Mới Policy in 1986, Việt Nam has 
increasingly moved towards a “socialist-oriented market economy,” adopting tenants of Western 
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capitalism such as private enterprise.  Furthermore the world is no longer divided along the axis 
of “Communism” and “Democracy.”  In this post-9/11 moment, the United States identifies its 
“enemy” as not “Communism,” but “Terrorism.”  The geopolitical axes are redrawn between 
“freedom” and “Islamic religious fundamentalism.”  The United States no longer sees Việt Nam 
as a threat, but as an economic “partner.”  Many American commodities are now produced 
inexpensively in Việt Nam. 
 These shifting geopolitical partnerships inadvertently encourage a sort of ahistoricity—a 
forgetting of the genealogy of the past.  Such a forgetting does not hold North Vietnam 
accountable for its violation of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords.  It discourages drawing 
connections between U.S. imperialism in Southeast Asian and current encroachments into the 
Middle East.  All the while the memory of South Vietnam is slowly fading from the global 
stage—and with it, the memory Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.   
 This chapter has sought to ground the biography of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn—or what we 
know of it, culled from online blogs, forums, and websites—in a sociohistorical context.  The 
following two chapters will focus on those who are invested in the memory of Colonel Hồ Ngọc 
Cẩn, highlighting their stories, their stakes, and their agency.  What is the nature and significance 
of their cultural memory practices—these attempts to remember and memorialize a hero and a 
loved one?  
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Chapter 3 
Making Space in the Present:  
South Vietnamese American Cultural Memory Acts 
 
 
 
“Memory is most certainly constructed  
and, more important, always political.”75 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 State-sponsored historical narratives tend to frame wars as strict dichotomies, delineating 
enemies and identifying a clear winner and loser.  Thus the state makes sense of its genealogy, 
drawing distinct borders to separate the Self from Other.   
 But patriotic narratives are hardly natural.  They are carefully constructed, eliding messy 
realities and erasing certain stories—certain agents—in the name of coherency.  The narrative of 
the Second Indochina War is a telling example.  As the previous chapter established, there were 
many players: North Vietnam, South Vietnam, the United States, France, Japan, Laos, and 
Cambodia.  Yet the need to distinguish a clear enemy and conclusion has flattened the different 
narratives, often drawing the main dichotomy between North Vietnam and the United States.  
The Second Indochina War may be understood as a conflict between North and South 
Vietnam—conceptualized alternatively as a push for Vietnam’s unification or a defense against 
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Communist invasion—with the United States being merely an outside agent supplying troops 
and equipment to South Vietnam.  However, contemporary historical narratives in both present-
day Việt Nam and the United States erase South Vietnam.  A South Vietnamese veteran attests:   
Today in Việt Nam they want to say that the war was against the U.S. because 
that is a bigger feat than fighting the Republic of Vietnam. 
 
Thành thử bây giờ nó muốn bên Việt Nam nó muốn nói đánh với Mỹ đó thì cái 
chiến công nó lớn hơn là dánh với Việt Nam Cộng Hoà.76 
 
Indeed, in Việt Nam the war is known as the “Chiến Tranh Chống Mỹ Cứu Nước”— the “War of 
National Salvation Against the Americans.”  Likewise, in the United States, the Vietnam War is 
remembered (if at all) with shame—evidence of a failed attempt to secure a democratic 
stronghold in Southeast Asia, or of the United States’ dishonorable imperialistic gestures in the 
Asian Pacific.  Under this construction, North and South Vietnam are homogenized.  The 
Vietnamese all become the “Việt Cộng,” and the independence of the South Vietnamese army is 
historically negated.  South Vietnam thus gets erased.  
 
 They say history is written by the victors.  Victors, though, at least acknowledged their 
fallen enemies.  In this triangulation between North Vietnam, the United States, and South 
Vietnam, South Vietnam gets forgotten.  Not only is it a loser; it is also a failed state.  The ability 
to write history is a privilege of the state.  Thus, South Vietnam has no existing space from 
which to produce its own historical narrative. 
 But although the nation-state itself may cease to exist, its people persist, keeping the 
specter of this failed state alive through their persistent allegiance to it.  South Vietnam thus 
exists in the space of memory.  It exists in the memory of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  The South 
Vietnamese diaspora has actively attempted to keep this memory alive, etching it onto the 
                                                
76 Lieutenant Hoa Pham, Interview with Evyn Lê Espiritu, Feb. 11, 2013. 
 49 
present.   They carve out spaces for their own history, stubbornly inserting their own narratives 
into places where they perhaps do not belong.   
 Other academics have dismissed South Vietnamese cultural memory practices—many of 
which are anticommunist in nature—as “conservative exile politics.”  However, in the vein of 
Thanh Thuy Vo Dang, I take South Vietnamese cultural memory practices surrounding Colonel 
Hồ Ngọc Cẩn seriously, examining how “the refugee (or first) generation apprehend and deploy 
anticommunism in community spaces and in their private lives in order to engage with 
conversations about how memory, history and silence intersect and reveal hidden dynamics of 
institutional power and violence.”77  I echo her question: “How can acts of collective 
remembrance and the burdened silences of the first generation regarding the Vietnam-American 
war and post-war traumas work as alternatives to state sanctioned narratives (in Vietnam and the 
US) that erase or disavow South Vietnamese perspectives?”78  In this chapter I read displaced 
South Vietnamese Americans’ public memory practices to commemorate Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn 
as attempts to create spaces for their own history—attempts to preserve and pass down their own 
memory: a memory that is at once national, collective, individual, and haunting.  South 
Vietnamese Americans have fiercely held the United States accountable to its promises of 
freedom—particularly freedom of expression and freedom of speech—and thus have articulated 
narratives and erected monuments, bringing to life memories that perhaps others would like to 
forget.  In this way they defy both North Vietnam’s desire to silence their narrative as well as the 
United States’ desire to forget the Vietnam War. 
 After drawing from two interviews in order to further examine this political triangulation 
that leads to the erasure of South Vietnam, I conceptualize South Vietnamese American public 
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memory practices as four different kinds of space-making acts: physical, ceremonial, digital, and 
oral.  Examining a Vietnam War memorial in Westminster, California, I analyze how South 
Vietnamese American activists map their history onto the physical landscape.  Next, I analyze 
South Vietnamese American’s interactions with these spaces, arguing that they organize these 
elaborate commemoration ceremonies in order to carve out a space in time to memorialize 
Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, specifically, and South Vietnam, in general.  Since these commemoration 
ceremonies are temporally contingent—once they are completed they cease to physically exist—
there is an urgency to videotape and archive these ceremonies, carving out a space in the digital 
to house them.  Transcending nation-state borders, South Vietnamese Americans use the Internet 
to archive their history and memories.  Lastly, this chapter takes seriously the oral element: the 
telling of stories as a way of creating space for Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn in the present. 
 I conclude with a discussion of the political usefulness of these memory acts.  What is the 
politics of memory?  What is the purpose of these creations of space?  Are public memory 
practices regarding Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn merely a nostalgic politics of the past?  What is the 
use of remembering a ghostly state?  What is the nature of this ghostly state’s haunting?  Is it 
better to be haunted—to remember or to forget?   
  
Articulating the Triangulation: Why South Vietnam is forgotten and Colonel Cẩn’s 
memory is suppressed  
 In addition to analyzing physical memorials, online websites, and videos as historical 
archives that memorialize Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn as a South Vietnamese hero, I draw heavily 
from two interviews from Vietnam War veterans: one with South Vietnamese veteran Lieutenant 
Hoa Pham and one with American veteran Colonel Craig Mandeville.  Although Lieutenant 
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Pham never met Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn personally—they both attended the ARVN Republic of 
Vietnam Dong De Academy, but Colonel Cẩn was in an older group—Lieutenant Pham was 
deeply moved by the story of Colonel Cẩn’s bravery and patriotism in the face of his execution, 
and continues to idolize Colonel Cẩn as a hero of South Vietnam.  Lieutenant Pham is at the 
forefront of carving spaces of memory for Colonel Cẩn.  In 2010 he organized an elaborate 
commemoration service for Colonel Cẩn, inviting people from around the country.  He also has a 
significant online presence: in addition to having a colorful and elaborate blog79 that details his 
autobiography, complete with political commentary and video slideshows of himself, Lieutenant 
Pham also has a thriving YouTube channel80 that currently has 481 videos and 440 channel 
subscribers.  His channel has accumulated 2,907,787 video views since its origin on December 
17, 2009.81  Most relevantly, a preliminary Google search for “Ho Ngoc Can” features two of 
Lieutenant Pham’s YouTube videos. 
 Lieutenant Pham introduced me to Colonel Mandeville, who spoke at Colonel Cẩn’s 
2010 commemoration ceremony and who is thus featured in several of Lieutenant Pham’s 
YouTube videos.  Born in a small city in Oklahoma, Craig H. Mandeville joined the military 
after participating in ROTC in college, and first served in Việt Nam in 1967, and then again in 
1972: 
The war started I think officially if you look at ’64, ’65.  I was still in uh, I was in 
college and then I graduated in ’61.  So I joined the military right after that.  They 
didn’t send me to Vietnam, they sent me to Berlin.  And while I was there, you 
know, I couldn’t wait to get to Vietnam.  And after a year or so went by I got 
alerted and I went to Vietnam in 1967. . . .  Well my first tour I stayed one year.  I 
started with the 101st Airborne, a separate airborne brigade where I commanded 
an artillery battery and I left there and went back to a stateside assignment and 
then back to Germany.  Then I got my orders to go back.  And I went back in ’72 
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for another year.  That tour I served as an advisor to the South Vietnamese 
military.82 
 
It was on this second tour that Colonel Mandeville met Colonel Cẩn, and after some initial 
distrust, they developed a special friendship.  Colonel Mandeville is currently the Executive 
Director of the Westminster Vietnam War Memorial Committee; he helped in the initial 
organizing and fundraising for the memorial, and attests that it is the memory of Colonel Cẩn 
that personally drives him to “protect the memorial to perpetuity.”83 
 The personal testimonies of these two men help to explain why South Vietnamese 
people—especially patriotic veterans and those that lived through the war—find it so important 
to publically commemorate Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, elevating his story to the realm of collective 
memory.  On one level, Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn—with his stubborn refusal to surrender and his 
request to see the flag of South Vietnam before he died—becomes representative of this fallen 
and forgotten state.  To pay tribute to Colonel Cẩn is to pay tribute to South Vietnam.  This is 
important, given the current Communist Vietnam government’s desire to suppress the memory 
of South Vietnam.   
 This suppression is motivated by a couple factors.   For one, Việt Nam has a long-
established historical narrative of defense against from foreign invasion, reaching as far back as 
the Han Chinese’s annexation of the Nam Việt Kingdom in 111 BC and the subsequent 
millennium of struggles against China.  North Vietnam’s construction of the United States as a 
foreign imperialist invader fits into this narrative.  As a result, the Vietnamese state is hesitant to 
give full voice and credence to the cause and demands of the now-defunct South Vietnamese 
state.  A parallel geopolitical tension can be found in the United States’ careful and somewhat 
uneasy historical treatment of the cessation and later re-inclusion of the Southern states during 
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the American Civil War era.  Both North Vietnam and the Northern U.S. states conceptualized 
unification as beneficial to the country as a whole, and thus, there is a desire to suppress the 
alternative memory of unification as not embraced but rather coerced. 
 According to Lieutenant Hoa Pham, the Vietnamese state’s choice to identify the United 
States and not South Vietnam as the primary enemy is an attempt to consolidate an image of 
greater political strength.  When asked specifically why he thought the current Vietnamese state 
does not want to acknowledge Colonel Cẩn’s story, Lieutenant Pham cites geopolitical dynamics 
larger than the individual: “they bigger when they fought with the Americans than with the South 
Vietnam.”84  He insists that the Vietnamese government manipulates the history of the war:  
The North Vietnam they win the war because, um, because the United States 
withdraw, not just because they win it.  They have no capability to win it at all.  
1968 they almost like wiped out.  And they retreat everybody back into their 
stronghold area. . . . And then the same time, Nixon went to China and have a 
treaty and gave away South Vietnam.85  
  
Thus Lieutenant Pham insists that North Vietnam is not as strong—and by extension, South 
Vietnam was not as weak—as dominant historical narratives would suggest.  To remember 
Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s then is to remember an alternate history, in which the South Vietnamese 
army fought bravely for the independence of their state, but ultimately lost when their American 
allies abandoned them. 
 What is the nature of this memory suppression?  It is more akin to the subtle and 
pervasive structure of hegemony rather than blatant acts of oppression.  For one there is the issue 
of demographics: almost sixty percent of those currently living in Việt Nam were born after the 
war.86  According to Lieutenant Pham, the current government tries to “brainwash” the “smaller, 
younger generation” with their version of history, and although the older generations in the 
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South claim that “nobody pay[s] attention” to the “propaganda,” Lieutenant Pham worries that it 
will affect the kids, who have no alternative memory of their own: “[The kids] been watching 
over and over again, one day they believe it. . . . [The government] keep doing that until you 
think that’s the true story.”87  Likewise, Colonel Mandeville highlights the erasure of the South 
Vietnamese flag: 
[For those born in Vietnam after the war,] there’s nothing in their memory that 
shows the flag of South Vietnam.  All their history books have been taken out.  
There’s nothing.  The people that come up there today, only know one flag.  
That’s the Communist flag.  And they make an attempt to guarantee that.  There’s 
flags on every building, just about.  I’m not exaggerating.  I’ve been back.  And, 
so they wanted that, “Take it out of their memory!  It’s off the books.”  What they 
teach; they don’t even talk about the war having a flag.88   
 
Colonel Mandeville’s use of the word “memory” here is significant, and points to either a 
nonlinear temporal bending or an alternative definition of memory.  For the flag to be taken out 
of the younger generation’s memory, it would have to have existed there in the first place.  
However, these Vietnamese individuals were born after the war, and thus the memory is not 
personal; it is not exactly theirs, in the sense that the memory does not stem from a literal 
physical experience of seeing the flag fly in honor of South Vietnam.  Colonel Mandeville thus 
references the idea of a collective memory—a memory that is passed down through the 
generations.  The memory of the South Vietnamese flag is thus transferred, ending up in the 
unconscious of the younger generations.  It is like a ghostly image that cannot be fully articulated 
or recalled.89  And yet the Vietnamese state desires to control this memory and “take it out”—to 
control not only its citizens’ bodies, but their unconscious psyches as well. 
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 Despite this undercurrent of psychological violence, the government appears benevolent, 
and “life goes on.”90  In the only time that he breaks into Vietnamese, Lieutenant Pham points 
out:  
Today people [the Vietnamese government officials] do not hold grudges like 
they did before.  They let people go in and out of Việt Nam to go here and there, 
so that’s why in this period people have forgotten all about the heroes [of the 
war]. 
 
Mấy người ta bây giờ không có giống như là hận thù giống như là hồi xưa vậy đó. 
Ta đễ cho mấy người đi vô ra Việt Nam đi chơi đi này kia no ̣đó, thời gian người 
ta quên những người anh hùng.91   
 
Reform is the greatest inhibitor of revolution.  The government allows greater freedoms to 
appease the people, to encourage them to forget the messy narratives of the past.  The urgency 
for resistance threatens to fade.  But an ocean away, South Vietnamese Americans try to rekindle 
that sense of urgency.   
 Given the historical geopolitical triangulation, it is not only Việt Nam that attempts to 
erase the Republic of Vietnam and its representative heroes, but the United States as well.  
Unlike other vocal anti-Communist South Vietnamese veterans, Lieutenant Pham does not 
unequivocally praise the United States and the Americans.  He critiques the U.S. as well.  Part of 
this critique is historical—a criticism of the United States’ decision to pull out of Vietnam too 
early: “Nowadays, a lot of document[s] come out.  And uh, if we be able to, uh, hold the country 
for seven or eight months, and they could have some kind of treaty.  So kind of, uh, thing that 
change it so we not completely to the Communists.”92  Lieutenant Pham criticizes Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger for allegedly abandoning South Vietnam in order to focus instead on 
Israel.  In this way, Lieutenant Pham does not conceptualize South Vietnam as a dependent 
puppet, but rather as a sovereign state.  It is equal to the United States, in dignity if not in 
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military might.  The U.S.’s promise to help South Vietnam was an agreement between allies.  
But the United States broke the promise. 
 Lieutenant Pham also moves beyond the historical, critiquing the American government’s 
contemporary refusal/inability to acknowledge South Vietnamese veterans: “The only people 
[that] recognize the South Vietnam veterans is the U.S. veterans.”93  Even then, most American 
Vietnam War veterans do not see the South Vietnamese veterans as equals, as comrades from the 
war.  Colonel Mandeville explains: 
You know I hate to say this, but a large majority of American veterans don't like 
the South Vietnamese military.  We in our typical macho American way, we go 
over and fight, we fight the American way, and we kind of bully our way in and 
take over. . . . But a lot of American soldiers saw the Vietnamese as lazy, 
cowards, didn’t want to do anything.  And they were fighting and losing their 
friends, and then they go back to base and they see the Vietnamese sitting around 
doing nothing and they have that memory.94 
 
Colonel Mandeville does not believe that the South Vietnamese soldiers were inherently lazy, 
but rather places the blame on the American military: “Well, we created that problem.  If we had 
gone over right and said well we’re going to go ahead and do this but you got to come with us, 
and equally, given the ammunition and training, that wouldn’t have occurred.”95  Colonel 
Mandeville believes that the U.S. did not invest enough resources into training the South 
Vietnamese soldiers or providing them ample ammunition.  In this way he blames the American 
government for fostering a sense of South Vietnamese dependency.  However, he sometimes 
slips into infantilizing naturalist rhetoric as well, conceptualizing South Vietnamese people as 
inherently in need of stronger leadership:  
They were able to hold their own. . . . The only difference is that the South 
Vietnamese soldier requires leadership to lead them.  They needed strong officers 
to lead them.  Americans, with the officers gone, somebody will pick it up and 
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start leading.  The South Vietnamese, as long as they had a leader, they were 
great.96   
 
Nonetheless, Colonel Mandeville advocates greater collaboration and camaraderie between 
South Vietnamese and American veterans of the Vietnam War: The American veterans “didn’t 
know why they disliked the Vietnamese.  What they disliked was, they didn’t really know them.  
The war does funny things to your memory.”97  Here it is not the state directly, but rather the 
state-initiated agent of “war,” that manipulates “memory,” speaking again to the psychological 
violence that validates some historical narratives while actively erasing others. 
 Lieutenant Pham testifies that even if individual American veterans befriend and support 
their South Vietnamese counterparts, there is no institutional support for South Vietnamese 
veterans.  “The veterans help the veterans more than the government.  The government, they 
don’t care.”98  The South Vietnamese people are a stateless people; there is no state to recognize 
them, to provide them material benefits or to acknowledge their bravery, sacrifices, and loss.  
Even the degree of inter-veteran support takes place on an individual rather than an 
organizational level.  According to Lieutenant Pham, the Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA), 
the biggest organization for U.S. veterans in the United States, follows the “political agenda of 
the government.”99  In November 2000, President Clinton became the first president to visit 
Vietnam since the end of the war, thus breaking the political embargo and in a sense legitimizing 
the Communist government.  Thus Lieutenant Pham laments: “So right now the VVA they 
completely… they completely with the Việt Nam government but not, but they not really care to 
listen to the South Vietnam soldiers.”100 
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 And there is an urgent wish for people to listen to the South Vietnamese soldiers, for 
people to know the story of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  Lieutenant Pham conflates the personal and 
the collective, explaining that he wants Colonel Cẩn’s “story on the internet so to let the people 
know he’s a hero.  And to let the people know that’s how—that’s how we conduct ourselves in 
the war.”101  This is a story that exists in South Vietnamese veterans’ collective memory, but that 
must be then transferred to succeeding generations in a way that does not rely on state-sponsored 
historical narratives, given that a South Vietnamese state does not exist.  Lieutenant Pham 
worries:  
Right now they, they, they talk about the war in Iraq and Afghanistan but they do 
not talk about Vietnam war because it’s kind of like, old war for them, it’s too 
old.  Most of the people right now, the youngest is already like sixty.  So, twenty 
years from now, maybe, maybe nothing.  Maybe all gone.  A year from now.  It 
will be gone.  
 
In light of this eminent forgetting and historical erasure, South Vietnamese Americans engage in 
space-making practices, grafting their memories onto the landscape as a means of materializing 
memory and archiving their history.   
 
1. Physical 
 
 Westminster, California—the heart of Little Saigon in Orange County—is home to 
36,058 self-identified individuals of Vietnamese descent, making it the city with the most 
Vietnamese Americans per capita.102  Westminster also hosts a stunning Vietnam War Memorial: 
an impressive twelve-foot structure featuring two young and upright soldiers—one American 
and one South Vietnamese—standing atop a semi-circular arch of waterfall.  The waterfall’s 
arms curve in to surround and embrace a central bowl of flame.  Three flags billow in the wind: 
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the red-white-and-blue of America, the three-red-stripes-on-yellow of South Vietnam, and the 
stark black-and-white of the POW flag.  Flowers are lain at the soldiers’ feet.  People wander 
through the memorial to pay tribute to the veterans or sit on the surrounding benches.  It is this 
memorial that at least one man, Colonel Mandeville, dedicates specifically to Colonel Hồ Ngọc 
Cẩn.  It is this memorial that testifies to the history of the South Vietnamese soldier and the 
Republic of Vietnam.  It is also this memorial—with the story of struggle behind its initiation 
and construction—that attests to how difficult—and therefore how important—it is to write 
South Vietnamese memories onto the physical landscape. 
 Most monuments and memorials are visual representations of state-sponsored historical 
narratives.  According to James E. Young: 
By themselves, monuments are of little value, mere stones in the landscape.  But 
as part of a nation’s rites or the objects of a people’s national pilgrimage, they are 
invested with national soul and memory.  For traditionally, the state-sponsored 
memory of a national past aims to affirm the righteousness of a nation’s birth, 
even its divine election.  The matrix of a nation’s monuments emplots the story of 
ennobling events, of triumphs over barbarism, and recalls the martyrdom of those 
who gave their lives in the struggle for national existence—who, in the 
martyrological refrain, died so that a country might live.  In assuming the 
idealized forms and meanings assigned this era by the state, memorials tend to 
concretize particular historical interpretations.  They suggest themselves as 
indigenous, even geological outcroppings in a national landscape; in time, such 
idealized memory grows as natural to the eye as the landscape in which it stands.  
Indeed, for memorials to do otherwise would be to undermine the very 
foundations of national legitimacy, of the state’s seemingly natural right to 
exist.103   
 
But in Westminster, the Vietnam War Memorial resurrects the ghost of a now-defunct state—
South Vietnam.  The diaspora that does not have its own geographically-bounded state is perhaps 
then free to write their history and memory on the landscape of other politically sovereign 
nations.  The messiness of diasporic memory thus offers an implicit critique of the limitations of 
the nation-state structure.   
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 In 1997, Mayor Frank Fry initiated the Westminster Vietnam War Memorial project.  
Colonel Mandeville explains: 
Frank Fry was the mayor of Westminster, City Council member, WWII veteran, 
had seen how poorly the South—the American soldier was treated when they 
came back from the war.  We were spit on; they didn’t respect us.  And he also 
had this huge community of South Vietnamese here.  And so he said, “We got to 
do something in memory of those people who fought.”  So he had this idea of this 
memorial.104 
 
Americans’ desire to forget the Vietnam War hurt both the American Vietnam War veterans as 
well as the South Vietnamese immigrant community.  Mayor Fry recognized the overlapping 
interests of these constituencies and decided to construct a memorial that would pay tribute to 
both.  He thus highlighted rather than ignored the collaboration between American and South 
Vietnamese soldiers.  He acknowledged the South Vietnamese veterans as equals rather than 
dependents. 
 A contest was held to determine the design for the monument.  A select committee, 
headed by Frank Fry, unanimously chose sculptor Tuan Nguyen’s proposal.  Tuan Nguyen’s 
own biography is intimately tied to the story of South Vietnam.  Born in Sài Gòn in 1963, 
Nguyen started his life in the midst of the Vietnam War.  In 1988 he attempted to flee, but was 
captured by the Communists and sent to a reeducation camp.  He eventually escaped by sneaking 
out through the Cambodian jungles and ultimately made it to the United States.105   Here, he 
became interested in sculpting, and in 1995, Tuan Nguyen received his fine art degree from the 
Art Institute of Southern California in Laguna Beach, CA.106  According to Colonel Mandeville,  
Tuan has two things: if you look at the statues, the American soldier has his 
helmet off, and he’s going home.  He’s looking to the future and he’s finished his 
job and he’s leaving.  Proud of his service, etc.  The South Vietnamese soldier’s 
got his helmet on, and he’s got his finger out pointing to the ground.  And he’s 
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staying to fight for his country.  That was the symbolism that Tuan wanted to 
portray. . . . [I]t’s the only memorial truly where soldiers stand upright.  They 
fight for what they’re asked to do.  And they fight and they come home or they 
don’t come home.  And people wanted to put the names of the people that were 
killed in Vietnam and Tuan said, “No, no.”  People know in their head when they 
walk up that people died.  He didn’t want that.  The thought of fighting for your 
country, just like the saying says below it.  Freedom.107 
 
Thus there is an emphasis on life, rather than death.  The soldiers, forever young, bring this past 
moment of youthful camaraderie into the present.  It is a liminal moment—a moment that marks 
the threshold between a time of intimate fighting, side by side in the jungles of Vietnam, and the 
reminder of distance, the fact that the American can ultimately leave and go “home.”  It also 
references a lost time in which the South Vietnamese soldier can indeed point to the Vietnamese 
ground and claim the soil as his sovereign country—a gesture that no longer holds true. 
 The memorial now stands proudly in Sid Goldstein Freedom Park.  However, it took six 
long years for this project to come to fruition—six long years of raising money, resisting active 
suppressions of memory, and negotiating conflicts over the memorial’s meaning and structure.  
Colonel Mandeville recounts resistance to the memorial from both the American community and 
the current Vietnamese state.  On the American side, there is a desire to forget: “The war’s 
still… not happy.  The American people don't like the Vietnam War.  They don’t like Vietnam, 
American soldiers, they don’t like Vietnamese.  It was a bad memory for them.”108  When I 
pressed further, Colonel Mandeville elaborated: 
Kind of the turning point if you look back in history, it was Tet in ’67, ’68.  And 
the press played it up that the South Vietnamese were getting killed, American 
soldiers were being killed, because they really didn’t hit the whole country.  But 
we destroyed the North Vietnamese.  We killed them all and fought them all back.  
But the press turned against us.  And so the people started rioting.  I mean, they 
said, “Get us out of there,” and they turned on the military guys as we were the 
problem, rather than the politicians.  They turned on the politicians but they 
thought we were the problem.  The baby killers, the rapists, the burning people.  
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You know, all that stuff, they thought that’s what we were.  And uh, so that, that’s 
what’s filtered into the American people’s mind.  And that’s why I say those same 
generation, those were them and their kids today.  They’re doing what they do.  
And uh, you know, they just… They didn’t understand why were fighting the war, 
they didn’t understand the cost of the war, you know, 68,000 people died and they 
just don’t like it.109 
 
Colonel Mandeville articulates the feelings of “a bad memory” in terms of both an inability to 
understand and a lingering affect of shame.  In “Dangerous History: Vietnam and the ‘Good 
War,’” Marilyn B. Young argues that the Vietnam War was the first event in American history 
that threatened the American historical metanarrative itself—a metanarrative that “has been 
based on a belief in the fulfillment, over time, of the enduring principles of the Founding 
Fathers” and which claimed that since its inception, the U.S. has “stood for self-determination, 
freedom, and democracy.”110  The Vietnam War was posed as an antithesis to WWII, the “Good 
War,” in which Americans held the moral high ground and secured a decisive victory.  Indeed, 
Colonel Mandeville identifies WWII veterans as some of the most vocal opposition to the 
Vietnam War Memorial: “They are not the greatest generation.  Because those same people that 
fought turned against us when we were trying to build a memorial.  The VFW and the Foreign 
Legion, whatever else came out, didn’t want the statue!”111  Part of this Colonel Mandeville 
interprets as a personal affront, an attack on the American Vietnam War veteran: 
And it was like, they didn’t think we were veterans that needed anything to focus 
on, to remember our veterans.  I was devastated!  So they’re not the greatest 
generation.  If they were they would have welcomed us home and treated us well, 
and they didn’t.  For some reason they thought they’d fought the only war and we 
were just not equal to them.  Well statistics prove that we saw more combat than 
they did.  Everything we did was a lot more than they did, except they got 
welcomed home.112 
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Another reason is the continual distrust of the South Vietnamese people and the conflation of 
North and South Vietnam, as this anecdote exemplifies: 
Actually I was trying to raise money, I was working at Boeing, a veterans group 
there.  And all of a sudden a couple of people said they didn’t want to talk to me 
anymore.  I asked, “Why?”  And he said, “Why you dealing with the 
Vietnamese?”113  
 
Whatever the reason, as a result of the lack of American support, “ninety-nine percent” of the 
money raised for the memorial—well over a million dollars—was “given by the South 
Vietnamese.”114  Despite the significant support of American allies such as Mayor Frank Fry and 
Colonel Craig Mandeville, the sense of camaraderie depicted by the memorial’s statue is perhaps 
not as reflective of the reality in Westminster as one would like to believe. 
 However, it is not only the American community that would like to suppress the memory 
of South Vietnam’s struggle as materialized by this memorial.  Colonel Mandeville tells a 
chilling story of the extent to which the current Vietnamese state will go to silence the memory 
of South Vietnam.  They sent “a formal complaint letter to our state department saying they did 
not want that memorial built, primarily because of the flag.  And the state department sent it to 
the city of Westminster.”   However, “the city council just threw it away.  Who were they to tell 
us what we could do with our property and our memories?”115  Thus the act of constructing the 
Vietnam War Memorial is one of political defiance. 
 But defiance is not without risk.  The question of memory—and who has a right to 
control it—became quite literally a question of life and death: 
M: And they were serious about it.  They threatened my life.  I got calls, “If the 
flag goes up, I go down.”  So the city of Westminster—I carried a concealed 
weapon for three years.  Uh, because the threats were real.   
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E: Hmm. Who was calling you? 
 
M: You know.  Whoever is here: a relative, or gang member, or whoever they got.  
And they considered it to be valid threats.  They threw glass at my yard, a lot of 
stuff which I had to deal with.  I was married at the time; I think that’s one reason 
we got a divorce.  She was frightened to death.  And I kept saying, “Just bring 
them on.  I’ll take them on, just like I did in Vietnam.  They try one, I’ll take them 
on.”116   
 
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam feels threatened by the memorial and Colonel Mandeville 
conflates contemporary opposition with his past enemies in Việt Nam.  Thus the Vietnam War 
Memorial resurrects the South Vietnamese state in the present, bringing to life past struggles in 
its wake. 
 Not only were there difficulties with financial support; Americans contended with the 
degree of equality portrayed in the memorial as well: 
They fought, we fought with them, and they should be standing equal to 
Americans and that’s why in Frank’s mind and my mind they’re equal.  You 
know, not one.  I got in a battle with I won’t tell you who, but they wanted the 
American flag higher than the South Vietnamese flag.  Just because, American 
pride.  We should have dumped him.  I got to prove it to him, in American 
regulations they’re equal height.  Well then people said, “Well inch it down a 
couple of inches; nobody will know.”  Well we knew.  So the flags are equal 
height and equal importance.  You wouldn’t believe there was so many innuendos 
that happened during that time.117 
 
Even those who did not actively suppress the memory of South Vietnamese agency, bravery, and 
collaboration wanted to diminish it, to qualify it in comparison to the American soldier’s 
representation. 
 How does this memorial connect to the memory of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn?  For Colonel 
Mandeville, who served with Colonel Cẩn in 1972, the connection is deeply personal.  His 
moving testimony speaks for itself: 
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But, uh, I got involved with it, and this sounds corny, and I may not get through it, 
but I heard when Colonel Can was executed he had three requests.  He wanted to 
be in his full dress uniform, he wanted his blindfold removed, and he wanted to 
see the flag of South Vietnam.  So… That’s what I think I would want.  And so in 
their cruel way, they let him have his uniform but then they brought his family out 
to watch the execution.  And when I heard that story it really irritated me.  So in 
my mind I got involved to build a memorial—getting a bit choked up here—to 
pay tribute to Colonel Can.  ‘Cause the flag is always there for him to see.  And 
uh, that’s a flag here.  Don’t put this in the tape but when you lose your country, 
you lose your flag.  There’s no longer a flag of free Vietnam.  Now in my heart 
and all the Vietnamese here there is.  And in reality all these flags around here are 
banners.  But I wouldn’t tell the South Vietnamese that; they’d run me out of 
town.  But the memorial is on a piece of ground that was dedicated to be there 
1965-1975, so it’s a historical place, so as long as it stands there, that is a flag.  
And so when I look at the flag, it’s Colonel Can.  [tears up]  Sorry.118 
 
Thus the work of the Vietnam War Memorial in Westminster is both personal and political.  It 
commemorates a fallen hero—Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn—that otherwise would be forgotten.  For 
Colonel Mandeville and others, he was a dear ally and friend.  It evidences a history of equal 
alliance between American and South Vietnamese soldiers during the Vietnam War.  And it 
carves out a space of sovereignty—if only symbolic—for the specter of the South Vietnamese 
state on American land.  A space where the South Vietnamese flag can snap briskly in the wind.  
This carving out of space is perhaps an anti-imperialist gesture in its own right: an act to reclaim 
a part of American soil for the Republic of Vietnam, in a telling reversal of the United States’ 
encroachment on Vietnamese land forty years ago.  It is an oblique and subversive move of 
resistance, as the South Vietnamese state is but a ghost, and thus not read as a real political threat 
to the United States.    
 But ghosts have very real effects on the present.  They can be resurrected.  One way that 
South Vietnamese interact with the physical landscape of the memorial and resurrect the ghost of 
the South Vietnamese state is by holding elaborate ceremonies for Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  
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2. Ceremonial 
 In his essay on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., American art critic 
Arthur Danto drew a philosophical distinction between monuments and memorials, ultimately 
defining monuments as spaces of the present/life and memorials as spaces of the past/death:   
We erect monuments so that we shall always remember and build memorials so 
that we shall never forget.  Thus, we have the Washington Monument but the 
Lincoln Memorial.  Monuments commemorate the memorable and embody the 
myths of beginnings.  Memorials ritualize remembrance and mark the reality of 
ends. . . . Very few nations erect monuments to their defeats, but many set up 
memorials to the defeated dead.  Monuments make heroes and triumphs, victories 
and conquests, perpetually present and part of life.  The memorial is a special 
precinct, extruded from life, a segregated enclave where we honor the dead.  With 
monuments, we honor ourselves.119 
 
James E. Young troubles this division between monument and memorial though, pointing out 
that “the traditional monument (the tombstone) can also be used as a mourning site for lost loved 
ones, just as memorials have marked past victories.  A statue can be [both] a monument to 
heroism and a memorial to tragic loss.”120  Thus, the Westminster Vietnam War Memorial is not 
only space a death, “extruded from life,” marking the “reality of ends,” and memorializing the 
“defeated dead” of the Vietnam War.  It also is very much a space of life; the Americans and the 
South Vietnamese may remember the Vietnam War as ending in defeat, but Tuan Nguyen’s 
decision to depict young, upright soldiers simultaneously calls forth the moments of “heroes and 
triumphs, victories and conquests”—moments that cannot be negated by the end result and that a 
queered understanding of non-linear temporality gives equal credence to.  Furthermore, 
“memorials themselves remain inert and amnesiac, dependent on visitors for whatever memory 
they finally produce.”121  Thus it is the visitors—the viewers of the present and not the dead of 
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the past—that ultimately activate the memorial, pulling the memories of past heroes such as 
Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn into the space of the present. 
 The Vietnam War Memorial has been incorporated into the fabric of contemporary life.  
The memorial has six reviews on yelp.com, and while three of these reference the history of the 
Vietnam War explicitly—one drawing a comparison between the Washington D.C. Vietnam 
Veteran Memorial’s somber inscription of names and the Westminster Vietnam War Memorial’s 
more “straightforward” construction in “a sunny cheery park surrounded by flowers”—all six 
refer to the site as a space to relax, reflect, study, and eat.122  Part of this emphasis on everyday 
life practices has to do with the nature of yelp.com as a website to review places of interest and 
entertainment.  But despite this selection bias, there is something striking about the decision to 
note that “[t]here’s benches and a small playground—good place to just sit, eat lunch, and have 
your kiddos play,” rather than to comment exclusively on the historical significance of the 
memorial.123  Indeed, the ease with which the viewers incorporate the memorial into their 
everyday life practices speaks to the successful integration of the South Vietnamese flag—and 
thus the specter of the South Vietnamese state—into the present.  Colonel Mandeville attests to 
how the memorial is simultaneously a space of relaxation, rejuvenation, reflection, and 
remembrance:  
. . . sometimes, I’ll spend the day out here at the memorial sitting over there on 
the bench.  It’s not because I’m feeling like the war.  I like to see the people come 
out.  I like to see them talking to their kids.  I go over there and talk to them, I ask, 
they’re always talking to their kids about the war or their dad or whatever.124 
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These acts of memory transfers, then, are not isolated lessons of history, but rather fluid 
moments of intergenerational sharing, interwoven into shared activities such as visiting a park or 
enjoying a picnic.  
 The South Vietnamese American community interacts with the memorial in more formal 
and ritualized ways as well.  However, these acts can still be read as rooted strongly in the 
present, rather than merely oriented somberly towards the past.  For example, in August 2011, a 
group of South Vietnamese military officials organized a memorial for Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn at 
the Westminster Vietnam War memorial, complete with flags, patriotic speeches, elaborate 
flower arrangements, and photographs of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  A Vietnamese woman dressed 
in a traditional áo dài sang both the South Vietnamese and the American anthem, back to back.  
Thus the gathered Vietnamese crowd paid respect to both nations, acknowledging their current 
presence in the United States, but refusing to give up allegiance to South Vietnam.  They saluted 
both flags, calling forth the specter of the South Vietnamese state.  Most importantly they paid 
tribute to their fallen hero, Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, retelling his story and recounting memories of 
his victories.125 
 The Westminster Vietnam War Memorial writes South Vietnamese history onto the 
Southern California landscape.  But it is ultimately a stone structure, and thus lifeless.  Thus 
South Vietnamese ceremonial practices are important; they gather together live bodies in public 
spaces.  The South Vietnamese people are not a people relegated to history; they actively make 
and claim space in the present.  In some ways this ceremony for Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn is 
oriented towards the past.  But it is simultaneously an act to pull Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn into the 
present and to advocate his continued remembrance in the future.  
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 On August 15, 2010, Lieutenant Hoa Pham, President of the Dong De Military Cadet 
Association, dedicated the organization’s annual reunion to Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.126  The day 
marked the thirty-fifth anniversary of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s public execution; the ceremony 
was both a personal đám giỏ đó—a death anniversary celebration—and a more political 
commemoration.  Over two hundred people came from around the country to attend the event, 
which took place at the Diamond Seafood Restaurant in Stanton, California.  Lieutenant Pham 
started planning six months in advance, making sure there was adequate time to send out the 
invitations, reserve the restaurant, make a press release, acquire the sound equipment, find the 
musicians, hire a decorator, and schedule the nights’ events.  Lieutenant Pham cites five reasons 
for organizing the commemoration ceremony for the Dong De Military Cadet Association’s 
reunion: First, he felt that as President of the group it was his responsibility to initiate and 
organize such an event.  Second, many of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s classmates and military 
friends lived out-of-state, and this was the only time they came to California.  Third, he wanted 
Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s friends to meet his family.  Fourth, he felt the ceremony was a way to 
assert his belief that the Communists had violated the Geneva Convention by executing Colonel 
Hồ Ngọc Cẩn when he was a prisoner of war without giving him a fair trial.  Fifth, 
the main [reason] I really want to do the event [is] because I want the people to 
remember him. . . . As who he is.  Because during the war, even the shooting—no 
matter how big, how small the shooting—he never sit down. . . . You know your 
normal reactions, you always, when you hear the shooting, is always, you know, 
duck down little bit.  But he never.  He always stand up.  He always.  Big battle, 
small battle.  Whoever shooting. 127 
 
Lieutenant Pham thus articulates a desire to specifically commemorate Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s 
bravery in battle.  For Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn is not only an individual but also a symbol.  He is a 
                                                
126 The Army of the Republic of Vietnam Dong De Academy was one of the major military academies of the Republic of Vietnam. The academy 
trained NCOs and officers for all branches of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, as well as offering other specialized training.  Lieutenant 
Hoa Pham and Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn both attended the Dong De Academy. 
127 Lieutenant Hoa Pham, Interview with Evyn Lê Espiritu, Feb. 11, 2013. 
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representative of the bravery and strength of the South Vietnamese army that is often forgotten 
or negated by teleologically driven narratives emphasizing the end result of the war.  
 The night of the ceremony, Lieutenant Pham came dressed in his full military uniform. 
He presided as Master of Ceremony on a wide stage complete with Christmas lights and banners 
honoring Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  Marine Corps Colonel Harold A. ‘Hal’ Hayes, a high-ranking 
commanding officer during the war, gave a speech in commemoration.  Helen Elena Lopez, a 
third generation Spanish American who initiated her career singing in Vietnamese, performed an 
upbeat song.128  Associate Justice Eileen C. Moore, who served as a combat nurse in Vietnam 
and is now a member of Vietnam Veterans of America, urged the audience to register Colonel 
Hồ Ngọc Cẩn on the MY HERO website, a nonprofit digital archive and educational project.129  
Colonel Craig Mandeville, who knew Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn personally in Việt Nam and who 
met and befriended Lieutenant Hoa Pham in Westminster, was invited to speak as well.130  
Colonel Mandeville was moved by the ceremony and he teared up during his speech.  “They 
made me dig out stuff I hadn’t looked at in a long time.”131  Colonel Mandeville also appreciated 
the đám giỏ đó ceremony, articulating its importance from the perspective of a cultural outsider: 
I thought it was very touching.  It’s something Americans don’t do.  You know, 
there’s been so many great generals and colonels and stuff, and people in my 
mind should be recognized.  But they die, and the ceremony, and then they’re 
kind of remembered by a few.  But I love the Vietnamese tradition of 
remembering their parents after they die and the tradition of well, they’re 
recognized as heroes too in fighting.  So, it’s the first time I had been exposed to 
it.  I thought it was great, you know.132 
 
                                                
128 “Helen Elena Lopez,” accessed March 15, 2013, http://helenelena.com/Helen_Elena_Lopez.html; “Helen Elena Lopez Spanish Singer in 
Vietnamese,” accessed March 15, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=be1sIG_bISo.  
129 “My Hero Project,” accessed March 15, 2013, http://myhero.com/go/home.asp; Lieutenant Hoa Pham, Interview with Evyn Lê Espiritu, Feb. 
11, 2013; “Colonel Ho Ngoc Can Classmate, Justice Eileen Moore, Mrs Ho Ngoc Can and Colonel Mandeville,” Sept. 2, 2010, accessed March 
15, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6k5OSu11wkc.   
130 “Colonel Mandeville Honoring RVN Colonel Ho Ngoc Can,” April 29, 2010, accessed March 12, 2013, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JOuA-3QvakE.  
131 Colonel Craig Mandeville, Interview with Evyn Lê Espiritu, Feb. 20, 2013 
132 Ibid. 
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Vietnamese Americans make space in the present for the dead of the past, gathering together for 
communal acts of memory.  Lieutenant Hoa Pham had taken a death anniversary ceremony that 
traditionally takes place in the private domestic space of the home and grafted it onto the more 
public space of the Dong De Military Cadet Association Reunion. There is a blurring of the 
personal and the political: the people had gathered to simultaneously remember a friend and a 
South Vietnamese hero.  Memory here is not individual, relegated to space of the mind, but 
rather communal, acted out in speeches, songs, and rituals—physical movements of the body. 
 What is the significance of these memory practices?  According to Colonel Mandeville, 
. . . it was also good for her, for his memory—his wife’s, but also his grandkids.  
The remembrance of their granddad.  Also, the younger generation get exposed to 
realizing they’re over here, because of what the other ones, the Vietnamese, the 
South Vietnamese, been fighting for freedom.133   
 
Ceremonies, then, are important not only for the collective enacting of memory by Colonel Hồ 
Ngọc Cẩn’s peers, but for the potential transfer of memory to the next generation.  There is the 
very real fear, coupled with a sense of urgency, that the memory of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn in 
particular—and of South Vietnamese heroes in general—will perish with this generation of 
military veterans.  Insofar as the Republic of Vietnam is only a ghostly state that persists in the 
minds and hearts of the South Vietnamese diaspora, there is a worry that this state will cease to 
exist when it ceases to be remembered.  
 One safeguard against the failure of memory is the archive.  However, because the 
Republic of Vietnam is but a spectral state, it no longer has the power to construct a state 
archive—a collection of textbooks, a library of documents, a museum of artifacts.  Thus South 
Vietnamese patriots must find other creative ways to archive their history and memory. 
 
                                                
133 Ibid. 
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3. Digital 
 In his article “Archive,” British cultural theorist Mike Featherstone traces the genealogy 
of the archive, explicitly linking its formation to the maintenance of the state: 
The term archive refers to the place where government records are stored.  It was 
initially conceived as the site where official records were guarded and kept in 
secrecy.  The archive was part of the apparatus of social rule and regulation, it 
facilitated the governance of the territory and population through accumulated 
information.  At the same time, alongside home territorial governance, there were 
also archives on foreign affairs to sustain the state in relation to other states and 
empires.  State intelligence became more important and formalized in the 
intensifying and globalizing power struggles for hegemony.134 
 
The archive, then, is not a neutral accumulation of documents, but rather a political construction 
of knowledge about the state and its history.  With the coupling of the nation-state, the archive 
also became a “crucial site for national memory”—the “place in which the sacred texts and 
objects were stored that were used to generate collective identity and social solidarity.”135  Thus 
the archive also works in the realm of memory, both drawing from and infiltrating into the 
subconscious of the people to create a sense of group identity and cohesion. 
 What happens, then, when there is no existing state to construct an archive?  In some 
ways this opens up a space of freedom, unconstrained by the power of state coercion and 
hegemony.  But in other ways it presents a difficulty: with no state to house or collect an archive, 
a people’s history and memory become threatened by potential loss.  However, Featherstone 
optimistically coins the term “diasporic archive” to describe the “imaginative and creative work” 
of migrant groups “to form new collective memories, which are distinct from the official 
memories of the host and former home societies.”136  South Vietnamese Americans construct 
these “collective memories”—which are shaped but not defined by the Vietnamese and the 
                                                
134 Mike Featherstone, “Archive,” Theory Culture Society 23, no. 2-3 (2006): 591. 
135 Ibid, 592. 
136 Ibid., 594. 
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American state—through their cultural memory practices.  This diasporic archive thus becomes 
an “active aspiration, a tool for reworking desires and memories, part of a project for sustaining 
cultural identities.”137  The diasporic archive then is not only oriented to the past, but very much 
rooted in the work of the present, with the future-oriented desire to maintain a distinct sense of 
cultural identity in a foreign land—within the borders of another nation-state.  
 One way that the South Vietnamese diasporic community engages in this “imaginative 
and creative work” is to construct a communal archive on the Internet—to claim space and assert 
a sense of sovereignty online.  The Internet is a transnational space—it transcends nation-state 
borders, while still being physically rooted in many computers simultaneously around the world.  
With the Internet, “informational control and formation ceases to be in the form of the 
panopticon with its bureaucratic forms of control and surveillance” and the “knowledge becomes 
freer to flow through decentred networks.”138  Communities need not rely on the state to 
legitimize their archive; they can produce their own online archives, as exemplified by the 
Republic of Vietnam Historical Society’s website.  Their mission statement reads: 
The Republic of Vietnam Historical Society was created with the purpose to 
preserve the memory of the state of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) and 
the men and women whose lives became intertwined with its legacy. This 
organization aims to achieve this through the collection and archiving of artifacts 
pertaining to the government and military of the Republic of Vietnam, 
accumulation of the personal histories of individuals who served its cause and 
their families, and providing a venue for education and discussion. RVNHS is a 
registered non-profit historical group, and is not affiliated with any political 
activities or parties. We are based in California, USA, and are open to anyone 
interested in learning about and preserving the memory of the Republic of 
Vietnam.139 
 
Thus they articulate the relationship between archive and “memory,” rather than history, in 
reference to the ghostly state of the Republic of Vietnam.  The website is still relatively 
                                                
137 Ibid., 594.  
138 Ibid., 595. 
139 Republic of Vietnam Historical Society, “About RVHS,” accessed March 10, 2013, http://rvnhs.com/about.html. 
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conservative in their presentation and conceptualization of “archive” though.  The “Virtual 
Museum”—a space carved out in the digital rather than the physical world—presents mostly 
images of South Vietnamese military regalia: photographs of insignias, uniforms, and soldiers.  
They emphasize the traditional masculine markers of history. 
 In addition to the Republic of Vietnam Historical Society’s digital archive, there are a 
number of grassroots-created websites dedicated specifically to the memory of Colonel Hồ Ngọc 
Cẩn.140  Most are explicitly patriotic in nature.  On many of these sites, Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn is 
remembered as much—if not more—for his death as for his life.  His body is significant because 
of its end—his refusal to surrender and his public execution in Cần Thơ.   
 Because the content of these websites was already cited and addressed in Chapter Two, in 
this chapter I focus more on the digital video archive of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  South 
Vietnamese individuals in the United States can upload videos that people in Việt Nam—where 
the state actively suppresses the history and memory of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn —can then view 
clandestinely.  The current Vietnamese state may erase the Republic of Vietnam and its flag from 
Vietnamese history books and brand Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn a traitor, but they cannot control 
information on the Internet, which exceeds the sovereignty of its state borders. 
 Although commemoration ceremonies are important for the ways that they activate the 
space of memorials and facilitate the enactment of collective memory rituals, they are temporally 
contingent: once completed they persist only in the memories of the individuals present.  Given 
the spectral threat of mortality—the pressing fact that many of the South Vietnamese people who 
fought in or lived through the Vietnam War are getting older and dying—there is a concern that 
their memories will die with them.  Thus the importance of archiving.  I myself would not have 
                                                
140 “Black April 30th 1975,” accessed March 10, 2013, vnafmamn.com/black_april.html; “The Suicides on April 30, 1975” accessed March 10, 
2013, www.vietquoc.com/APR3098.HTM; “A Hard Time,” accessed March 10, 2013, www.bietdongquan.com/article1/rgrhard.htm;  “Colonel 
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 75 
known about the two commemoration ceremonies for Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn discussed in the 
previous section if I had not found them on YouTube.  The former was uploaded by the 
Federation of Overseas Free Vietnamese Communities, a South Vietnamese American media 
network based in Orange County, California.  The latter was uploaded by Lieutenant Hoa Pham.  
In these cases archiving consists of two processes: both video recording and uploading.  There is 
an emphasis on not only preserving but also sharing.   
 Lieutenant Hoa Pham is one of the most active contributors to the digital archive on 
Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, and on South Vietnamese history, life, and contemporary cultural 
practices in general.  Most recently he has uploaded nine videos of the February 2013 Tết 
Festival in Westminster.141  Three videos of the recent funeral ceremony of Mayor Frank Fry, the 
Westminster Mayor who initiated the Vietnam War Memorial project, precede them.  Lieutenant 
Pham also has a vibrant online blog entitled “Life of Republic Of Vietnam Special Operations 
Member,” which is replete with significant amounts of text, videos, and images.142  It has an 
interesting feeling of excess; this is no ordinary biography.  In his latest post, dated August 24, 
2011, Lieutenant Pham carefully details his childhood, military career, escape from Việt Nam, 
experience in refugee camps, and his education and establishment in California.  He uses multi-
colored text, switching between paragraphs of black, blue, and purple and alternating between 
bold, regular, and italicized font.  The text is interspersed with fifteen videos and 104 
photographs, most of which were taken by Lieutenant Pham or which feature him in military 
uniform, in casual clothing, or shirtless.  Some of the videos are of found footage from the 
Vietnam War.  But others are autobiographical video slideshows of Lieutenant Pham’s photos, 
complete with campy stock effects.  A photo of Lieutenant Pham and four other South 
                                                
141 “Tết” refers to the Vietnamese Lunar New Year. 
142 Lieutenant Hoa Pham, “Life of Republic Of Vietnam Special Operations Member,” accessed March 20, 2013, http://hpnkt.blogspot.com/.  
 76 
Vietnamese military cadets saluting the American flag is labeled “FIRST VIETNAMESE BOY 
SCOUT OF AMERICAN IN MARINES CAMP PENDLETON OCEANSIDE, CA” in bright 
pink text that covers half the picture; animated rainbow rings bounce around the photo in a 
bubble-like fashion.  In two other self-portraits, Lieutenant Pham’s body is flanked by a stock 
photo frame of two half-naked white women.  This is indeed a queered and creative archive.   It 
asserts the story and presence of Lieutenant Pham in an almost camp-like fashion, exceeding the 
neat parameters of what is traditionally considered—and constructed to look—“legitimate” 
enough to be included in a formal state archive.  There is an element of pastiche, of collage—of 
the radical bringing together of serious South Vietnamese refugee history with the colorful stock 
tropes of play and pleasure.  But perhaps when one feels the urgency to create one’s own archive 
online, given the absence of a state to construct and harbor one, one only comes across as 
“excessive” to an outside viewer.  There is an urgency to assert oneself in the present, within the 
pictorial language of contemporary visual tropes.       
 In any case, Lieutenant Pham has firmly established himself and his videos online, 
generating enough hits between his blogs and his YouTube channel to be recognized by Google.  
If you type in “Colonel Ho Ngoc Can” into Google, Lieutenant Pham’s videos are the first links 
to pop up.  Twelve of Lieutenant Pham’s 480 uploaded YouTube videos are recordings from the 
August 2010 ceremony for Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  The most popular of these videos, which has 
amassed 31,949 views, depicts a candle lighting ritual performed in front of an enlarged and 
framed photograph of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  A man plays “Taps” on the bugle in the 
background.  The other popular Google result is a video 5:24 minute slideshow entitled 
“COLONEL HO NGOC CAN HERO OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM.”  It features 
photographs and illustrations of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, animated with a Ken Burns effect and 
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accompanied by a wordless patriotic South Vietnamese song.  Lieutenant Pham included a 
transcription of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s last words in the video: 
If I had won the fight, I would not have condemned you as you have in turn 
sentenced me.  I haven’t insulted you like you have insulted me.  I haven’t asked 
you the questions that you have asked me.  I fight for the freedom of the everyday 
people.  I am not guilty of crimes.  Nobody has the right to persecute me.  History 
will decide if you are the enemy or if I am the devil.  If you want to kill me, go 
ahead.  But please don’t blindfold me.  Down with the Communists.  Long live 
the Republic of Viet Nam. 
 
Nếu tôi thắng trong cuộc chiến, tôi sẽ không kết án các anh như các anh kết án tôi. 
Tôi cũng không làm nhục các anh như các anh làm nhục tôi. Tôi cũng không hỏi 
các anh câu mà các anh hỏi tôi. Tôi chiến đấu cho tự do của người dân. Tôi có 
công mà không có tội. Không ai có quyền kết tội tôi. Lịch sử sẽ phê phán đoán 
các anh là giặc đỏ hay tôi là ngụy. Các anh muốn giết tôi, cứ giết đi. Xin đừng bịt 
mắt. Đả đảo Cộng Sản. Việt Nam Cộng Hòa Muôn Năm.143 
 
Thus he archives Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s speech on YouTube, lest it be suppressed in Việt Nam 
and then forgotten by the next generation.  The video ends with a chilling black and white 
photograph of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s dead body draped under the South Vietnamese flag.  A 
small crowd of people stands around, but apart.  The camera zooms in to the body and the draped 
flag, then zooms back out and wanders across the faces of the crowd.  It starts to zoom in again, 
and you cannot make out the new focus until it is too close for comfort: it is the face of a small 
child and what appears to be a mother.  The child stares straight into the camera.  The scene 
fades to black.  The child’s face, pale and ghost-like, is the last thing to disappear.  It is a 
haunting reminder of the responsibility of the living, of those left behind, to keep the memory of 
Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn—of the Republic of South Vietnam—alive. 
 This video is important not only for its relative popularity—31,094 views and 45 likes—
but for the way it encourages the circulation and reproduction of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s story, 
as evidenced by the way it is cited in other videos as well.  Sometimes the citation is just a 
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certain photograph, or the text of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s last words, inserted into another video.  
Perhaps most interesting though is one video that starts out very obviously with a recording of a 
computer screen playing Lieutenant Pham’s slideshow video.  It then cuts to a screen shot of a 
poster labeled “The Face of Our Heroes” depicting a blue sky with faint clouds in the shape of 
what appear to be a face, and then cuts back to Lieutenant Pham’s video just at the point when 
one of the illustrated portraits of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn fades into the scrolling text of his last 
words.144  Uploaded on August 15, 2011— the anniversary of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s death—
this video is only 1:06 minutes long and has 8,026 views.145  The cut is sharp and juxtaposition is 
stark.  The viewer realizes that the face is supposed to be that of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  Further 
investigative research reveals that the “sighting” took place in Westminster, above the Vietnam 
War Memorial; the upload date suggests that the sighting took place at the very commemoration 
ceremony discussed in the previous section.  The uploader is a Vietnamese American 
televangelist of sorts who makes money by selling posters of the faces of Jesus, God, and the 
Devil sighted in the sky.  He also sells CDs of calming instrumental music.  He insists that the 
end of the world is near and that the viewer must repent.  He has 250 videos on YouTube.  
Amongst all the talk of religion, this video of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn and this direct citation of 
Lieutenant Pham’s video is striking.  Indeed, the importance of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn is 
implicitly compared to that of Jesus. 
 The Internet archive is also important for the ways in which it facilitates the online 
construction of community and collective identity, in transcendence of state borders.  For 
example, the Republic of Vietnam Historical Society’s website includes a “Guestbook” link, 
where people from all over the world—Minnesota, London, Sydney, Detroit, Vietnam, Vermont, 
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the Republic of Indonesia, Florida—can leave comments and questions.146  Similarly, YouTube’s 
comment section provides a space for individuals to share their memories of Colonel Hồ Ngọc 
Cẩn or to explicitly resurrect the ghost of the Republic of Vietnam.  For example, under the 
video posted by the Federation of Overseas Free Vietnamese Communities of the ceremony for 
Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn at the Vietnam War Memorial in August 2011, “THUCSVN1” writes: 
I am so moved, I pray that Colonel Ho Ngoc Can’s soul finds peace and rest. 
Long live Colonel Ho Ngoc Can for his courage!  He didn’t duck in front of the 
Communists!  Vietnam!  … We are very proud of all the sons who gave their 
lives to safeguard the country like all of you!  Long live the South Vietnamese 
military… Forever!  Many thanks to all the brave fighters of the VNCH whether 
alive or dead…!  Thank you my brothers..! 
 
cảm động quá , xin cầu cho linh hồn cố Đại Tá Hồ Ngọc Cẩn được an nghỉ bình 
an !  VINH DANH CỐ ĐẠI TÁ HỒ NGỌC CẨN ĐÃ ANH DŨNG , KÊU 
HÙNG ...KHÔNG CUỐI ĐẦU TRƯỚC LŨ CSVN ..! TỔ QUỐC VN ...QUÝ 
PHỤC NHỮNG NGƯỜI CON TRAI CAN TRƯỜNG GIỬ NƯỚC NHƯ CÁC 
ANH ! VINH DANH QUÂN LỰC VNCH ...MUÔN NĂM ...! GHI ƠN CÁC 
CHIẾN SỶ VNCH DÙ CÒN SỐNG HAY ĐÃ CHẾT ...! CÁM ƠI CÁC ANH 
..!147 
 
Some comments, such as those found below the video slideshow uploaded by Lieutenant Hoa 
Pham, move beyond the rhetoric of remembrance, articulating a desire to reinstate the fallen 
South Vietnamese state:  
 
God Bless Colonel Ho Ngoc Can ...he had belong to ages !!! He will always be 
our Hero throughout Vietnam History !!! Communist V.C will fall soon when my 
generation take over ! 
 
Join me all Vietnamese around the world and in USA it is time to stand up and we 
must not be silent when our homeland is calling for our help and our people are in 
danger !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
I love my homeland and want to go back to my homeland but only if Communist 
Vietnam doesn't exist free our homeland and protect our people and 
race!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Bring back the Republic of South 
Vietnam!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
 
                                                
146 These locations are self-reported; hence the variation in specificity. 
147 Comment section, Federation of Overseas Free Vietnamese Communities, “2085 Lễ Tưởng Niệm Cố Đại Tái Hồ Ngọc Cẩn 2085 Lễ Tưởng 
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I want to join the ARVN Army today if South Vietnam exist 
I want protect my homeland,people,and my family and I will bring honor to 
Vietnam and the republic of South Vietnam and whenever my country calls for 
my help I will always be ready and prepared to fight off anyone or anything that 
tries to harm my country,family,and my people!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
Free Vietnam from the Communists of Vietnam and bring back the Republic of 
Vietnam!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!-!!!!!!!!!!148 
 
Others address Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn directly, interpolating him into the present: 
 
Thank You, Colonel HN Can.You are the martyr/love/strength/force/pow-er of 
natural freedom, inheritable liberty, and inalienable justice within Vietnamese of 
VNCH.Your fighting is the right within our nature/inborn/inseparable self, as in 
free speech/assembly/bear arm/education/etc, for the people, by the people. Your 
teaching on the youngster, as to be staying in school for education of free choice. 
No more one political party/a leader/concentration camps/etc. Not cheap, 
freedom, must protecting.149 
 
Thus the digital archive is not static, but rather mutable and fluid, always changing as different 
individuals around the world respond and interact.  The distinction between creator and receiver 
of knowledge gets blurred.  The hierarchies surrounding historical knowledge production are 
challenged.   
 I came to this digital archive of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn as a student, as one in search of 
information.  However, to my [perhaps naïve] surprise, my own research and writing on this 
figure has been subsumed back into the digital archive: the eleventh suggested link to a Google 
search of “Colonel Ho Ngoc Can” is a website citing own my research on Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, 
funded by Pomona College’s Summer Undergraduate Research Program in 2012.150  Thus I 
contribute to the archive, and am a part of the dynamic cultural memory process surrounding 
Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  
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4. Oral 
 Collective memory practices—building memorials, organizing commemoration 
ceremonies, and archiving information on the Internet—are public assertions of cultural identity 
and allegiance to a ghostly state, articulated through the act of remembering an individual, 
Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  In these articulations of patriotism, however, Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn is 
vulnerable to becoming a symbol, a mere abstraction.  Thus the importance of the oral—of 
telling stories, one person to another. 
 I want to highlight the significance of Colonel Mandeville’s interview—of how his 
sharing of his personal memories of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn was an act of transference, a way of 
carving out space for the intimate passing on of memories.  The previous three sections of this 
chapter have analyzed the significance of South Vietnamese cultural memory practices as a way 
to animate the ghost of the Republic of Vietnam.  In this section I would like share—and 
preserve in writing—the actual stories about Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn that Colonel Mandeville 
shared with me. 
 Colonel Mandeville remembers Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn for his patriotism: “he was 
extremely dedicated to his country, extremely dedicated to his family, extremely wanting the 
country to be free.  He wasn’t worried about the politics of the country; he just knew he wanted a 
free Vietnam.  He was extremely proud of the South Vietnamese flag.”151  And it was this 
patriotism that Colonel Mandeville admired and sympathized with, despite his initial distrust of 
Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn: 
I was a little protective of my people.  Colonel Can noticed that.  And um, after I 
kind of humorous story he invited me to his tent for dinner.  And by the way I was 
with an infantry unit.  We lived in the jungle, ate in the jungle.  Never saw any 
clean food, never saw any clean water.  And but he invited me to eat with him a 
couple times.  But when I went in there I came with full gear.  I had my helmet 
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on, I had my flag vest, I had my pistol, I had my weapon, and I walk in and I sit 
down.  Well, after two times he said, “You know, you obviously don't trust me,” 
because he didn’t have any of that.  When he ate dinner he scarcely had on any 
gear.  And I told him I don’t trust him or his people.  And I told him my story.  
And he said “Well, my job”—his job, was to keep me alive.  You know?  And I 
should just trust him.  And he assigned somebody with me to protect me so to 
speak as a driver.  And he said, “Your job is to give me American support when I 
need it.  My job is to keep you alive so you can help my soldiers fight.”  And that 
turned out to be the best thing that ever happened.  Because he truly was a man of 
his word.152 
 
  He remembers moments of shared dedication; he recounted a conversation that he had with 
Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn in the face of great odds during the Battle of An Lộc: 
And a lot of his soldiers wanted to surrender.  We started out with a 715, we 
ended up with 115 left, and every one of us had been wounded several times, not 
once.  And the easy thing to have done would be to surrender.  And he looked at 
me and he talked to me and I said, “Well you know sir, I’ll never let them get me 
alive because I’m not sure how I could POW and I don’t want to embarrass my 
family.”  And he said, “Me too.  You know, we’re going to fight to the end.  And 
my soldiers will, and they’ll never capture me alive.”  And I thought that was a 
defining moment for my time in my life and also for his leadership.  And that kind 
of filtered toward his soldiers in that way.  So I thought it was a great moment.153 
 
Colonel Mandeville remembers Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn most for his bravery, and has repeated 
this signature story many times: 
As we went into An Loc, I never will forget, we were under fire and he stood 
straight up and walked right on down the road, and I said “Hey Colonel, let’s 
walk on the side of the road, and let’s crouch a bit.”  Because I’m taller than him 
and—what he did I had to do.  So if he stood up I had to stand up.  Well I was a 
good foot taller than him, and I felt like I was the target, you know.  So he was 
just, in face of any fire he would just stand up and take it on.  And that’s why the 
South Vietnamese began to believe he was kind of like a—couldn’t be killed.  
And the North Vietnamese didn’t think he could be killed.  Because they actually 
overran us and everything.  The only guy in that whole group who didn’t get 
wounded was Colonel Can.154   
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It is a story that South Vietnamese soldiers, concerned that the end of the war will negate their 
moments of valor, embrace strongly.  Lieutenant Hoa Pham referenced it several times in his 
hour-long interview with me.  There are humorous stories too: 
We’d walk through the rice paddies.  And he was always out with his soldiers.  
He didn’t sit back in his seat—excuse me, command post—and take it easy.  He 
was out with his soldiers out front.  And when they’d walk out in the rice paddies, 
they’re lighter and they’d just walk in.  And when I walk in the rice paddies I’d go 
down through my boots, my weight, and I’d be sunk in the rice paddies.  And 
many times he’d look around and kind of harass me, “Can’t you keep up?”  Well I 
was knee-deep in mud and they were kind of walking on top, and he had a sense 
of humor.155   
 
Some comedies are laced with tragedy though, made humorous only in face of the sheer terror 
and violence of war: 
Combat is terrible.  But during combat there’s a lot of humor that takes place that 
people that weren’t there wouldn’t consider humorous but for those that were 
there there were a lot of exchanges back and forth.  But the most—my famous 
story was that we were in An Loc, and we had fought our way for a little over a 
week.  We were outside of An Loc.  There was a big plantation headquarters 
which is still there today.  It’s not operational.  It was then built by the French.  It 
was a rubber plantation.  And the North Vietnamese had put their headquarters in 
it.  And everybody knew it was there.  And we were fairly close to it.  And 
literally we had fought ten meters at a time for several weeks.  That’s how tough 
it was.  And we got a call to pull back 500 meters.  And we said, “Why?”  And 
they said “We’re going to drop a Commando Vault.”  So we looked at each other.  
And he didn’t know what it was and I didn’t know but we didn’t say anything.  
You know.  And both of said, “We’re not pulling back.”  Because if we pull back 
500 meters, that’s five days of fighting.  So we stood there, stuck there on the 
ground.  We had to dig fox holes.  I’ve dug more fox holes as a field artillery 
officer, probably more than any other infantry guy in the world, because we dug 
fox holes two or three times a day to stay alive.  So, we just dug in, told 
everybody to dig in.  We had no idea what a Commando Vault was.  A C1 30, and 
aircraft went over, saw a parachute coming out the back, and a platform.  And it 
drifted down.  Well, there were only a few of these bombs left.  It was a 20,000 
pound bomb left over from WWII or something.  The biggest bomb they ever 
dropped, besides a nuclear one.  And we didn’t know what it was going to do.  
When it went off, it literally destroyed the ground. We were covered with 
banana—oh excuse me, rubber tree—they just covered us!  The North 
Vietnamese…  We woke up shaking our heads, couldn’t see anything, and when 
it went off the ground literally raised up and came back down again.  And we uh, 
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we had some Vietnamese injured because they weren’t deep enough.  But that 
was—if I look back in retrospect, if I would have moved back a couple of 
hundred yards, because it was really frightening when it happened.  Later on we 
talked about it, I said “You know what it was?” and he said, “No, I didn’t know 
what it was, I thought you knew and I didn’t know,” so we laughed about it that 
we didn’t know.  So that was a great moment for both of us.156 
 
Despite the level of intense sharing, this friendship forged in the danger of war, Colonel Hồ 
Ngọc Cẩn and Colonel Mandeville ultimately had to part: 
First of all they pulled me out of the field.  I had been wounded so many times.  
And they put me back in one of their training schools.  And when I was taken out 
he was not happy with the American command.  He wanted me to stay.  Of course 
secretly I was glad to get out of there.  [chuckles]  But um—because I’d had it, 
and um, so… We departed, and you know it was the first time I really understood 
doing more than shaking a hand.  You could tell there was a bond that we had.  
And he was really worried about me.  I was more worried about him because he 
was staying where all the action was, and I was going back to a relatively secure 
training center in Sa Dec.  And well, so.  And then when I finally had to leave 
there was a ceremony and they gave me an AK 47 on a plaque, captured weapon, 
and they gave me the Vietnamese cross of gallantry, a bunch of stuff.  And um, 
when they read the citation and all that stuff I could see that he was emotional.  
And uh, I was emotional too.  Not—I could just sense that I didn’t like leaving 
him alone.  But he was going to be okay.  Because after I left he got overrun by 
the North Vietnamese, once just totally overran his position and he comes out of it 
alive.  And that was terrible, I was on the radio, I heard about it, I was worried 
about it.  But uh, that was kind of it.  It was just a field operation and ceremony 
and I was gone.157 
 
Thus the reality that Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn and Colonel Mandeville were not the same—one had 
to stay while the other could leave; one was fighting desperately for the existence of his country 
while one was merely following government orders—was starkly reaffirmed.   
 Colonel Mandeville still feels residual guilt for leaving, and part of this guilt motivated 
him to dedicate his time to the Vietnam War Memorial project in Westminster.  Colonel 
Mandeville also considers writing a book, to archive his memories in print form and to tell the 
story of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s contributions to the Battle of An Lộc: 
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Well, I, I don’t read a lot about Vietnam because I got this, what they call PTSD.  
I don’t like reading about stuff, I get angry real easy about it.  But the battle of An 
Loc, there’s a book written by General Nhut Tran who was actually the—I 
probably announced his name wrong, he’s a good friend of mine—but he 
commanded the forces inside of An Loc.  He was at that time a district chief.  And 
General Or was his advisor and Colonel at the time.  They were surrounded; they 
were the ones in there.  He wrote a book about that.  And he talked about the 
battle of An Loc.  But the problem is, the real bad Loc—An Loc, was certainly 
won by those who stayed and fought.  They didn’t give up.  But the end of An 
Loc was due to Colonel Can.  The thing that broke the siege of An Loc was not 
the people fighting, but us fighting our way in to give them an opening.  So 
nobody’s told that story about how treacherous it was, and the skill that it took to 
get in there, to open up ten divisions of North Vietnamese, who had that place 
surrounded.  So my idea was that somebody needs to tell that story about really 
breaking the siege of An Loc.  Because all the other books talk about how tough it 
was.  It was tough inside, I’m sure.  But Colonel Can and the ranger unit next to 
us, we were the ones that… Colonel Can was the first one to walk in there, and it 
was the first time they’d seen anybody from the outside world from several 
months.158 
 
As demonstrated in the Chapter Two, Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s contribution to the Battle of An 
Lộc is only vaguely known.  Thus, unless Colonel Mandeville archives his memories, they 
threaten to die with him.   
 What is significant, though, is not only what Colonel Mandeville says—the stories he 
shares—but how he says it.  Thus I was drawn to Colonel Mandeville’s concluding words: 
I just want it recorded about what it was really like.  How terrible it was, how 
American soldiers thought they had it bad, they don’t know how bad they had it.  
South Vietnamese went through more crap than I ever saw on my first tour.  And 
also the heroics of Colonel Can. . . . But he was truly an amazing person.  He was 
who[m] you would want if you’re an American soldier you’d want him with you.  
And uh, I just think it should be recorded someway.  Yeah.  The end?159 
 
Colonel Mandeville ends with a question.  There is an interrogation of the end.  It is perhaps a 
rhetoric question; a hope that this is not, indeed, the end, and that Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s 
memory and story will live on after the conclusion of this interview—indeed, after the 
conclusion of Colonel Mandeville’s life.  Memories haunt the living.  But it is the passing on of 
                                                
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid.  
 86 
memories—the intergenerational transfer of memories—that requires an articulation for 
preservation.  Thus the importance of the oral in carving out space for a narrative resistant to 
dominant state histories. 
 
The Politics of Memory 
 The Southern Vietnamese diaspora has no state to archive its history.  And yet the 
Republic of Vietnam is an ever-present ghost that haunts the community and is resurrected by 
cultural memory practices.  South Vietnamese people carve out space in the present, writing their 
memories onto the physical landscape, activating these memorials with ceremonial practices, and 
archiving these practices on the digital Internet.  Yet the danger of a digital archive is that 
“knowledge will no longer be contained in a singular system in which all the elements are 
articulated into a unified corpus.” 160  With the overabundance and proliferation of knowledge on 
the Internet, memories might get lost. Thus the importance of the oral: storytelling is significant 
for its ability to transfer memories directly to the next generation.  
 What is the political nature of these cultural memory practices—this insistence to 
preserve the memory of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn?  Is this merely a nostalgic politics oriented 
towards the past, with no stake in the present or future?  At several points Lieutenant Hoa Pham 
and Colonel Craig Mandeville deny any “political agenda”—or rather, politics conceptualized in 
the traditional sense.  When expressing frustration over the difficulty of obtaining a visa to visit 
Việt Nam, Lieutenant Pham says that he told the Vietnamese government, “I’m a soldier, I do 
things for the veterans, I—I have no political agenda. . . . I don’t try to overthrow you, anything.  
I don’t do anything damage for Việt Nam.  Anything.  I just take care my own veterans.”161  
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Likewise, Colonel Mandeville is not necessarily interested in critiquing the current Communist 
government in Việt Nam or agitating for social change: “I know there’s atrocities over there 
now, I know there’s not equal rights, I know there’s not religious freedom and everything else.  
That memorial is not about whether the war was right or wrong.  A lot of people want to make it 
that way.”162  Neither are Lieutenant Pham or Colonel Mandeville interested in actually 
reinstating the fallen Republic of Vietnam, of resurrecting the ghostly state in any literal political 
manner. 
 What then is the political use of these cultural memory practices?  For they indeed have 
value in the present.  As a queered understanding of temporality allows, memories are not bound 
to the space of the past, but touch and impact the space of the present and future.  Furthermore, 
to control or suppress a people’s past—their history and memory—is to oppress or erase their 
existence in the present and future.  However, individuals can resist this control, asserting their 
own memories and alternative histories.  For example, Lieutenant Pham acknowledges that due 
to the insistence of South Vietnamese diasporic communities, “in the North, in the Communist 
area, they started to recognize what we have done in the war. . . . In the January 19, that the day 
the China attack South Vietnam.  And I think we lost forty-six people.  We lost one battleship.  
And the Vietnamese government, right now, they recognize the people.  The South Vietnam 
people.”163  Thus the Southern Vietnamese immigrants successfully changed the dominant 
historical narrative.   
 Lieutenant Pham also continues to disseminate the story of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn 
because he believes that Colonel Cẩn’s execution was a violation of the Geneva Convention’s 
rules against killing prisoners of war, and he wants the Vietnamese government to acknowledge 
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the war crime and pay retribution to his family.  Colonel Mandeville wants to open a Vietnam 
War Studies Center at the Westminster public library so that the younger generations can 
continue to learn about and research the war.  The consequences of these cultural memory 
practices are thus very material. 
 There is also the importance of the transgenerational transfer of memory in and of itself.  
Colonel Mandeville reflects: 
I just want the Vietnamese community, the Vietnamese Americans to teach their 
kids, you know, that there’s a cost for having freedom.  Sometimes it’s war, 
sometimes it’s just money.  I don’t want them to forget that.  Because there was 
so many brave people over there, Vietnamese and Americans, and so… You 
know, millions of Vietnamese lost their lives after the war.  Americans don’t 
know that.  They don’t want to know.  But somehow I want that story, little things 
like that to never die.164 
 
In the face of state suppression, memory work itself is an act of resistance—an insistence that 
one country’s did exist, that past atrocities did happen, and that one’s bravery and loss should be 
acknowledge rather than erased or forgotten.  In Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of 
Queer History, Heather Love theorizes the use of a politics oriented towards a painful past: “It is 
crucial to find ways of creating and sustaining political hope.  But hope that is achieved at the 
expense of the past cannot serve the future . . . instead, we have to risk the turn backward, even if 
it means opening ourselves to social and psychic realities we would rather forget.”165  Perhaps 
then there is great use in haunting—in embracing the ghosts that push us to remember alternative 
histories, in order to remain ever critical of the way that states and other structures of power may 
flatten narratives or deny subjectivity. 
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Chapter 4 
Remembering in Private:  
The Subversive Practices of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s Relatives 
 
 
 
“Oral history is built around people.   
It thrusts life into history itself and  
it widens the scope.  It allows heroes  
not just from the leaders, but also from 
the unknown majority of the people.”166 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 According to Marita Sturken, “Cultural memory is a field of cultural negotiation through 
which different stories vie for a place in history.”167  In their public commemorations of Colonel 
Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, South Vietnamese Americans resurrect the specter of the now-defunct Republic of 
Vietnam.  They carve out spaces for their articulations of the past—for their ghosts and their 
heroes—engaging in space-making acts that contend with dominant state narratives for not only 
“a place in history,” but also a place in the present.  
 Although subaltern in their relation to the state, these immigrant cultural memory 
practices still operate in the realm of the public, in the form of memorials, ceremonies, and 
online videos.168  Thus South Vietnamese Americans benefit from their position in the United 
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States: although the U.S. does engage in its own forms of “organized forgetting,” publicly 
erasing the figure of the South Vietnamese soldier in its foregrounding of “the painful experience 
of the American Vietnam veteran,” it does grant its citizens freedom of speech, press, and 
expression.169  Thus South Vietnamese Americans are allowed to defy their historical erasure and 
publicly commemorate Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  
 Such is not the case in Việt Nam.  Over the past five years, the Socialist Republic of Việt 
Nam has cracked down on political dissidents, curbing writers’, bloggers’, and journalists’ 
critiques of the state.  In October 2008, U.S. and international media campaigners condemned the 
guilty verdicts of two Vietnamese journalists, Nguyễn Việt Chiến and Nguyễn Văn Hải, who had 
helped to expose a major corruption scandal in Việt Nam’s Ministry of Transport.170  The same 
year the Vietnamese government tightened restrictions on Internet blogs, banning “posts that 
undermine national security, incite violence or disclose state secrets” and requiring “service 
providers to report to the government every six months and provide information about bloggers 
on request.”171  In January 2009, the government released Nguyễn Việt Chiến and 15,000 other 
prisoners under a Lunar New Year amnesty, but dismissed Lê Hoàng and Nguyễn Công Khế, the 
editors of the country’s two largest pro-reform newspapers, who had covered the original 
October corruption scandal trial.172  In December of the same year, pro-democracy activist Trần 
Anh Kim was sentenced to five-and-a-half years in jail for allegedly publishing pro-democracy 
articles online.173  This year, Human Rights Watch’s most recent World Report accused Việt 
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Nam of continuing to restrict freedom of expression and intensifying its suppression of online 
dissent.174   
 Such is the sociopolitical environment in which the Vietnamese government continues to 
control history and memory production, reproducing dominant narratives of the Second 
Indochina War as that of the “Chiến Tranh Chống Mỹ Cứu Nước,” the “War of National 
Salvation Against the Americans.”  In “Commemoration and the State: Memory and Legitimacy 
in Vietnam,” Edyta Roszko asserts that the Vietnamese state “seeks to promote its own 
ideological aims, such as legitimizing the war, showing its continuity with previous heroes and 
dynasties in its resistance against foreign invasion, and building a ‘strong and happy 
country.’”175  By organizing public memorial services for fallen North Vietnamese liberationists 
while actively suppressing commemorations for South Vietnamese soldiers like Colonel Hồ 
Ngọc Cẩn, the current Communist government of Việt Nam maintains its national narrative of 
reunification and liberation.   The sentiment of this national narrative is exemplified in a speech 
delivered by Lê Duẩn, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of Vietnam, on May 15, 1975: 
In the spirit of national reconciliation and concord, our people have shown 
leniency to all those who have strayed from the right path and who are now 
returning to the people, no matter what their past was.  Provided they sincerely 
mend their abilities to the service of the homeland, their place among the people 
will be guaranteed and all the shame put on them by criminal US imperalist[s] 
will be washed away.176 
 
This emphasis on reconciliation and forgiveness, however, does not allow for recognition of  the 
South Vietnamese soldiers who refused to surrender, who refused to reconcile—soldiers such as 
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Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  These soldiers remain publicly unmourned, their bodies uprooted from 
the national cemetery, their stories violently erased, and the pain and sorrow of their relatives 
publicly unacknowledged. 
 In light of this public memory suppression, this chapter highlights the private realm as 
another site of resistance.  I drawn from nine oral histories that I conducted with Colonel Hồ 
Ngọc Cẩn’s siblings and cousins during summer 2012, eight of whom live in Việt Nam and thus 
do not have the luxury to publicly commemorate Colonel Cẩn the way that South Vietnamese 
Americans do.177  These are the individuals who grew up with him, who loved him, and who 
continue to memorialize him in the privacy of their own homes and hearts.  I examine the ways 
in which these relatives’ narratives complicate the dichotomy between hero and traitor, as well as 
how their annual death commemorations, although private, defy state mandates of organized 
forgetting.  In this way they articulate a nuanced resistance to the imperatives of state-sponsored 
historical narratives.  
 
 
 These oral histories were made possible by Hồ Ngọc Hoa Taylor, my grandmother, who 
helped me to conduct the interviews.  Situating her family’s narratives between the public 
suppression of South Vietnamese soldiers’ memories in Vietnam, and the overt veneration of 
Colonel Cẩn by Southern Vietnamese immigrant groups in the United States, Taylor asserted the 
need for her family’s voices: 
[In Vietnam] they always think my brother the traitor, or the bad guy, anything 
like that, so we cannot mention his name.  Or, anybody who knew him before 
cannot say anything.  And . . . I sure Vietnamese people [who] live in the United 
States here, they already know a lot about my brother, because every year they do 
memory day for him.  And they meet, they do in the TV, Vietnamese TV, and 
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they interview, and they done bundle stuff.  Everybody—I feel like most the 
people already know.  But I just want that this is my family’s side.178 
 
Highlighting this story of Hồ Ngọc Hoa Taylor’s “family’s side,” I focus on five main themes: 
the distinction between crimes against the people and crimes against the state; the uprooting of 
graves and the subsequent presence of ghosts; politically-conscious articulations of heroism 
given the interviewees’ presence in Vietnam; the valorizing of attributes other than masculine 
strength and honor; and the significance and circulation of cultural memory practices honoring 
Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn. 
 
1. Construction of a Criminal: Crimes Against the People versus Crimes Against the State 
 As demonstrated in Chapter Two, South Vietnamese Americans adamantly archive 
Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s biography on the Internet; thus we know that on August 14, 1975, 
Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn was tried, convicted, and executed by Communist officials in Cần Thơ, 
the largest city in the Mekong Delta.  But there are many holes in these public biographies—
holes that Colonel Cẩn’s relatives can help to fill in.  For example, family members tell the story 
of another trial—a failed trial—that has been elided by the more public versions of history:   
And at Chương Thiện, when Anh Hai179 was captured, they wanted to hold the 
trial at Chương Thiện, but the people protested so vigorously.  They would not 
allow it to take place there.  So they had to move Anh Hai to Cần Thơ to hold the 
trial at Cần Thơ because the people would not allow the trial to take place at 
Chương Thiện.  It’s because at that time the people felt very close to him and 
really loved him, so they did not agree to have the trial there. 
 
Rồi ở Chương Thiện, khi mà anh hai bị bắt đó, khi mà bị bắt đó, thì người ta 
muốn xử tại Chương Thiện luôn nhưng mà ở dưới đó dân nó la quá, nó phản đối 
quá, nó không cho xử cho nên là ở đó mới là đưa anh hai về Cần Thơ để là xử ở 
Cần Thơ chứ không có giám sử ở Chương Thện.  Tại vì bây giờ dân đó là người 
ta giống như là người thân, người ta thương đó, người ta không đồng ý cho xử.  
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Nói là ông này không có tội gì hết, không có tội gì với dân hết cho nên không 
được xử.180 
 
This story is corroborated by another relative’s narration of the events: 
Usually the officials who intimidated the people around them would be tried at 
that place rather than being sent somewhere else, but in Cậu Hai’s181 case, when 
he was at the trial, the people said that he was a good person who really loved his 
people and who always helped everyone.  He never treated them badly.  So then 
they sent him to Cần Thơ to another trial and they asked why he did not surrender. 
He said that he lived over here so his loyalty was with the South.   
 
Thường thường coi như là những cái người mà hà hiếp dân và kia nọ thì cái chỗ 
nào thì người ta xử ngay cái tỉnh đó chứ không có đưa đi chổ khác nhưng mà cậu 
hai xử cái tỉnh đó thì người ta nói là cậu hai là người tốt thương dân thương này 
nọ, có giúp đỡ người này người kia không phải gọi là ăn hiếp dân, thành ra mới 
đưa về Cần Thơ xử rồi ra tòa đàng hoàng rồi nói tại sao cậu hai không có đầu 
hàng thì cậu hai mới nói là cậu hai sống bên này thì cậu hai phải có trung thành 
với bên này.182 
 
These interviewees emphasize that the Vietnamese citizens of Chương Thiện embraced Colonel 
Hồ Ngọc Cẩn—who had served as their kind and thoughtful Province Chief for the past two 
years—and refused to convict him.  The relatives thus conceptualize Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s 
transgression—his participation in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and his 
subsequent refusal to surrender— as a political crime rather than a war crime: a travesty against 
the state rather than a travesty against the people.  As one interview articulated it: 
His crime wasn’t against the everyday people but against the revolutionaries 
[Communists].  That’s what I heard.  Just like when he was in the military, he 
killed so many of the revolutionaries and therefore that was what his crime, but he 
committed no crimes against the everyday people.  In fact he was known for his 
good deeds. 
 
Ổng không có tội với nhân dân nhưng có tội với cách mạng.  Em có nghe vậy 
thôi. Là cũng như là đi lính đi giết bao nhiêu cách mạng vậy đó thì có tội, nhưng 
mà với nhân dân thì không có tội thì rất tốt. 183  
 
 
                                                
180 BC, Interview with Evyn Lê Espiritu, June 28, 2012. 
181 This interviewee identifies Hồ Ngọc Cẩn as an uncle. 
182 BB, Interview with Evyn Lê Espiritu, June 28, 2012. 
183 BA, Interview with Evyn Lê Espiritu, June 28, 2012. 
 95 
Another insists: 
But he was not found to have committed crimes against the people but only 
against the country so the people did not try him.  During his career in the 
military, even when he became highly ranked he really loved his soldiers and the 
people around him.  He always took care of them.  He wasn’t one of those people 
who did whatever he wanted because of his rank and who did not consider the 
needs and wants of those of whom he was in charge.  Because of that, the people 
really loved him so at the people’s court they said that he committed no crimes 
against them.  
 
Nhưng mà có cái là không có tội với nhân dân, thì tội với đất nước thì mấy ông xử 
thì thôi chứ không phải là nhân dân xử. Trong thời gian làm việc, từ thời gian làm 
lớn anh hai thương lính thương dân nghĩa là lo cho lính lo cho dân chứ không có 
phải là ý là mình làm lớn rồi mình muốn làm cái gì thì mình làm không cần thiết 
tới những cái gì dân kêu gọi, dân muốn, cái đó là anh hai không có làm cho nên 
dân chúng thương, thì cũng có đưa ra tòa án nhân dân nhưng mà dân nói không có 
cái gì với nhân dân hết.184 
 
Thus these interviewees defiantly challenge the Vietnamese state’s insistence on Colonel Hồ 
Ngọc Cẩn’s traitorous and criminal nature.  They correct the government’s misrepresentation of 
Colonel Cẩn’s treatment of the everyday people.  They insist on representing Colonel Hồ Ngọc 
Cẩn as a virtuous and caring figure, who unfortunately just happened to be on the losing side of 
the war.  However, we must acknowledge that this insistence on virtue is a rhetorical strategy 
itself, meant to perhaps to draw an implicit contrast with the Communist leaders: If Colonel Hồ 
Ngọc Cẩn was so virtuous, what does that imply about the people who executed him?  In this 
chapter I do not contend that the interviewees’ narratives are necessarily more “accurate,” 
“moral,” or “true” than that of the Vietnamese state; rather, I highlight these narratives in order 
to juxtapose them against the state narratives, to provide a more multifaceted representation of 
Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn.  Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn was human: he was neither completely criminal 
nor entirely virtuous.  However, because the Vietnamese state’s narrative already has so much 
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power and influence, in this chapter I choose to privilege the narrations of Colonel Hồ Ngọc 
Cẩn’s relatives.  
 
2. Razing the Cemetery: Uprooting Graves and Disturbing Ghosts 
 
 The Vietnamese government’s insistence on a totalizing narrative of unification and 
reconciliation led to not only the organized forgetting of the ARVN soldiers, but to the uprooting 
of their very bodies as well.  Hue-Tam Ho Tai explains: 
While those who fought against the French, the Americans, or the South 
Vietnamese government are interred in cemeteries devoted to revolutionary 
heroes, the remains of those who fought on the other side in the Armed Forces of 
the Republic of Vietnam had to be taken away when its military cemetery was 
razed after 1975.185   
 
Thus the bodies were disturbed and displaced, their ghosts condemned to wander the earth.  In 
Vietnamese culture, ancestor worship is very important, and thus, the inability to locate and 
memorialize the dead can be both traumatic and jarring.186 
Such would have been the case with Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, if his loyal followers had not 
rescued his body.  Colonel Cẩn’s sister paints a politically subversive tale of multiple actors 
collaborating to (re)locate Colonel Cẩn’s remains.187  According to this interviewee, after 
Colonel Cẩn was publicly executed, his body was driven off and buried in an unmarked grave.  
However, a loyal friend followed the car and unobtrusively marked the grave so that Colonel 
Cẩn’s parents could at least honor their fallen son.  Later though, the government decided to raze 
the cemetery.  Colonel Cẩn’s relatives went to ask for his remains.  Because Colonel Cẩn was 
such a politically contentious figure, who publicly refused to surrender—indeed, when he died 
he brazenly requested that he be buried under the flag of the Republic of Vietnam—the relatives 
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could not ask for his remains directly, but rather used the name of a son of another relative.  
They then transferred the remains to a Church cemetery in Long Xuyên.  But he remained there 
only a year, until that cemetery was leveled as well.  The family then had to move Colonel Cẩn’s 
body to private land: a relative’s place.  Finally in 1995, Colonel Cẩn’s wife and son sent money 
home for the family to send his remains on to the United States.  Thus Colonel Cẩn’s remains 
were dug up once again, cremated, and carried to the U.S. by Hồ Ngọc Hoa Taylor, who was 
visiting Việt Nam at the time.188 
The current Vietnamese state insists on reconciliation and unification, but this reunion is 
predicated not only on the suppression of ephemeral memories, but also on the eradication of 
material bodies.  Thus Colonel Cẩn’s body traced multiple displacements, belatedly following 
the path of Vietnamese refugees who had fled before him.  In this way his body reenacted the 
history of Vietnamese refugee displacement, twenty years after the mass exodus of 1975.  It is an 
eerie echo of the past in the present—a duplication of that moment of removal and trauma.  This 
duplication highlights the fact that war and its displacements have lasting effects that haunt the 
present, attesting to the necessity to remember and come to terms with the past. 
  Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn could have made this journey twenty years earlier, and perhaps 
then would have still been alive today.  He was offered the opportunity to escape to the U.S. in 
1975. However Colonel Cẩn refused, instead choosing to steadfastly die for his country: 
My older brother was a hero because he stayed back in Việt Nam and let them kill 
him.  He did not hide or try to escape.  If he had, he wouldn’t have died that way.  
Only heroes would stay behind and try to fight back that way.  Even when the 
airplane came, he still refused to leave.  What was he fighting?  It was already a 
lost cause, but he kept fighting.  If he had left, he wouldn’t have died. 
 
Anh hai vậy, cậu hai Cẩn là người anh hùng, nghĩa là ở lại nước Việt Nam đễ cho 
tụi nó bắn. Không có trốn.  Nếu trốn thì đâu có chết như vậy.  Người anh hùng 
mới ở lại chống cự như vậy.  Tới sau này chị ngồi, chị còn nói là máy bay tới 
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cũng không có chịu bay, chống cự hoài, chống cái gì?  Người ta đã bị ấy hết rồi, 
còn ổng cứ chống hoài.  Nếu đi thì đâu có chết.189 
 
This quote suggests that Colonel Cẩn is memorialized as a hero less for his accomplishments in 
battle as for his final refusal to surrender.  Would he still be venerated and memorialized if he 
had fled to the United States?  Perhaps Colonel Cẩn is special not for his life but for his death; 
many South Vietnamese veterans feel like they betrayed their country by leaving in 1975, and 
thus look to Colonel Cẩn as an epitome of bravery, patriotism, and heroism—as a figure to 
assuage their guilt.190  This relative is more ambivalent about Colonel Cẩn’s choice to stay 
though.  Although she insists that “Only heroes would stay behind,” she also painfully 
acknowledges that “If he had left, he wouldn’t have died.”  She wouldn’t have lost him so soon. 
 Despite his initial refusal to leave when still alive, Colonel Cẩn’s body did ultimately end 
up in the United States.  However one should be wary of conceptualizing the United States as a 
final refuge, given the fact that U.S. intervention exacerbated the war between North and South 
Vietnam in the first place.  Thus although Colonel Cẩn is laid to rest—his ghost freed from 
“wander[ing] along the highway” and “disturb[ing] the living”—he still haunts the present, 
serving as a constant reminder to his relatives in Việt Nam of his multiply uprooted burial, and to 
his loved ones in California of the painful journey of escape. 191  Yet rather than repress these 
painful memories—these haunting ghost stories—Avery Gordon advocates their engagement: “It 
is something about writing ghost stories, stories that not only repair representational mistakes, 
but also strive to understand the conditions under which a memory was produced in the first 
place, toward a countermemory, for the future.”192  By acknowledging the figure of Colonel 
Cẩn’s ghost, his relatives and followers narrate a history repressed by both the Vietnamese and 
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American state, conceptualizing a countermemory in which Colonel Cẩn and other South 
Vietnamese soldiers are honored for their bravery and self-sacrifice. 
 
3. Honoring a Hero: Nuanced Narratives of Valor 
 When asked explicitly if they believe Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn is a hero or a traitor, all the 
interviewed relatives mark him as the former, though their answers are more nuanced than that of 
their counterparts in California, given their continued presence in Communist Vietnam.  Thus it 
is interesting to note how they navigate their precarious positioning, valorizing Colonel Cẩn’s 
bravery and steadfastness while avoiding direct commentary on the political implications of his 
stance.  They are careful to highlight his devotion to his cause, thus rendering the cause itself—
loyalty to the Republic of Vietnam—almost inconsequential.   
 For example, this sibling admires Colonel Cẩn’s self-sacrifice for his country—an act of 
loyalty that should be acknowledged for its selflessness, regardless of the politics of the given 
state:  
We always say that he is a hero because… whatever side you are on, if you live on 
one side you follow that side, and you protect that side.  The people who knew 
him, they all believed that he sacrificed himself for his country.  That his whole 
life, from youth to adulthood, and from the time that he joined the military, his 
whole life was for his country. 
 
Luôn luôn nói anh hai là người anh hùng, tại vì … bên nào cũng vấy, thứ dụ như 
là sống bên nào thì mình theo bên đó, nghía là mình bảo vệ bên đó.  Những cái 
người mà biết về anh hai thì ai cũng nghĩ là anh hai hy sinh về cho đất nước, là 
cuộc đời từ nhỏ tới lớn đó khi mà bất đều ra đi lính đó là cuộc đời của anh hai là 
cho tổ quốc.193 
 
Likewise Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s brother, who was sent to a reeducation camp for ten years due 
to both his relationship to Colonel Cẩn and his service in the ARVN, qualifies Colonel Cẩn’s 
heroism as thus: 
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 I think that my older brother is a hero but when we stand between freedom and 
communism, as an example, then one would have to live according to their duty 
to their motherland.  So this means that if there are two groups who are fighting 
each other, whoever is loyal is given the title of “hero.”  So if that’s the case, then 
I think that my brother, the way that he died… he should be a hero because he 
completely fulfilled his obligation to his country [by dying for his country]. 
 
Cậu tám thì nghĩ là anh hai là người anh hùng nhưng mà dụ đứng trên một lập 
trường giửa tự do và cộng sản thứ dụ đi thì người nào cũng phải sống theo cái bổn 
phận cuả quê hương của người đó cái tư tưởng của người đó bể vậy người ta nói 
là ngày xưa có truyện trung thần … con có biết truyện trung hần không? Có nghĩa 
là giữa hai người hai bên đánh với nhau nhưng mà người nào trung thì người đó 
được trung thần thì cậu tám nghĩ là nếu cậu hai chết như vậy thì cậu hai cũng 
được trung thần vì cậu hai đã lam´ tròn được cái bổn phận trách nhiệm đối với cái 
đất nước của cậu hai.194 
 
Although he also fought on behalf of South Vietnam, this brother does not explicitly venerate 
that now-defunct state, in the way that South Vietnamese veterans do in the United States.  He 
admires they way Colonel Cẩn “fulfilled his obligation to his country,” and thus identifies his 
brother as a “hero,” but he is careful not to betray his political loyalties when speaking about the 
conflict between North Vietnam and the South.  Another interviewee, even when asked explicitly 
to comment on Colonel Cẩn’s refusal to surrender, avoids a political answer and instead says that 
Colonel Cẩn “did the right thing” because he remained steadfastly ardent to his cause.  However, 
this interviewee shies away from explicitly condoning the cause itself: 
I believe that he did the right thing because he followed the country that he 
belonged to, that he tried to protect.  But when he no longer could protect it, he 
decided to sacrifice himself.  He would rather die than surrender.  
 
Cai đó là anh hai làm đúng tại vì anh hai theo cái nước của mình lúc đó, mình bảo 
vệ mà giờ không được thì thà là mình hy sinh, mình chết chứ mình không có đầu 
hàng.195 
 
Taking this rhetoric a step further, one interviewee was almost philosophical in her answer, 
avoiding the question of politics and country altogether: 
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According to my values, the way that I think, everyone’s life has a separate route.  
Each life has its own meaning.  Each person has his own will that’s different from 
another’s, so we can’t put a price on their action [we can’t judge].  About Mr. Hồ 
Ngọc Cẩn, to me, the way that I think, what he did was his own will, he gave it 
meaning and that was his own meaning. 
 
Theo như tôi đánh giá đó, theo tôi nghĩ đó, đời ai cũng có một cái hướng đi riêng, 
không cho đó là một cái mà gọi là cũng như là chính nghĩa của mỗi người, mỗi 
người có một cái ý chí khác nhau cho nên mình không thể đánh giá người ta.  Về 
anh hai, theo chị nghĩ thì đó là ý chí của ảnh, của ổng, ông Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, thì ông 
Hồ Ngọc Cẩn cái ý chí của ổng thì như vậy.  Ổng cho đó chính nghĩa thì đúng là 
chính nghĩa của ổng.196        
 
According to this interviewee, Colonel Cẩn refused to give in to the demands of the Communist 
government; by refusing to surrender, he forged his own path and made his own meaning—a 
meaning that is kept alive by the oral tales of his remaining loved ones.   
In contrast, Hồ Ngọc Hoa Taylor—who grew up in Việt Nam but moved to the United 
States in her late twenties—has more freedom to make politically-charged comments, given her 
current position in California rather than in Việt Nam.  Thus throughout the forty-five minute 
interview she switched between politically-neutral evaluations of her brother’s actions and more 
explicitly nationalist articulations of what constitutes heroism.  For example, Taylor initially said 
that she does not know if her brother is a hero or not because he was really just defending his 
own side—in the same way that the Northern Vietnamese defended their own side in turn.  
Furthermore, she thinks he should be held responsible for the people he killed.  But at another 
point, her rhetoric echoes that of her relatives in Việt Nam, praising Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s 
steadfastness to his cause in politically neutral terms: “Sometimes they say when you die, you 
cry, you do something, but no.  He think [it was] the right thing to do, and maybe the right time 
he die, and he accept that.”197  However, she intersperses these comments with more politically-
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charged language: “I think he the hero for my country, because he not surrender.”198  At points 
she explicitly identifies with the southern Republic of Vietnam, in spite of the now-defunct status 
of this political state.  
Despite the general avoidance of politically-charged comments, when Colonel Cẩn’s 
relatives in Việt Nam do explicitly reference the no-longer-existing Republic of Vietnam, they 
conceptualize Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn not as an aggressor or traitor, but rather as a protector and 
peacemaker, as exemplified by these two testimonies: 
Ever since he was little he had it in his mind that he would do whatever needed to 
protect his country, so when there was a program for families who had sons 
fourteen or older to join the ARVN Junior Military Academy our dad signed him 
up so he could go study there. 
 
Từ nhỏ đã có ý nghỉa là mình sẽ làm để là giữ dìn đất nước của mình, rồi cho nên 
lúc mà khi có chương trình mà gia đình của quân nhân con cái trên 14 tuổi được 
đi thiếu sinh quân thì ba mới làm lên để cho anh hai đi học ở đó, rồi đi học xong 
rồi thì khi mà ra trường thì là làm cho quân cụ thôi, trong thời gian đó, ớ Thủ Đức 
đó.199 
 
What we know about him is that every time he would talk to the family, he would 
always want peace for the country and to do whatever needed so that our country 
would become a prosperous and happy place.  Whatever he could do, he would.  
That was his aspiration. 
 
Thì theo như mà được biết về anh hai khi mỗi lần anh hai nói chuyện với gia đình 
đó thì anh hai là luôn luôn muốn được sự thanh bình cho đất nước và làm những 
cái gì mà có thể là cho đất nước được tốt đẹp nghĩa là yên vui đó, nghĩa là cái gì 
anh hai làm được thì anh hai sẽ làm, thì đó là  nguyện vọng của anh hai.200 
 
These interviewees emphasize that Colonel Cẩn genuinely fought for what he believed was best 
for Việt Nam.  According to them, Colonel Cẩn’s ultimate goal then was not to defeat the North, 
but rather to protect and love his people—the people of Việt Nam.  This rhetoric parallels the 
testimony of another RVN soldier, Ly Tong Ba, who survived the war and was interviewed in 
the 1980s: 
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I fought for my country.  I did my duty.  I did the best I could.  And I lost.  Yet I 
am proud, still.  When I could not perform my job any more I still tried to fight.  I 
lost my army, but I was never defeated.  I just did my job for Vietnam.  And when 
the [PAVN] General that I fought against said to me, “What do you think now?”  
I said, “I am Vietnamese.  I want to see Vietnam rich and the people happy and 
free.”201 
 
Like Colonel Cẩn, Lý Tòng Bá refused to be “defeated” and asserted that he was just doing his 
“job for Vietnam.”  However, unlike Colonel Cẩn, who ardently fought and died for the Republic 
of Vietnam, this brigadier general attempted to reconcile and reconceptualize his protection of 
the people of South Vietnam with a love for Việt Nam as a whole, regardless of leadership: “I 
still say to the leaders of the country, ‘I did my part.  You won and I lost.  And now you do what 
you wanted to do.  If you do good, if the people become free and prosperous, then I have nothing 
against you.’”202  However, Lý Tòng Bá ultimately believed that the Communist leaders failed to 
bring freedom and prosperity, and thus he mourns the futility of Việt Nam’s civil war: “Việt 
Nam lost many good citizens in the war and now look at the country.  I must say that we got 
nothing from the war.”203  It is important to note though that Lý Tòng Bá does not (explicitly) 
deride the current leadership for their Communist politics, but rather their failed promise.  Thus 
his critique of the current state is implicit, like that of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s relatives.  It is not 
of the forceful nature articulated by South Vietnamese veterans in the United States. 
 
4. Heroism off the Battlefield: A Gendered Critique of Masculine Might 
According to Hue Tam Ho-Tai, in Việt Nam heroism can be “celebrated without 
associating it almost exclusively with battlefield combat, as is the case with much Western 
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ideology.”204  Heroism is rather associated with “determination, endurance, the spirit of self-
sacrifice, and, above all, the willingness to fight against an invader whatever the odds.”205  Thus 
it “need not be an especially aristocratic or masculine quality.”206  Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s 
relatives take this reframing of Western and masculine notions of heroism a step further.   Not 
only do they nuance the narratives of his military honor and political loyalty, qualifying the stock 
image of heroism constructed by his ardent South Vietnamese American followers and refuting 
the construction of traitor imagined by the current Vietnamese state.  They also offer domestic 
stories of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s kind deeds and generous acts.  Thus they honor and remember 
Colonel Cẩn not only for his bravery, but also for his compassion—his willingness to help those 
in need.  They value more feminine conceptualizations of heroism. 
One interviewee notes explicitly that she admires Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn not for his 
political refusal to surrender, but for his loving treatment of others: 
I know Mr. Hồ Ngọc Cẩn was a person with great integrity.  I don’t know if he 
chose the right or wrong path.  That is not a question of importance for me.  What 
was important for me was how he treated the people around me.  In that sense, I 
regarded him as someone who was very great.  His virtues were very great. 
 
Rồi tôi biết ông Hồ Ngọc Cẩn là một cái người rất là trung thực, không biết ông 
ấy đi đúng đường hay là sai đường, cái chuyện đó tôi không thèm nhẩn đề, nhưng 
mà tôi thấy ông ấy là đối sử với mỗi người tốt thì tôi cho ông ấy là một người rất 
cao thượng.  Cái công đức đó là rất là cao.207    
 
When asked to describe their early memories of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, the interviewees praised 
Colonel Cẩn selflessness and compassion: “If anyone needed anything and he could help, he 
would.  Các em mà cần cái gì anh có thể làm được thì anh hai làm.”208  For example, several 
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siblings shared stories of how Colonel Cẩn personally took them in and cared for them, given 
their parents’ precarious financial situation.  One sister recounts: 
When I was little, about seven years old, I went to live with my older brother.  At 
that time his wife just had the baby.  My brother really loved me.  He was 
concerned that there would be difficulty between his wife and me so he gave me 
money himself for everyday use so that I wouldn’t have to bother his wife.  He 
really took good care of me.  Sometimes I used to get sick, throwing up, but he 
took care of me, buying medicine and making sure that I was getting enough rest.  
He would take care of everything.  When he went to Nha Trang for a year I went 
with him and I lived there with him.  Overall, I will always remember how he 
took good care of me and how he made sure that there would not be any trouble 
between me and his wife. 
 
À… hồi nhỏ khi em khoảng bảy tuổi thì em có lên ở với anh hai thì lúc đó chị hai 
mới sanh em bé thì anh hai rất là thương em.  Lo cũng như sợ là chị dâu với em 
chồng bị mất lòng rồi anh hai cho em tiền để ăn hàng tán để không có đụng chạm 
gì chị hai.  Anh hai lo dữ lắm.  Hồi đó em hay bị bịnh bị ói thì anh hai lá lo cho 
em đi lấy thuốc lấy đồ em nằm đó thì anh hai cũng săm sóc đũ thứ hết.  Thời gian 
khi anh hai đi ra ngoài Nha Trang một năm thì em có đi theo anh hai ở ngoài đó 
với anh hai. Nói chung ra là em là rất nhớ anh hai vì cái gì anh hai cũng lo lắng 
chăm sóc cho em chứ không có đễ em mất lỏng với chị dâu.209 
 
Another sister describes a similar situation: 
When I was little, I lived with him for a little while, about half a year.  I was six 
years old, at Thủ Đức.  And after that, when I was about sixteen or seventeen 
years old, I lived with him at Bạc Liêu, for about a year.  So then I stayed with 
him that year.  He had a place in Gia Bình where he built a house, but he would 
go on military missions and he would go for several months at a time.  So I would 
go there to visit him at the Gia Bình jungle, and that place was very harsh. 
 
Lúc nhỏ thì cũng ở với anh hai một thời gian, khoảng nữa năm, lúc sáu tuổi.  Ở 
Thủ Đức.  Rồi sau này, lúc mà khỏang mười sáu, mười bảy tuổi, ở Bạc Liêu, thì ở 
khoảng một năm.  Đi theo anh hai ở một năm thì lúc đó là anh hai coi như là có 
cái chổ, khu Gia Bình đó, là cấp nhà ở, nhưng mà anh hai thì lại đi hành quân, đi 
thì vài ba tháng thì về nhà, rồi tôi cũng đi lên đó thăm, là ở rừng Gia Bình đó, thì 
thấy cũng cực khổ lắm.210 
 
Likewise, Taylor remembers how Colonel Cẩn paid for her housing when she had to leave her 
parents in Rạch Giá in order to go to high school in Sài Gòn.   First Colonel Cẩn took her away 
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from the home of a miserly uncle who begrduged her cost of living: Colonel Cẩn then paid  
“more than half of his salary for me to live every month.  And but he do it, because you know, he 
don’t want me [to be] upset, don’t want me feel, you know, left out because my parents not 
here.”211  As these testimonies show, Colonel Cẩn went out of his way to take in his siblings or 
provide them with alternative housing, despite his military responsibilities and his minimal 
income.  These are stories that have been left out of the existing historical record—that are 
missing not only from dominant state narratives, but also from the online timelines written by 
South Vietnamese American veterans.  Those timelines only recount Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s 
military accomplishments.  In contrast, these interviewees also emphasize the value of the 
domestic: they praise Colonel Cẩn’s guardianship of his siblings, elevating these traits to the 
same status as battle victories.  Thus they offer up a more feminine standard of heroism: one that 
acknowledges and appreciates domestic care work as well as battlefield victories.  
 Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn was also praised for his humility.  Even when he became a 
decorated officer, he did not consider himself better than his fellow Vietnamese citizens: 
Even though he was a high-ranking official, he lived simply, like an everyday 
person.  He would come frequently to visit the grandparents.  And it wasn’t just 
them.  He treated all the elders around him with the utmost respect. 
 
Sống dung hòa, mặc dù làm lớn nhưng sống như là bình dân dãn dị. Tới lui 
thường xuyên để mà thăm ông bà.  Mà không riêng ông bà, là những người già 
xung quanh ông ấy đều tôn trọng hết, chứ không riêng về ông bà trong nhà.212 
 
Perhaps this humility was in remembrance of his own humble beginnings, growing up in the 
countryside of Rạch Giá.  Indeed, when Colonel Cẩn had raised enough money, he did not spend 
it on himself, but rather went back home to build a bigger and fancier grave for his grandparents:  
He was a very devoted son who really loved his parents and his aunt, and who 
always remembered his grandparents.  When he went to Xa Đét, that was the 
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beginning of his rise in the ranks.  He had saved a little money that he used to 
build a tomb for our grandparents.  This tomb was very well-built, so today, even 
though all of the children and grandchildren don’t live in Rạch Giá anymore, the 
tomb is still intact because he put such care into building it.  Because at that time, 
our family was poor and we lived far away so there was no one else that could 
have done it. 
 
Như là đối với gia đình đó, cậu Cẩn là một người con có hiếu, là thương cha mẹ, 
thương dì, rất là thương dì và còn nhớ ơn ông bà nữa, thì khi mà cậu đi về Xa Đét, 
là mới bất đầu nhậm chất thì cậu cũng có đễ dành dụm được một ít tiền là cho mồ 
mã cho ông bà ngoại.  Cái mồ mã đó rất là chắc chắn và đễ tới bây giờ mặc dầu 
con cháu đã đi xa không còn ai ỡ Rạch Giá nữa, nhưng mà mồ mã của ông bà 
cũng còn nguyên vẹn là nhờ công đức của cậu Cẩn đã xây dựng.  Chứ lúc đó 
chúng tôi củng nghèo và ở xa cho nên là cũng giống như con cháu cũng không có 
ai làm được.213 
 
As reflective of Vietnamese culture, Colonel Cẩn retained the utmost respect for his ancestors, 
ensuring their restful state—in much the same way that his relatives would later try to do for him 
in turn.  Thus, these interviewees highlight Colonel Cẩn’s virtue in the familial space, offering 
different axes upon which to appraise Colonel Cẩn’s heroism. 
  Notably, Colonel Cẩn’s kindness extended even to those who were not in his family.  
One interviewee attests that although Colonel Cẩn traveled around a lot, he was always very 
respectful and concerned about the affairs of those he met, however briefly: 
I heard people say that every time Anh Hai214 would ride in his jeep to the 
countryside, whenever he would see a funeral he would stop his car and go in to 
give his respects and share their sadness with them and drink with them and stay 
for a little while before he left.  That’s why so many people loved him, because of 
his compassion for those around him. 
 
Em cũng nghe người ta kể là mổi lằn anh hai đi xe jeep đó đi tới vô mấy cái đồng 
quê rồi thấy đám ma gì đó thì anh hai ngừng xe lại rồi vô đó anh hai chào với lại 
chia buồn với cái đám ma của người ta rồi uống rượu đế rồi một lác anh hai mới 
đi, thành ra nói về tình cảm thì người ta rất là thương anh hai.215 
 
Another interviewee recounts a specific example of Colonel Cẩn’s generosity: 
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Mr. Hồ Ngọc Cẩn was a man who helped a lot of people.  Whenever he saw 
anyone who was poor or who needed anything, he would help him or her.  One 
time, I heard that there was a pregnant woman.  Mr. Hồ Ngọc Cẩn was traveling 
on the road; he was in a car when he saw the pregnant woman about to give birth 
to her baby.  But her family said that she was having a difficult time giving birth 
and that if she were to stay in the village, she would not be able to have the baby.  
The people were trying to catch a ride to go to a nearby town so that the woman 
could have a C-section.  When Mr. Hồ Ngọc Cẩn spotted them, he stopped his 
car.  He asked the family what was going on.  And when they told him, he had his 
driver drive the woman straight to town so that she could have the operation.  
Both the baby and the mother ended up healthy.  When I heard this story, I really 
cherished him for helping the woman to have a safe delivery.  This story shows 
that he was a very virtuous person. 
 
Ông Hồ Ngọc Cẩn thì ổng giúp đỡ rất nhiều người, ổng coi những người nào mà 
nghèo khổ đó là người ta cần cái gì thì ổng hay giúp đỡ lắm.  Rồi có một lần đó 
thì tôi nghe là có một sản phụ đó, ông Hồ Ngọc Cẩn đang đi trên đường, đang 
chạy xe trên đường thì thấy thì thậy một người sản phụ đó đang chuyển dạ sanh 
nhưng mà gia đình nói là sanh rất khó cho nên ở quê không có sanh được.  Mới 
chuyền ra xe ra đường lộ để mà đi về tỉnh đón xe.  Trên đường đón xe để đi về 
tỉnh để mỗ đứa con thì gặp Ông Hồ Ngọc Cẩn ổng chạy xe tới thì ông mới ngừng 
xe lại, ông hỏi thì gia đình người ta kể lại như vậy, thì ông ấy cho người đệ tự ổng 
đó là đưa cái người sản phụ đó đưa thẳng về tỉnh để mà mỗ sẽ đàng hoàng.  Đứa 
bé và mẹ khỏe, hai người đó là coi như là an toàn. Cho nên tôi, tôi nghe nói như 
vậy thì tôi rất là quí ông ấy, đã giúp một người đàn bà sanh đẽ, như vậy thì coi 
như là một người quá nhiều công đức.216  
 
Colonel Cẩn’s actions in this story become even more relevant when another relative reveals that 
this woman was actually married to a Việt Cộng official.  Thus, political factions did not limit 
Colonel Cẩn’s compassion.  Interestingly, Colonel Cẩn’s generosity eventually paid off, as the 
husband of this pregnant woman would later be one of Colonel Cẩn’s jailors at Cần Thơ.  Out of 
gratefulness for Colonel Cẩn’s kind deed, this man would sneak Colonel Cẩn extra food as he 
awaited trial.217  Thus Colonel Cẩn’s kindness was reciprocated.  
 The generosity exhibited by Colonel Cẩn in this incident contrasts with the Vietnamese 
state’s portrait of Colonel Cẩn as an unrelenting ARVN criminal: Colonel Cẩn loved and fought 
valiantly for his country, but this did not hinder him from assisting Northern Vietnamese people.  
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Overall these interviewees highlight stories of Colonel Cẩn’s selfless and virtuous nature off the 
battlefield—private stories that have been left out of the more public archives, but which are 
significant in their own right.  They nuance masculine conceptions of heroism and highlight the 
importance of domestic care.  
 
5. Honoring the Dead: Subversive and Transnational Memory Practices 
 The Vietnamese state attempts to not only control the production and organization of 
life—what Foucault termed “biopolitics”218—but also to “own the memory of its war dead,” as 
exemplified by the “official memorial services organized by local party cadres.”219  In these 
state-sponsored ceremonies, a “fallen soldier’s sacrifice for the state and revolution” served to 
“exclusively define the meaning of his life and death.”220  However, these “official memorial 
services” are not held on behalf of those who died for the losing side of the Vietnamese civil 
war; the “fallen soldier” does not reference the ARVN combatant.  In fact, the Vietnamese state 
has actively suppressed any commemoration of the southern dead, because such memory acts 
threaten the state’s historical metanarrative of reconciliation and reunification.  In her gendered 
analysis of state-sponsored war memorialization, Hue-Tam Ho Tai identifies mothers as the 
primary caretakers of memory in Việt Nam.  However, the category of ‘Heroic Mothers’ 
“include[s] only those whose sons and daughters died in the cause of the Revolution and the War 
Against the Americans,” leaving the grief of Southern Vietnamese mothers to go “officially 
unacknowledged,” their war losses “erased from public memory.”221  Given this context, it is 
quite significant that Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s sister—the oldest living member of his immediate 
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family—continues to hold private commemoration ceremonies for this fallen soldier, gathering 
the remaining siblings together each year to pay respects to Colonel Cẩn’s spirit and to tell 
stories about his life.222  Thus the private domestic home becomes a politically subversive space, 
where Colonel Cẩn’s family continues to remember him, despite state suppression.   
Furthermore, Colonel Cẩn’s relatives seek out information about South Vietnamese 
Americans’ public commemoration ceremonies on the Internet, thus constructing a transnational 
community and connection.  One relative recounts: 
Just the other day, his death anniversary celebration was on the computer and 
when I saw it, I called everyone in my family to come to see it, everyone!  Even 
though he is now dead he still is better known or more famous than most people.  
Over in the U.S. they also celebrate him so there’s a lot to be proud of.  You only 
get that kind of special treatment if you are a hero. 
 
Như hôm trước mà đám giổ lên mạng đó, thì chị thấy, chị cũng gọi, kêu tùm lum 
hết trên, kêu con cháu đi ra coi như vậy đó, kêu hết. Nghĩa là thấy bây giờ chết 
mà cũng danh dự hơn người ta.  Bên Mỹ người ta cũng làm vậy, người ta cũng 
chàu, người ta cũng ấy vậy đó.  Như vậy thì được hãnh diện dữ lắm đó.  Anh hùng 
mới được hãnh diện như vậy.223 
 
Thus the Internet is a medium through which transnational communities can subvert state 
restrictions.  Colonel Cẩn’s relatives may not be able to personally celebrate Colonel Cẩn’s death 
anniversary in public, but they are heartened that their counterparts in America can do so.   
Perhaps even more radically, there exists a whole town in Việt Nam that continues to 
publicly worship Colonel Cẩn, despite state censorship: Chượng Thiên, the town in which 
Colonel Cẩn was originally captured and tried, but which refused to participate in the execution 
of their hero, thus forcing the Northern Vietnamese officials to move the trail to Cần Thơ.  One 
interviewee testifies: 
These people really respected and even worshipped him as if he were a saint, 
because when he was working there, he really helped the villagers by building the 
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Chượng Thiên open-air market, so that poor people who didn’t have a place to 
sell things could go there.  For people who didn’t have a place to sell their wares, 
they would now have a decent place to sell their goods.  Before that, this open-air 
market was a very run-down and muddy place, and now it’s a very prosperous 
place.  Everyone in that village really venerated him and felt indebted to him.  We 
heard that the people at Chượng Thiên all really worship him.  Even though he 
had died, they all continue to venerate him as if he were the patron saint of the 
town. 
 
Thì những người dân đó là họ kính phục và tôn xù như là một vị thánh vì khi mà 
cậu Cẩn làm việc ở Chương Thiện thì cậu có giúp đỡ cho dân bằng cách là lập cái 
chợ Chương Thiện, rồi cho những người buôn bán lẽ, nghèo khó, không có chỗ 
buôn bán thì cậu Cẩn sắp chổ cho những người đó để họ có chổ họ buôn bán cho 
nó đàng hoàng có nơi có chổ để không có phải khó khăn.  Cái chợ Chương Thiện 
hồi trước đó thì bùn sình lầy lội bây giờ cái chợ đò thì khang trang.  Mội người 
dân ở đó thì mỗi người đều rất là kính phục cậu và mang ơn cậu Cẩn.  Cái tin mà 
chúng tôi được nghe người dân ở vùng Chượng Thiên báo lại cho tôi biết và 
những người ở đó họ tôn thờ và họ kính phục lắm, mặc dầu cậu đã mất rồi nhưng 
mà dân ở đó người ta vẫn thờ, có người người ta thờ vậy đó, nghĩ là cậu sẽ thành 
một vị thần ở vùng đó.224       
 
Likewise, in another interview Colonel Cẩn’s cousin recounts visiting Chượng Thiên after the 
execution and being treated like a celebrity due to her relation to Colonel Cẩn.  She was 
welcomed by the entire village, honored with a large feast, and showered with stories of 
gratitude and loyalty towards Colonel Cẩn, thus testifying to his significance to this town.225  
Despite the excitement of these subversive public commemorations, one brother echoes 
Hồ Ngọc Hoa Taylor’s desire to specifically highlight the private memories of Colonel Cẩn’s 
relatives, insisting on the special place of his family in these memory productions: 
His love for the family was very whole-hearted and the way he acted towards his 
soldiers—those who were below him—also really fulfilled his duty towards them.  
Because of this, many, many, many people get on the Internet and write about 
him.  But what I have to say is that all of those things don’t equal what I do 
because I still remember him more than all of those people. 
 
Cậu hai tình thương cho gia đình trọn vẽ và cá tình đối với quân đội những người 
khấp hơn cậu hai thì cậu hai cũng làm tròn bổn phận đó. Chính như vậy đó thì cậu 
tám chỉ nói rằng có rất nhiều người rất nhiều họ đã lên trên internet và nói về cậu 
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hai.  Thì đơn nhiên đội với cậu tám là tất cả mấy điều đó cũng chưa bần cậu tám 
nữa.  Cậu tám vẫn nhớ anh hai nhiều hơn họ.226 
 
Thus the family members provide a perspective missing from public negotiations of Colonel Hồ 
Ngọc Cẩn’s memory, filing in the gaps left by Việt Nam’s and the United States’ official 
historical records, as well as by South Vietnamese Americans’ patriotic memory practices.  
According to Hue-Tam Ho Tai, the struggle of memory against forgetting, or “collective 
amnesia,” can “be waged by constructing a counternarrative out of the suppressions and silences 
in official history.”227  I read these testimonies by Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s relatives as 
counternarratives in their own right, respecting their private nature but highlighting them here in 
this chapter, to show the ways in which they negotiate, challenge, and nuance existing public 
narratives surrounding Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn. 
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Chapter 5 
The End?  Writing History and Transferring Memory 
 
 
 
“A nation which loses awareness  
of its past gradually loses its self.”228 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 This is a story about history and memory—about silence and resistance, suppressions and 
eruptions, narratives and counternarratives—surrounding the controversial figure of Colonel Hồ 
Ngọc Cẩn.  My initial question, “Who was Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn?”, is not only a question of 
biography—an excavation of facts.  It is also a question of perspective and construction: Who 
was Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn to whom?  Who has the privilege to share their story?  Whose story 
do we decide to hear?  Is one story “more true” than another?  How do we know what we know?   
 In this thesis I probe the relationship between official history and subaltern cultural 
memory practices, examining the ways in which we narrativize the past—especially painful 
pasts, which powerful agents such as the state seek to erase or suppress.  I have chosen to 
highlight these erased pasts, these memories, to see how they contend with and eventually 
constitute our understanding of “history”—of “what happened.”  In Chapter Two, I situate the 
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few facts we know about Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn —gathered from online timelines posted by 
South Vietnamese veterans—within their sociopolitical context, arguing that all history is 
constructed, and that this is my own careful construction.  In Chapter Three, I examine the 
Vietnam War Memorial, commemoration services, YouTube videos, and two interviews with 
Vietnam War veterans to show how South Vietnamese Americans push back against state 
imperatives of organized forgetting.  By publicly venerating Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, they make 
space for their hero in the present.  Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn thus becomes a symbol through which 
these immigrants resurrect the ghost of the now-defunct Republic of Vietnam, to make sense of 
their own lives as displaced immigrants and to demand recognition for their veterans, in order to 
gain material compensation for their losses.  In Chapter Four, I highlight the narratives of 
Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s family members, many of whom live in Việt Nam and thus cannot 
publicly commemorate their loved one.  I read their domestic commemoration ceremonies as 
subversive practices and argue that they re-conceptualize “heroism,” focusing on Colonel Hồ 
Ngọc Cẩn’s virtues and domestic contributions in addition to his military victories.  Their stories 
are stories that exist solely in the space of memory; I wanted to archive them here, before they 
fade away. 
 My investment in Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn is personal: he is my grand-uncle, I desired to 
know more him, and I wanted to give my family a space to share their memories and learn more 
about him in the process.  But my investment is also political: to construct counternarratives of 
the past is to image different futures for the present.  Futures that recognize the agency and valor 
of displaced peoples—such as South Vietnamese veterans—and that challenge state-sponsored 
dichotomies—breaking down constructions of “hero” and “traitor,” “us” versus “them.”  In the 
late twentieth century, the world was divided between Democracy and Communism; today, the 
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line is drawn between Freedom and Terrorism.  To recognize that alternative constructions 
existed in the past is to search for erased but resistant narratives in the present.  
 Is this the end or is this the beginning?  Where does the past end and the future begin?  
There is still much work to be done.  The sharing of memories and the archiving of cultural 
memory practices does not guarantee the construction of a counternarrative; rather, it is the 
transfer of memories—of ghosts—that guarantees their life.  These interviewees have transferred 
their memories to me, and I have archived them here; but for this work to resonate in the future, 
the transfer cannot end with me.   
 Furthermore, in order to develop the field of history and cultural memory studies, I 
suggest further theorization of the relationships between history, memory, diaspora, and 
statelessness.  How do diasporic peoples—especially those who trace their “origin” to a state that 
now longer exists—articulate and organize “the past?”  If narrations of history are driven by state 
imperatives, then how does one organize or articulate the past when a state no longer exists?  Are 
archives the purview of the state, and if so, how do stateless peoples archive their memories?  In 
order to answer these questions, I suggest comparing the cultural memory practices of South 
Vietnamese individuals with other stateless immigrant peoples, such as the Palestinian or 
Hmong.    
 History is a construction and memory is a process.  I am grateful to all the individuals 
who helped in the construction and process of this thesis, in this careful study of Colonel Hồ 
Ngọc Cẩn.  Perhaps most importantly I thank my grand-uncle, Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, for 
haunting me, for inspiring me, for reaching out of the past to touch me in the present.  It is 
because of him that I began to even ask and answer these questions. 
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